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Preface 
I have been working as a professional planner, in a local Palestinian consulting firm, in the 
West Bank / Palestine, since the year 1999. Since that date and for more than 10 years now, I 
have been involved in the preparation of a large number of master plans for Palestinian 
communities as part of my daily job tasks.  
A Palestinian independent state has been a Palestinian demand, and dream, since the 
beginnings of the Palestinian-Israeli struggle. When the Palestinian National Authority was first 
founded, in 1993, it adopted this demand as an essential part of the PNA's vision. With that 
stated, during my work experience I have noticed that the bulk of the planning projects do not 
take into consideration the surrounding planning environment. On the contrary, plans were only 
created inside Israeli-imposed boundaries. The Israeli-imposed boundaries, most of the time, 
used to cover only the built-up area. In a few cases these boundaries allowed for modest urban 
growth.  
On the other hand, the Israeli Authorities––specifically the Israeli Civil Administration 
(ICA)––had plans of their own for the areas outside of the built-up environment of cities and 
villages. Israeli authorities were building highways, water and power infrastructure, and of 
course, Jewish illegal settlements in these areas. It was clear to me that Israeli plans greatly 
contradict the Palestinian vision of a contiguous state. This planning reality raised some 
questions, for me at least: what are we doing as Palestinian planners to contribute to the 
Palestinian vision of an independent, contiguous state? Were we, by planning only where Israeli 
officials allow us to plan, unconsciously contributing to the Israeli plans? Are there any 
Palestinian actions or plans, on the official or private levels, that aim at challenging Israeli ones?  
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 In this research I examine the Palestinian planning process in an attempt to spot 
Palestinian planning actions that might be counter-acting Israeli ones. This research will present 
recommendations that can enhance the Palestinian counter planning performance of the 
Palestinian planning institutions.  
 v 
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Abstract 
 
In the beginning of the 2000s, Israeli policies in the West Bank shifted from policies of 
control to policies of separation, which in turn led to the Transformation of West Bank 
communities into isolated urban islands. Current plans prepared for Palestinian localities by 
Palestinian planning institutions most often address these isolated islands without taking into 
account the Israeli-controlled areas surrounding these localities. Palestinians envision the entire 
West Bank as a contiguous area that will eventually form part of the Palestinian national state. 
However, most Palestinian plans take the boundaries imposed by Israel as a given and plan only 
for areas within the Israeli-controlled areas.  
This dissertation is about the Palestinian planning processes in the West Bank. It makes an 
attempt to assess whether these processes are or could counteract Israeli policies of separation. 
Upon extensive research, it was found that Palestinian planning institutions have a very limited 
impact in countering Israeli plans. The only counter-planning activity that can be observed is the 
Palestinian National Authority’s latest orientation to plan in Palestinian areas classified as Area 
C (found in areas under complete Israeli Control). The aforementioned lack of counter-planning 
activities can be attributed to the inefficiency of a legal framework, lack of vision, lack of 
coordination, and deficiencies within Palestinian planning institutions. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Counter Planning, Palestine, West Bank, Conflict, Occupation, Planning Under 
Conflict, Power, Planning Against Main Power, Ramallah, Rawabi, Fasayil.
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Introduction 
The West Bank and Gaza Strip are Palestinian lands that were militarily occupied by Israel 
in 1967 after the Six Day War with the Arab countries. The West Bank and Gaza Strip remained 
under direct Israeli Military occupation until the year 1995, when the Palestinian National 
Authority (PNA) was formed.1 In accordance with this agreement, land in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip were divided into three categories: A, B and C. The PNA has complete control and 
administrative authority over Area A and only administrative authority over Area B. Socio-
economic institutions, such as education, health and municipal services, including urban 
planning, are administered by the PNA in Areas A and B. The PNA has law-enforcement 
institutions, such as police forces, in Area A only. Total control and administration remains in 
the hands of Israel regarding Area C. However, Area C includes the vast majority of Palestinian 
lands in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (about 60%) (ARIJ 2011, OCHA–OPT 2011, PASSIA 
2011). Moreover, Areas A and B are isolated islands which reside within an Israeli controlled 
Area C, as shown in Figure 1.  
Currently in Palestine, one of the greatest challenges facing planning is that Palestinian 
localities are isolated from one another in the form of islands. This isolation is a result of Israeli 
policies which began in 2001, when the Israeli government began constructing a separation wall. 
Other Israeli acts of isolation include the construction and expansion of illegal Israeli 
settlements,2 Israeli bypass roads and military checkpoints on the entrances of many  Palestinian 
                                                 
1 The PNA was formed as a result of the signing of the Oslo Accords in September 1993 between The 
Palestinian Liberation Organization and Israel under the umbrella of the United States, the Russian Federation and 
the European Union.  
2 The United Nations considers all Israeli settlements built in the Palestinian, and Arab, territories that were 
occupied by Israel in 1967, including Jerusalem, in conflict with the Fourth Geneva Convention, and therefore  
illegal. The United Nations Security Council has repeatedly asked Israel to stop building such settlements and 
declared that these settlements "have no legal validity." UN resolutions concerning Israeli settlements in Palestine 
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communities.  Many scholars argue that by the year 2001, Israeli policies shifted from a focus on 
control and domination to that of isolation and separation (Bauer 2012, Chomsky 2010, Gordon 
2008, Halper 2008).  
On the other hand, planners within many of the Palestinian Local Government Units; 
Municipalities or local councils, are proposing master plans for Palestinian localities that barely 
take into account the surrounding urban environment. These plans mostly fail to take into 
account area C. Official Palestinian planning institutions, such as the Regional Planning 
Committees and the Higher Council on Planning, are supposed to be responsible for coordinating 
the planning process between various planning regions both horizontally and vertically; 
Horizontally between multiple plans for the same area and vertically between different planning 
levels. In this research I have examined the Palestinian planning process on the regional and 
national levels to assess if this planning process is contributing to the Palestinian vision of a 
contiguous national state, and thus is counter-acting Israeli policies of separation. At the end of 
this research, in Chapter 8, recommendations will be presented on actions that might enhance the 
counter-acting of Palestinian planning process to Israeli policies of separation.  
                                                                                                                                                             
are: Resolution 446 (1997), Resolution 452 (1997), Resolution 465 (1980), Resolution 471 (1980) and Resolution 
476 (1980), See Appendix 2. 
  
Figure 1: Palestinian Planning 
  
3 
Areas 
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1 Chapter 1: Historical Background 
1.1 Historical Background and Land Tenure in Palestine 
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, Palestine has historically transitioned through 
several political regimes which have had a tremendous impact on its urban development. 
Palestine was under the Ottoman Empire’s rule since the beginning of the fourteenth century for 
more than 600 years, until 1923. In November 1917 the United Kingdom's Foreign Secretary, 
Arthur James Balfour, wrote a letter to Baron Rothschild, the leader of the British Jewish 
community, in which he promised that the Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland would 
establish a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine. This letter was to become 
infamously known as "the Balfour Declaration" (dated on 2 November 1917). After the collapse 
of the Ottoman Empire in 1923, Palestine came under the British Mandate3 until the 1948 War 
that broke out between the Palestinians and a coalition of Arab countries and the Haganah 
Zionist groups.4 In 1947, the United Nations' Security Council issued Resolution 181 that 
partitioned the area of the British mandate into two states—one for Arabs and the other for Jews 
(Figure 2).   
The 1948 War resulted in the foundation of the state of Israel on approximately 80% of 
"Historic Palestine".5 However, Israel ended up controlling a far larger area than that dictated in 
the UN Resolution 181. At the end of this war only the West Bank and Gaza Strip were left 
                                                 
3 After the WWII, Britain and France convinced the new League of Nations (precursor to the United Nations), 
in which they were the dominant powers, to grant them quasi-colonial authority over former Ottoman Empire 
territories. The British and French regimes were known as mandates. Britain obtained a mandate over the areas 
which now comprise Israel, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Jordan and Egypt. France obtained a mandate over Syria, 
Lebanon, and western North African areas. 
4 The Hebrew word haganah translates to "Defense"." The Haganah was a Zionist military organization that 
acted in Palestine from 1920 to 1948. Organized to combat the revolts of Palestinian Arabs against the Jewish 
colonization of Palestine. It was outlawed by the British Mandatory authorities (Encyclopædia Britannica Online 
2014). 
5 I refer to the area between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River which was known before 1948 as 
Palestine. 
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Figure 2: Partitioning of Palestine 
outside Israeli controlled areas. Thereafter, the West Bank was placed under Jordanian rule and 
the Gaza Strip under Egyptian control. June 1948 marked the date for the establishment of the 
state of Israel and for the Palestinians it marked what came to be known as the "Nakbeh" or 
"Catastrophe." In 1967 a second war broke out between Arab countries and Israel. Israel won 
again and the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Sinai Desert of Egypt were militarily occupied. Sinai 
returned to the Egyptian rule as a result of another Arab-Israeli war in 1973, while the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip remained under the Israeli occupation.  In 1993 after the Oslo Interim 
Agreement was signed between Israel and the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization, the 
Palestinian National Authority (PNA) was 
established and began limited governance over 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1995.   
Israeli governments took tremendous 
advantage of the land tenure and ownership 
regulations that originated from the laws of the 
Ottoman Empire. During the late nineteenth 
century, the Ottoman Empire suffered from 
difficult economic and social conditions. One of 
the main concerns of the Ottoman Empire at that 
time was to raise money through the collection 
of taxes. It was not until the late nineteenth 
century that Ottoman law required registration 
of land ownership. However, land owners rarely 
 6 
 
complied with this law, probably because of the fact that one of the major reasons for requiring 
land owners to register their land ownership was to enforce taxes. In many cases, citizens 
(usually farmers) were assigned the right to cultivate these lands only as a way to collect taxes 
from them. Land plots which were not cultivated for periods which exceeded 10 years were 
considered to be dead "Moat" lands and would be transferred to state (government) control. 
These Ottoman land tenure and registration policies left most of the Palestinian lands as state-
owned or Miri lands (Tamim 1995, Tannous 1951). During the British period most of the 
Palestinian lands remained under state control. The main contribution of the British mandate was 
the accurate cadastral survey of Palestine. This survey drew accurate boundaries of villages and 
it drew the boundaries of Palestine (Woods, Fles and Krygier 2010). It should be duly noted that 
this survey, although accurate, did not have anything to do with individual land parcels, or parcel 
ownership issues. The survey produced an accurate cartography of the boundaries and physical 
features on the ground of Palestine. Hence as a result of this survey, fixed concrete survey 
benchmarks that were founded deep into the ground were constructed. These benchmarks still 
exist and are used by surveyors to this day. So even though the British had conducted an accurate 
survey of Palestine, they did not attempt to document the ownership of lands. Furthermore, and 
despite the fact that residents actually owned, cultivated, or lived on this land, most of the 
Palestinian lands remained registered as Miri (State-owned) lands. Thus, Woods et al. (2010) and 
Gavish (2005) argue that this survey was carried out in response to the demands of the Zionist 
movement at that time, and to facilitate the occupation of Palestine. It was a deliberate step to 
draw specific boundaries for the land that would contain the Israeli state in the future. The 
Zionist movement needed an accurate map for the lands on which it was to establish the Israeli 
State and that was the exact product of this survey.  
 7 
 
The British Mandate for Palestine ended with the 1948 war. Afterwards the West Bank was 
transferred to Jordanian control. Since Jordan additionally fell under the British Mandate all 
previously mentioned land ordinances by the British authorities were also applicable in Jordan.  
Land ownership registration remained voluntary, and land categories remained almost the same. 
Very few parcels of land were actually registered. Most of the Palestinian lands remained under 
the Miri category (Tamim 1995). Miri originates from the Turkish language and means, "state 
owned."  
Soon after the West Bank and Gaza Strip fell under the Israeli occupation in 1967, the 
military authorities issued an order forbidding any land transactions without a written permit 
(Benvinisty, Abu-Zayed and Rubinstein 1986). This military order implied that land ownership 
registration had become practically compulsory since that date. Any ownership change of lands 
had to be approved by the Israel military authorities. As a result, most of the land in the West 
Bank remained unregistered, and lands remained under state-owned (Miri) status. After the 
occupation in 1967, Israel became the governing entity and assumed control over all state-owned 
(Miri) lands. Israel took advantage of this situation to easily confiscate Palestinian lands for the 
benefit of Jewish illegal settlements (Woods, Fles and Krygier 2010). 
In 1980, the Israeli government adopted a new "legal" approach that revived the Ottoman 
law, and manipulated it to the benefit of the occupation's own interest. This approach declared 
uncultivated, unregistered land as state land. Under this declaration, all Mewat6 lands and Miri 
lands which were not cultivated for 10 years or more, were to become state lands and liable to be 
confiscated at any time (Benvinisty, Abu-Zayed and Rubinstein 1986). Shelav (2012) through 
B'Tselem also discusses how Israel manipulated Ottoman land regulations to declare much of the 
West Bank lands as State lands in order to try to legitimize the process of building illegal Israeli 
                                                 
6 Mewat land is an Ottoman term that translates into "dead land." It refers to un-built, uncultivated land. 
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settlements upon them. 7 Figure 3 shows the spatial distribution of Illegal Israeli settlements 
against Israeli-declared state lands in the Ramallah area. It is very clear how all state-declared 
lands have been used to build Illegal Israeli settlements. Shelav (2012) provides other examples 
comparing Israeli-declared state lands against Israeli built illeagal settlements in other parts of 
the West bank, such as in Salfit area, and discusses that this represents a general Israeli policy in 
the West Bank since the Israeli occupation in 1967.   Israel used the previous Ottoman laws and 
regulations, which were originally issued for taxation purposes, to control more Palestinian lands 
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Moreover, Israel enforced many limitations on the mobility of 
Palestinians, which made many agricultural lands extremely hard to reach and thus remain un-
cultivated, and hence easy to be confiscated. As a result, many Illegal Israeli settlements have 
been built on parts of these Israeli controlled lands, as it was easy for Israel to do so under the 
Ottoman regulations. Vast areas of these lands also remained empty, as it was extremely hard to 
obtain building permits from the Israeli Military Government units which were authorized by the 
Israeli state to deal with the urbanization of these areas. The Israeli Military Government units 
had the sole authority to issue building permits, or to develop infrastructure in these areas. This 
was also a main reason why much of the land remained uncultivated.  
When the PNA was formed in 1993, as a result of the Oslo Accords signed between Israel 
and the Palestinian Liberation Organization under international patronage, most of the 
Palestinian lands in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were outside the jurisdictions boundaries of 
Palestinian cities and villages. These lands remained un built because of the Israeli authorities' 
limitations on urban growth since the year 1967. As a result of the Oslo Accords authority over 
these lands remained in the hands of Israel, in what was regulated to be Area C. Area C 
                                                 
7 B'Tselem is an Israeli human rights organization. 
  
comprises more than 60% of the West Bank. The PNA does not have the authority to administer 
or perform urban planning for this area (
Figure 3: Declared State-lands 
(Shelav 2012) 
The PNA is currently facing significant problems with 
with the fact that most of the land in the 
have any clearly defined parcel boundaries. The registration of 
significant financial resources. O
(Abdulhadi 1990, Coon 1992). A
the survey and registration of unregistered West Bank
between owners are issues that those working on the project
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Figure 4). 
verses Illegal Israeli settlements in Ramallah area.
land registration issues
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land in the West Bank requires
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 Norwegian-funded project in the West Bank has 
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Land registration and ownership issues 
consequences, as obstacles to the Palestinian planning
current Illegal Israeli settlements
land tenure policies Israeli planners have adopted on the basis of
regulations. By looking at planning as an act of power 
interpreted that land tenure regulations have contributed significantly to the planning power of 
the Israeli state; facilitating land occupation
Palestinian’s power to plan. Thus, i
hindered by land registration and ownership issues that still remain an obstacle. 
land registration and how it has affected planning in Palestine is discussed in more detail in the 
Ramallah case study later on in this dissertation. 
Figure 4: A Timeframe of Israel’s 
10 
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t can be argued that the PNA’s capabilities of planning are 
The history of 
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1.2 Research Setting  
As stated earlier, the West Bank and Gaza Strip / Palestine and in accordance with 
international law and U.N. Security Council resolutions,8 have been residing under Israeli 
military occupation since the year 1967. Even in Area A lands, where the PNA is supposed to 
have complete security authority, these area are subject to frequent Israeli military actions 
including arrests and assassinations of what Israeli officials call "wanted" activists. This research 
will concentrate mainly on the West Bank. Despite the fact that the Gaza Strip is geographically 
separated from the West Bank and is currently under different political rule, these facts should 
not be enough reasons for Gaza to be excluded from this research. I believe that the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip should be dealt with as one political unit.  However, the main reason why the 
Gaza Strip is excluded from this research is because all Israeli settlers were evacuated from it in 
2005. Thus, the Palestinians have full planning authority there. The classification of lands into 
categories A, B and C do not apply there since the Israeli unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza 
Strip in 2005. As a result Israeli policies of separation do not apply there anymore and isolated 
planning islands are nonexistent. Because Israeli policies of separation are a major component of 
this dissertation, I have decided not to include any cases from the Gaza Strip. The planning 
process in the Gaza Strip should be researched in the future in a separate prospect. The literature 
on planning in the Gaza Strip is very limited at this time.  
The West Bank has an area of 5,640 square kilometers (2,270 square miles) and a 
population of approximately 2.5 million, with most people  (more than 90%)  living in cities and 
                                                 
8 There are U.N. Security Council resolutions concerning the Palestinian / Israeli conflict, the most significant 
being: 
• Resolution 242 (November 22, 1967) which "calls upon Israel to reciprocate by withdrawing its 
forces from land claimed by other parties during the 1967 war." See Appendix 2. 
• Resolution 267 (July 3, 1968) which "'censures' Israel for administrative acts to change the status of 
Jerusalem." See Appendix 2. 
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villages (PCBS 2010). These cities and villages have an approximate annual population growth 
ratio of 2.6 % (PCBS 2010).  
1.2.1 The Formation of the Palestinian National Authority and Land Categories in 
the West Bank. 
The PNA was formed as a result of Oslo Accords signed between the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel under the umbrella of the United States, Russia and the 
European Union. The Oslo Accords was signed in Oslo, in 1993. Palestinian lands, two years 
later in 1995, according to the Oslo II agreement, were categorized into three types: A, B and C. 
Area C formed the majority, with a ratio of about 74% of the lands. This categorization was 
created as part of a 5-year interim period, during which Israel was to withdraw from lands 
converting B and C areas to A and B areas, respectively, until a permanent peace agreement 
between the Palestinians and Israel is reached by the end of the interim period. Unfortunately, 
this did not happen. Israel, since the signing of Oslo Accords, had made few minor 
redeployments of its forces. As a result Area C forms now about 60% of the West Bank area, see 
Table 1. 
Table 1: Areas of A, B and C lands (PASSIA 2011) 
Land Category Percentage of Area 
A 14% 
B 27% 
C 59% 
 
According to the Oslo accords, the Palestinian Authority has security and administrative 
control over category A lands and only administrative authorities in category B lands, which 
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includes urban planning authorities, within the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Category C lands are 
under full security and administrative control of Israel.  
Accordingly, the Palestinian institutions have the authority to plan within areas A and B 
(about 40% of the area of the West Bank) only, while the authority to plan in Area C (About 
60% of the area of the West Bank) is solely controlled by Israel. However, it is not just the area 
size that is significant here. Areas A and B consist of geographically discreet areas within a 
context of Area C, see Figure 1. The PNA is only permitted to plan inside these isolated islands, 
and has no control over the planning context in which these isolated islands are located. 
The urban planning environment in the West Bank is complicated due to the military 
occupation. Urban discontinuity and lack of authority on the ground contribute to this 
complexity. The numerous physical factors involved within the planning process include Illegal 
Israeli settlements, Israeli bypass roads9 and the limited authority of the PNA. This research will 
examine how the Palestinian planning process in the West Bank responds to the Israeli planning 
themes of Area C and to the Palestinian vision of an independent, integrated and geographically 
connected state. 
1.3 Israeli policies 
Ever since the occupation occurred in 1967, Israeli policies in the West Bank have aimed to 
enhance the control and superiority of the Israeli military power (Abu-Ayyash 1976, Abu 
Gharbiyyeh 2001, Bollens 2000, Chomsky 1983, Coon 1992, Gordon 2008, Makdisi 2008, 
Reshmawi 1987). However, many scholars suggest that these policies have shifted from the 
                                                 
9 Bypass roads are roads that have been constructed according to Oslo Interim Agreement to connect Israeli 
illegal settlements and at the same time bypass Palestinian communities. These roads are fully controlled by the 
Israeli Army and solely used by Israeli settlers. Palestinians are forbidden from driving on these roads. These roads 
form a network that contributes, along with the separation wall and the illegal settlements themselves, to the Israeli 
policies of separation. 
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beginning of the 2000’s towards policies of separation and insulation (Bauer 2012, Chomsky 
2010, Gordon 2008, Halper 2008). In the following section I discuss scholarly literature on 
Israeli policies in the West Bank. 
1.3.1 Policies of Control 
Coon (1992) discusses how prohibiting Palestinians from planning was a tool used by 
Israel to enforce its sovereignty over Palestinian areas in the West Bank and Gaza Strip since 
they were occupied in 1967 to the early 1990s. Coon (1992) argues that Israeli policies were 
aimed at controlling the maximum area of land with the least number of Palestinian residents. 
Israel simply wanted the land in order to build expand their territory by  building illegal Jewish 
settlements and confiscating resources, while at the same time having to deal with the least 
number of Palestinians. Bollens ( 2000: 65-101) similarly argues, when discussing Israeli 
policies in Jerusalem, that Israeli planners have used many tools to enhance Israeli control over 
the city.10  These tools include expropriation of land, restriction of Palestinian construction 
rights, use of roads which restrict and fragment Palestinian communities, and the intentional 
absence of plans for Arab areas that would be needed for infrastructure provision and community 
development. In essence, Israeli policies since the beginning of their occupation in 1967 and 
until the early 2000s, aimed to control Palestinian land.  
Eyal Weizman (2007), an Israeli planner and a professor at the University of London, 
argues that the main purpose of building Israeli settlements in the West Bank (usually on top of 
hills) is primarily for them to act as points of power to support the military occupation. These 
settlements and their transportation networks form lines that are then expanded into areas of 
power and control. Nevertheless, Weizman’s (2007) main argument remains that Israeli policies 
                                                 
10 The eastern part of Jerusalem City was occupied in 1967 with the rest of the West Bank, and thus has the 
same legal status as an occupied territory, despite the fact that Israel considers it a part of its territory. 
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in the West Bank and Gaza Strip act to enhance Israeli control over the occupied Palestinian 
lands. The same is also discussed by other scholars (Abu-Ayyash 1976, Abu Gharbiyyeh 2001, 
Chomsky 1983, Gordon 2008, Makdisi 2008, Reshmawi 1987). 
Makdisi (2008) adds another objective to current Israeli policies in the West Bank. He 
argues that, in addition to enhancing Israeli control over the occupied Palestinian lands, Israeli 
policies in the West Bank aim to transfer the local population out of the Palestinian territories to 
other parts of the world. He simply asserts that these policies are making Palestinians’ lives more 
difficult by imposing restrictions on construction, mobility, and economic resources. Thus, they 
are forcing Palestinians who have the means to emigrate. 
1.3.2 Policies of Separation 
Neve Gordon (2008), an Israeli professor of politics at Ben-Gurion University, argues that 
the underlying structure of Israel’s occupation has fundamentally shifted from the colonization 
principle, by which Israel attempted to administer and control the lives of Palestinians, to the 
separation principle, by which Israel abandoned efforts to administer the lives of the indigenous 
population while still maintaining its control over the land. Gordon continues by stating that 
Israel is attempting to impose a permanent spatial arrangement that will enable it to extend its 
control over the area of occupied lands, while abandoning Palestinians to small self-governing 
enclaves completely surrounded by Israeli controlled areas.  
From a similar point of view, Halper (2008) argues that the current Israeli strategy is one of 
"warehousing." Israel is attempting to "warehouse" its "surplus" Palestinian population, in the 
West Bank, by enclosing it within closed enclaves and abandoning any political efforts to resolve 
the conflict. Halper argues that this might explain why Israel is unconcerned about entering into 
a genuine peace process or resolving its conflict with the Palestinians:  
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By warehousing them it has the best of both worlds: complete freedom to expand its 
settlements and control without ever having to compromise, as a political solution would 
require (Halper 2008 : 1). 
These policies of separation have been evident on the ground where Illegal Israeli 
settlements, Israeli-controlled road networks and the separation wall are dividing Palestinian 
cities and villages into separate islands, see Figure 1.  
Yehuda Bauer (2012) argues that the principle of separation is a Zionist necessity. Bauer 
signed a document, along with other Israeli figures, calling for a Palestinian state to exist within 
the pre-1967 borders (Bauer 2012). The document states that, from a Zionist point of view, it is 
an Israeli interest not to include a significant number of non-Jews (Palestinians) within its 
borders. According to Bauer (2012), this is the only way Israel can preserve its Jewish identity 
and at the same time be able to survive as a democratic state. Bauer states that this is the reason 
why he signed that document calling for a Palestinian State. However, if this is the only reason to 
give the Palestinians a state, then why give it to them in accordance to the pre-1967 borders? 
According to Chomsky (2010), this is the exact position of the current Israeli government and its 
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. This is leading Israel to a policy of "Bantustans."11 Israel is 
planning to abandon Palestinians in these isolated ghettoes, permitting them to call these 
disconnected territories a state. Chomsky (2010) argues that Palestinians could name these 
ghettos "fried chicken" meaning that Palestinians can call them what they want, but isolated 
"Bantustans" are what they will wind up with, according to Israeli policies. 
Considering the points above, it can be argued that planning Palestinian localities as 
isolated units—while not taking into account their surroundings nor the ability to form 
continuous and integrated urban environments—contributes to the Israeli policies of separation. 
                                                 
11 A "Bantustan" is a territory that was designated for black inhabitants of South Africa and South West 
Africa (now Namibia), as part of the policy of apartheid. 
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The PNA has a planning body that is represented in Palestinian planning institutions. These 
institutions are responsible for urban, regional, and land-use planning in Palestine. The 
Palestinian's government plan illustrates a vision of an independent contiguous Palestinian state 
within the pre-1967 borders by the year 2011. The following sections will shed light on the 
Palestinian planning process and vision. 
1.4 Planning Process in Palestine 
Urban planning in Palestine is usually initiated by Local Government Units, which are 
either municipalities or local village councils. Plans are then developed by private planning firms 
in coordination with the local planning units. Once an agreement is reached between a planning 
firm and the local planning unit, the plan is submitted by the municipality or local council to the 
regional planning committee in order to obtain the necessary approvals.  
Each "Governorate"12 has a regional planning committee that is headed by the Director of 
the Planning Department in the regional office of the Ministry of Local Government (MOLG) in 
that particular governorate. Members of this committee are deputies from regional offices of the 
Ministries of Planning, Public Works, Transportation, National Economy, Labor, Environment, 
Tourism and Archeology and Education. Also on these committees are representatives from the 
Engineers Association. The committee members study the plan and discuss it with local 
government unit officials. The plan is studied by each ministry within the governorate separately, 
approved by their technical teams, and approved accordingly by that specific ministry’s 
representative from within the committee. It must be duly noted that the MOLG is the entity 
responsible for reviewing and approving major elements of plans, such as land-use zoning and 
the relationship of local plans to surrounding cities and villages.  
                                                 
12 A "governorate" is a Palestinian administrative geographic division that includes a main city and its sub 
cities and villages. The West Bank is divided into 11 governorates. 
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Once the regional planning committee approves the scheme, it is then advertised in the 
official newspaper for a period of two months. The plan is also made available in the 
municipality offices and the regional department office of the MOLG for the local citizens to 
review. Any individual unable to reach the municipality or local council for any reason would be 
able to view the plan in the MOLG’s regional offices. Local citizens are then given the right to 
appeal. During the two-month review period a large number of appeals are usually submitted to 
the MOLG. Appeals are studied first by the planning consultant who prepared the plan and then 
by the local government unit. Once recommendations are made, the MOLG may modify, accept, 
or reject these recommendations. 
The plan is then approved by the Regional Planning Committee (after appeals have been 
addressed) and submitted to The Palestinian Higher Council on Planning, a national-level 
planning institution. The Palestinian Higher Council on Planning is located in Ramallah and is a 
centralized counterpart to the regional planning committees. It consists of  Deputy Ministers 
from the same ministries that form the Regional Planning Committee and is headed by the 
Minister of Local Government. The plan is reviewed by the central office of the MOLG and 
approved by the rest of the ministries included within the Higher Council on Planning. The 
Palestinian Higher Council on Planning may accept, request modifications, or reject the plan. If 
accepted, the urban plan is then advertised in the official newspaper for 15 days before 
implementation. Afterwards the plan becomes law and the municipalities are obligated to follow 
it. As part of my research I have examined the criteria which the regional and higher planning 
committees use to approve urban plans, how these criteria deal with separate Israeli plans, and 
how they contribute to a Palestinian comprehensive planning vision. Figure 5 provides a 
graphical depiction of the Palestinian planning process. 
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1.5 Palestinian Statehood and the Palestinian Vision 
Establishing an independent state has always been a national Palestinian goal since the British 
mandate era and during the early stages of the Palestinian / Israeli conflict in the 1930s. When 
the Palestinian Liberation Organization was formed in 1965, it announced two major objectives 
it would fight to achieve: the right to self-determination and the right of return for Palestinians 
who were expelled from their lands by Israel as a result of the 1948 war. They believed that the 
way of accomplishing self-determination was through the establishment of an independent 
Palestinian state. Since its formation in 1993, one of the PNA's major goals has been the 
establishment of an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders. Currently, the 
formation of an independent Palestinian state is at the core of all peace negotiations between the 
Palestinians and Israel. It can be argued that establishing an independent Palestinian state has 
been a Palestinian demand and dream since the beginning of the twentieth century. 
 
Currently, the main document that represents the PNA’s future planning vision is the 
Palestinian National Plan (Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development 2009). The 
National Plan builds upon the Palestinian Government’s Reform and Development Plan 
(Palestinian National Authority 2006). The Reform and Development Plan (Palestinian National 
Authority 2006: 4) defines the Palestinian vision as the establishment of a viable, geographically 
contiguous, independent state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Reform and Development 
Plan is simply the Palestinian Government’s 2006 political program, that is a set of policies 
geared toward reforming Palestinian institutions ahead of the envisioned Palestinian independent 
state. The Palestinian National Plan (Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development 
2009) takes the Reform and Development Plan one step further. It advances a concept of 
  
"sectorial development," meaning
governance sectors.  
 
Figure 
20 
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The Palestinian National Plan (Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development 
2009: 6-11) and the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (Palestinian National Authority 
2006: 27-35) provide a methodology for achieving the Palestinian vision of an independent state. 
This methodology can be summarized as developing civil society institutions or sectors, as these 
plans refer to them, in order to be able to handle the duties pertaining to an independent 
Palestinian state. The PNA is trying to prove to the world that its institutions have the ability to 
run a state.  
Unfortunately, Palestinian national plans do not mention mechanisms for responding to or 
resisting Israeli policies of occupation and separation. Instead, these plans are responding to 
political pressure by United States and European officials to implement a neoliberal capitalist 
agenda (Khalidi and Samour 2011). Ironically, this neoliberal policy is being practiced at a time 
when capitalist countries that have been politically stable for decades are facing one of the most 
significant crises of the last 50 years. Economists Raja Khalidi and Sobhi Samour call for 
Palestinian unilateral economic actions that are able to resist Israeli policies.  
Palestinian economic power . . . would have to be consolidated in a struggle to reclaim 
policy space and push back Israeli control through unilateral economic measures . . . 
(Khalidi and Samour 2011: 18)  
The same could be argued for the planning process as a whole. This research argues that 
the Palestinian planning process should act beyond what is permitted by the Israeli authorities. 
Israeli policies of control and separation come into direct conflict with the Palestinian vision of 
an independent, contiguous Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. Accordingly, 
Palestinian planning institutions should be ready to produce plans that are able to contradict or 
counteract Israeli occupation’s plans, and to contribute to the Palestinian vision of an 
independent contiguous State.  
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2 Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The West Bank is an area that is still under Israeli military occupation. Even Area A 
territories, where the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) is supposed to have jurisdiction over 
security, are still violated by the Israeli military forces on a daily basis arresting and sometimes 
killing what Israel call "wanted" Palestinians. Israeli authorities, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, are using planning as a tool to endorse the interests of the Israeli occupation 
(Abdelhamid 2006, Bollens 2000, Chomsky 2010, Gordon 2008). These interests, such as 
connecting illegal Israeli settlements or controlling resources, in most cases, run counter to local 
Palestinian needs. As a result, Israel is endorsing social injustice by implementing plans that do 
not respond to the needs of locals and that contradict their interests. Many scholars have 
discussed how planning can create injustice (Friedman 1969, Soja 2010) and how state policies 
can cause many social problems such as poverty and crime (Goode and Maskovsky 2001, 
Marger 2008).  
Planning can be used to promote unjust state policies. However, planning can also be used 
to defend social justice. The stream of thought on how planning can defend the interests of the 
least powerful against the plans of powerful groups is what this dissertation will refer to as the 
"concept of counter-planning." This chapter will discuss how social justice scholars have viewed 
the situation in Palestine and how various scholars view planning as a tool for endorsing or 
resisting social injustice. Finally, this chapter will discuss literature which pertains to planning in 
Palestine. The available literature is very limited, as planning in Palestine has not been discussed 
widely by planning scholars. 
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2.1 Social Justice 
Social justice generally refers to the idea of creating a society that is based on the principles 
of equality and solidarity, in which the values associated with human rights and human dignity 
are respected (Foucault 1995, Said 2004, Venkatesh 2000, Young 1990, Young 2005). Iris 
Young is among those scholars who have written on social justice. Young (2005 :11) recognizes 
the unjust social situation in Palestine. Building on her concept of social groups in previous work 
(1990), Young (2005) discusses three possible scenarios for the Palestinian Israeli conflict that 
can result in a socially just outcome. According to Young the first solution —— is a single 
secular state solution. An unbiased state would respond to everybody’s needs and recognize the 
rights of everyone and every group to freedom and development through a "politics of 
difference" approach. Everyone within the boundaries of this state would be considered citizens 
with equal rights and duties. There would be no occupation and no oppressed. Young (2005) 
suggests that this solution can act as an alternative to the two-state solution. Young argues that 
this solution is far from being implementable. Simply, it neither fulfills the Israeli nor the 
Palestinian political demands. Though some would argue that they think it might be the most 
suitable solution.  
The second solution that Young suggests is one based on to the "social groups" concept 
that she discusses in her book Justice and the Politics of Difference (1990). Young proposes a 
horizontal federation between existing different groups of different needs. Each group has the 
right of self-determination and has control over the area it occupies. These groups would interact 
with each other on a horizontal basis. There would be no central legitimizing force is needed. 
Young calls this solution the "self-determination non-dominance solution." She contrasts it to the 
two-state solution which she calls the "self-determination non-interference solution." Yet, the 
 24 
 
self-determination non-dominance solution does not answer many questions. For example it does 
not address how these horizontal relations would be monitored and maintained within a socially 
just context. How would people from either side react to it? It still requires further study and 
development if it is to be considered as a realistic, negotiable proposal.  Young states that: "The 
alternative I have imagined for Palestine/ Israel is not a political proposal. Political actors 
involved in the conflict themselves must develop those" (Young 2005: 9). Nonetheless, the 
second solution suggested by Young is not accepted by either party of the conflict. The third 
solution offered by Young is the political solution that is now being sought. It is the two-state 
solution: Palestine and Israel. Palestinians and Israel will be two separate, non-interacting, 
neighbor states. All political rounds of talks since the beginning of the peace process in 1991 
between the Palestinians and Israelis specifically revolve around this idea. Accordingly, Young 
discusses this solution and raises reasonable questions concerning it. How do we know each state 
would exercise social justice within its borders? Would there not still be oppressed groups? 
Would not a new Palestinian state be very weak, both economically and militarily, compared to 
its neighbor, Israel,? Accordingly, what would stop the powerful state from oppressing its 
weaker neighbor (Young 2005: 13)? The creation of a separate Palestinian state might do nothing 
but change the situation from one oppressed reality to another. The two-state scenario represents 
the official policy goal of the PNA. It forms the basis for the peace process that began with Israel 
in 1993. For this reason I have chosen to focus on it exclusively in this dissertation. 
2.1.1 Spatial Justice 
Planning can be a way to endorse social justice, or by default, social injustice. Friedman 
(1987: 40-48) establishes a link between thought and planning when he argues that the purpose 
of planning is to link knowledge to action in his book. Edward Soja (2010) establishes a similar 
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connection between social justice and planning by introducing his concept of spatial justice. Soja 
discusses how the exogenous geographies and political organization of space can result in unjust 
policies within communities. Edward Said (2004: 31-49) argues similarly that political 
organization of space can result in oppressive geographies.  
Harvey (1977: 96-116) elaborates on the concept of social justice from a Marxist point of 
view. He explains that although surplus value is rooted in the production process, it might be 
realized in a different place as well. For example, while surplus value might be produced in a 
factory in China, it might not be realized until the produced merchandise is sold in a department 
store in either Europe or the United States. Accordingly, Harvey states that, "urbanization is, in 
many ways, a field of realization of surplus value." (Harvey 2013: 1) Harvey points out that 
capital is very flexible. While the working class might think they have achieved some of their 
rights in the production phase, such as better wages or living conditions, they would probably be 
paying these privileges back to the bourgeoisie in their day-to-day interactions with the urban 
environment, through extra taxes, bills, or more expensive fees.  Harvey argues that urban spatial 
policies can be imposed by the elite to embrace spatial injustice.  
Although Soja (2010) finds that spatial injustice does exist in many cities of the world, he 
stresses that Israeli unjust policies are extreme in Palestine, resulting in greater oppression and 
injustice. Noam Chomsky, among others, in an interview with Christopher Lee (2004) links 
Israeli control of the West Bank and Gaza to the South African government's policy of 
Apartheid. Soja (2010) claims that Israeli policies are similar to the ones that were practiced by 
the Apartheid Regime in South Africa, only more technologically advanced:  
What we are seeing . . . is another form of spatial colonization . . . not entirely different 
from the blunt institutional expressions of territorial power association with apartheid or 
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the more technologically advanced spatial tactics of the Israeli military in controlling 
occupied Palestine (2010: 43). 
Therefore, Israeli plans and actions in the West Bank are endorsing social injustice. As 
discussed previously, Palestinian communities are daily facing many difficulties and social 
problems due to the measures imposed by Israeli authorities on the ground. These measures are 
mainly meant to facilitate the lives of Israeli residents in Illegal Israeli settlements. Israelis 
bypass roads, which in many cases Palestinians are forbidden from using by military orders, 
connect Israeli settlements and divide Palestinian communities into isolated islands. The 
separation wall and hundreds of military check points hinder the ability of Palestinian citizens to 
move freely and have access to services such as universities and hospitals. Therefore, It is clear 
that Israeli policies are the main reasons for many social and economic problems that local 
Palestinians encounter. 
Israeli planners were not the first to use urban planning as a tool of spatial segregation and 
social injustice. Urban planning was used as a tool for racial segregation in the United States 
during at least the first half of the twentieth century (Thomas and Ritzdorf 1997). According to 
Thomas and Ritzdorf, zoning was used in the United States by the dominant white elite to keep 
the undesired population of African Americans and new immigrants away from white 
neighborhoods (1997: 23-58). Although racial zonning was found to be unconstitutional by more 
than one U.S. court ruling in the 1930s, "racially informed" urban and master plans were used 
instead of racial zonning plans and continued to be approved in the 1930s. Many cities in the 
United States remain divided to this day along racial lines, as a result of the use of urban 
planning as a tool of racial segregation. The dominance of an elite group (in this example, the 
white race) on the planning process has ultimately resulted in the oppression and the ignorance 
 27 
 
of the rights of other groups (mainly African Americans). Urban planning here was used as a 
powerfull tool to eforce spatial injustice. However, residents of divided cities in the United 
States, currently, share the same rights and duties, at least officially and by law. In contrast, this 
is not the case in the West Bank where all Israeli governmental policies are directed towards 
enhancing the Israeli occupation. These policies result in the oppression of the Palestinian 
indigeneous population. 
Venkatesh (2000) discusses in more detail how state and elite policies can cause social 
problems. He studies a case in Chicago City where the state policy was the reason for many of 
the social problems that African American citizens were facing. In this case the poor African 
Americans were blamed for these social problems under the pretense that these problems were a 
result of the salient cultural practices. Venkatesh (2000) carried out an ethnographic study of 
African-Americans in a public housing project, The Chicago’s Robert Taylor Homes, one of the 
United States’ largest housing projects that were being dismantled in 2000. Venkatesh's (2000) 
main argument was that the overcrowding and insulation from the surrounding environment of 
this community acted as a scaffold for these social problems. The city council was dominated by 
the mostly white middle and upper classes. Therefore, the city’s policies ignored the interests of 
the working class mostly African-Americans. As a result, the inhabitants of the Robert Taylor 
Homes were victims of unjust economic and discriminatory policies. For example, the cuts in the 
city budgets assigned for maintaining some of the project’s apartments left many of these 
apartments vacant and in turn acted as bases for gangs and drug dealers. The same can be argued 
concerning Israel’s actions in Palestine. Israeli government's policies in the West Bank are 
leaving Palestinians within isolated and area-limited localities that are  and will suffer 
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overcrowding due to the Palestinian high rate of population growth and in turn expose them to 
similar social problems. 
Goode and Maskovsky (2001) explain how unjust planning policies can cause many social 
problems, especially poverty. Goode and Maskovsky (2001) argue that poverty in society is not 
accidental. On the contrary, it is a product of the system. The poor are viewed by the elite from 
two perspectives: either as undeserving their society or victims of that society. Goode and 
Maskovsky (2001) point out that the poor are definitely victims of the unjust policies of 
authorities. Elite groups are actually trying to sustain poverty. In the case of military occupation, 
this is even a more extreme orientation. Goode and Maskovsky (2001) goes on to suggest that 
poverty is the result of three characteristics of the neoliberal system: economic, political and 
market.  In this manner, Goode is in harmony with Marger's (2008) notion that there is an elite 
group within the society that controls the decision making process. Inequality and social injustice 
are in the interest of this group. In other words, in order for the elite group to get richer and more 
powerful, other groups will become poorer and less powerful. Bearing in mind that this group 
dominates the decision-making process, policies within the system are produced in a way in 
which this inequality is sustained. Israeli policies in the West Bank can be viewed from a similar 
point of view. These policies are directed towards the benefits of one group, here the Israeli 
settlers and the occupation. These policies are not only ignoring the needs of the Palestinian 
population but they are also expropriating lands and resources which is resulting in an extreme 
oppression of the Palestinian citizens. 
Thus, inequality in a society can exist on more than one level. There are social, economic, 
and power inequalities. Marger (2008) differentiates between stratification and differentiation 
within the society. For him, differentiation is acceptable, because groups within the society are, 
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simply different from each other, such as doctors, teachers, and workers. However, stratification 
means the classification of these groups in a hierarchical manner, where some groups are 
advantaged over others. Once again, the situation in Palestine represents an extreme case of 
stratification; the occupier versus the occupied, the Israeli versus the Palestinian. Marger (2008) 
argues that this inequality between groups is in the interests of an elite group. Thus the elite 
groups would always work to sustain inequality. Occupation can be looked upon as an extreme 
case of elite group stratification. Marger goes further to suggest that this is a structured 
inequality. Governments and institutions act to sustain this inequality. If this was the case with 
legitimate governments and states, then a military occupation regime such as Israel can easily be 
considered much more extreme in its efforts to maintain inequality. There are many factors that 
act to support inequality, including culture, ideology and institutions (Marger 2008).  
That stated, it is debatable whether all Israeli government policy is based on the view of 
Palestinians as inferior to Israelis. Baumann (1996) views the discourse of identity as a reason 
for unjust policies towards certain groups in society. Baumann argues that there are two levels of 
identity discourse: the official or dominant and the local or demotic. State officials view the 
public from a different perspective than the one from which they view themselves. Looking at 
the situation in Palestine from this perspective, it can be argued that Israeli official government 
policies identify Palestinians as having a lower status, as less significant human beings. Thus, it 
is not important for them (Israeli officials) to look out for Palestinians' interests when planning in 
the West Bank, as long as their own interests are met. This falls in line with the concept of social 
stratification (Marger 2008). No matter how one looks at it, Palestinians are a powerless group of 
people who reside under a powerful military occupation that is attempting to accomplish its 
interests without taking into consideration the cost the Palestinians would have to pay. 
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Although unjust spatial policies can result in oppression, it can be argued that one major 
result of this oppression is an increased potential to resist it. However, resistance has many 
forms; theory and planning can be two of these forms. As Soja points out, "this battle over space 
and territory is not just about soldiers and guns but also about ideas and imagery" (Soja 2010: 
41). Building upon that, plans of oppression can be counteracted by other plans of social justice. 
Plans that bear in mind only the Israeli settlers' interests can be counteracted with those which 
endorse the local Palestinians' interests. Additionally, plans that endorse the occupation’s vision 
of control can be counteracted by plans that envision a contiguous Palestinian state. This way of 
looking at planning is very similar to the concept of counter-planning upon which this 
dissertation builds. 
2.2 Planning as an Act of Power 
The planning process in general and that pertaining to Palestine specifically can be viewed 
as a power struggle. In Palestine the struggle is between the power of the Israeli occupation and 
its plans of separation on one side and the power of the Palestinian planning institutions and their 
ability to respond to the Palestinian interest and vision of having an independent state on the 
other. Despite the fact that the Israeli side is apparently more powerful, it can still be argued that 
Palestinian planning institutions can exercise their right to plan, regardless of whether 
implementation is currently possible or not. Foucault (1995) suggests that although power is 
unevenly distributed, it cannot be owned by any one party. Power is distributed and exercised 
among groups. Although the powerful would try to exploit this power and apply it towards their 
own interests, Foucault would argue that less powerful groups always possess some sort of 
power which they can practice to defy the powerful. Gandhi realized this –– and  put it into 
practice –– long before Foucault, during his peaceful resistance of the British colonization of 
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India in the first half of the twentieth century.  In reference to prison, Foucault (1995) argues that 
knowledge is a major source of power. He explains how knowledge provided to the prison 
guards, by means of surveillance cameras and remote communication systems, privileges them 
over prisoners who do not have the same means. Therefore, knowledge possessed by those less 
powerful can be a privilege and can be a great source of power. Having a Palestinian planning 
vision for a certain area can provide Palestinian planning institutions with the ability to argue 
from a more rigid position for this vision and regardless of their ability to currently implement 
these plans. Moreover, planning visions for Area C can help create plans within PNA areas (Area 
A and Area B) that can  comprehensively result in the future towards a contiguously planned 
area. 
In Palestine, the Israeli occupation possesses the greater amount of power. It can be argued 
that Israeli official policies are directing that power towards the occupation's own interests 
regardless of the needs of the Palestinian public. From a similar point of view, Scott (1998) 
argues that in some cases the power of states is used to impose legislation that serves the 
interests of the state itself, not necessarily its people. States use the power they possess to 
organize society in a way by which they will be able to govern. However, many of the public’s 
interests could be ignored as they are not the main objective of these policies. This can be argued 
to be the case in Palestine, but in a more extreme fashion, as the interests of the occupation often 
contradict the needs of the public. Furthermore, Scott, amongst other scholars, argue that the 
state would probably serve the more powerful group in a society.  
2.2.1 The Public’s Role and Public Participation 
The power struggle between the Israeli state and Palestinian planners is evident, as Israel is 
trying to implement plans that totally contradict Palestinians’ interests. In light of the fact that the 
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Israeli state is are an occupation authority, it should be mentioned that a different type of power 
struggle also exists here. The Palestinian society, as in any other society, has different social 
layers. In order for the Palestinian planning process to be effective, it should address the interests 
of the less powerful groups at the same time it is addressing Israel’s separation policies. Public 
participation practices in the planning process are a way for the public’s needs to be heard and 
integrated into the planning process.  
The public sector usually has stronger connections to the elite and powerful, or at least 
these entities have the power to influence the public sector’s decisions and make their voices 
heard more than the less powerful (Davidoff 1965, Forester 1989, Hunter 1968, Scott 1998). 
Therefore, the public sector is more likely than other organized groups in society to ignore the 
interests and needs of the poor and the less powerful while attempting to respond to the elite. 
Socially embedded and community based organizations, by contrast, are more likely to represent 
the interests of the minorities and the less powerful. Urban scholars are divided on the proper 
role of the state. Scholars such as (Friedman 1987, Healey 2006) debate that the public sector 
should step back to grant social embedded institutions more room to operate as they can properly 
address the interests of the poor. Savitch and Kantor (2004), on the other hand, view public 
sector intervention as essential. However, does the public sector have the motivation or the will 
to serve the less powerful? This falls in line with the concepts of advocacy, equity and counter 
power planning (Davidoff 1965, Forester 1989, Krumholz 1982) by which the planner is viewed 
as a social activist who is expected to fight business-oriented and middle-class-visional proposals 
in order to try to provide a better life for the distressed and low-income minorities. 
One reason the powerful influence planning decisions in Palestine is related to what Logan 
and Molotch (1987) refer to as the "growth machine." Although most Area C lands in the West 
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Bank are considered miri lands, people still buy and sell land parcels. The only proof of 
ownership is the taxation financial record. These records are more of a representation of the right 
to use, according to the Ottoman law, than official ownership papers and are utilized for 
processing real property transactions due to the lack of a better proof of ownership. 
Land within planned areas in Palestine is very expensive compared to those in areas 
controlled by Israel. This is understandable taking into account the risks of confiscation or 
demolition to properties that reside within Israeli-controlled areas (Area C). Logan and Molotch 
(1987) expand on Molotch's earlier work (1976) which introduced the concept of the growth 
machine. Logan and Molotch (1987) explain that local governments are concerned with growth 
in large part because of the influence of the private sector. Real estate in specific are viewed by 
profit-driven investors as ways of generating profit. Land parcels have values and these values 
can increase by focusing growth and development in the areas where these lands are located. In 
Palestine this increase in value is much more significant. Logan andand Molotch (1987) argue 
that private investors attempt and successfully impact urban development policies in reference to 
these lands in order to maximize their profits. It is here where Logan and Molotch (1987) 
distinguish between two types of value: value of investment –– which is a major concern for the 
private–sector investors and the value of use –– which is the main concern of the regular public 
who view real estate as a means to obtain their daily living. Logan and Molotch (1987) argue that 
because of the increasing influence of the private sector’s elite groups on governments, 
governmental development policies are more directed towards the value of investment and ignore 
the value of use. As a result, the working class or low-income individual’s needs and interests are 
ignored. This is very true in Palestine. Palestinian elite groups and thus Palestinian governmental 
development policies are more concerned with the value of investment rather than the value of 
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use. Land prices in Areas A and B are very high; for example one square meter of land in the city 
of Ramallah can easily reach the price of one thousand US dollars. It can be debated that prices 
in Areas A and B are high because of the limited availability of vacant land within these areas, 
whereas land in Area C is much cheaper. Thus, it can be argued that the growth machine concept 
exists clearly in Area A but  is limited in Area C. The growth machine concept becomes very 
apparent when discussing the Rawabi case study in Chapter 6. 
Therefore, the planning process in Palestine could be viewed as a struggle on two levels. 
First, against Israeli policies of occupation and second, as a response to the needs of the less 
powerful and the public rather than the needs of the Palestinian elite. Public participation can be 
used as a way to acknowledge the voices of the public and the less powerful. Until recently, the 
Palestinian planning process had very minimal public input, represented by the public's ability to 
appeal  master plans if they felt their properties were being threatened. Recently, the Ministry of 
Local Government (MOLG) is requiring Palestinian planners to conduct several workshops and 
public meetings for feedback and to present planning alternatives as part of the planning process.  
Norman Krumholz’s experience in Cleveland (Krumholz 1982) is a successful example of 
how planning can be used in ways that support the rights of  the poor. Krumholz served as the 
Director of the Cleveland City Planning Commission under several mayors. Krumholz 
considered the planner, thus himself, as a social activist. He set as one of his goals "to provide a 
wider range of choices for Cleveland residents who had few, if any, choices" (Krumholz 1982: 
163). Krumholz's task was not an easy one. It was more of a fight to try to provide the distressed 
with at least part of their rights. Krumholz had to face accusations of hindering the city's 
development.  
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Krumholtz's experience shows the amount of persistence and will that is required from 
planners to serve the distressed and avoid the upper-classes' interests. In Palestine, the plight of 
planners is a more difficult one; not only does the planner fight for the interests of the less 
powerful against the interests of the influential elites, but also fight plans of occupation that can 
contradict, in some cases, the interests of the elite and distressed Palestinians. Therefore, 
Palestinian planners should not be "ordinary bureaucrats seeking a secure career, some status and 
regular increases in salary" (Krumholz 1982: 170). 
2.3 Mapping and Counter-Mapping 
State authorities use maps to exercise power. Woods et al. (2010) show how states use 
maps to impose zoning laws, tax districts and other legislation that can be considered sources of 
power. Maps are also used to assign addresses and names to places. For some places these names 
and addresses would not have existed if it was not for maps. 
Monmonier (1996) argues that maps can be deceiving. Although they might be, content 
wise, true scale, geographic projection and presentation can all be ways for maps to be deceiving. 
Looking at maps from this perspective, it can be argued that Monmonier agrees with Woods et 
al. that using maps as a tool of deceit makes them a very effective source of power. As an 
example of lying with maps Monmonier (1996) presents a map published by the Jewish National 
Fund of Canada right before the 1973 war (Figure 6). The map is intended to mobilize world 
support for Israel in the war.  The map shows how small Israel is compared to the surrounding 
threatening Arab countries. While the map is true, shape and area wise, the map does not say 
anything about the Israeli military superiority over its Arab neighboring countries. It can be 
discussed then that on various levels cartographers, planners, planning institutions, states and 
  
military occupiers use maps to promote their own
indeed sources of power on various levels.
Figure 6: Lying with maps.
(Monmonier 1996) 
In the mid-1990s scholars introduced the term
efforts whose purpose are to counteract
of the research on counter mapping was concerned with the availability of newer mapping 
technologies such as Geographic Information Systems (
creation possible for social activists and community
are found in various parts of the world, such as South Africa
writing apartheid maps (Harris, et al. 1995)
formally claim historical territories 
technology, counter-mapping literature also considered simple handmade and artistic mapping as 
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means of collecting and representing cartographic data from popular groups (Poole 1995a, 
Rocheleau, Thomas-Slayter and Edmunds 1995, Rocheleau 1997, Rocheleau and Edmunds 
1997). 
Woods et al. (2010) argue similarly in their discussion of the relationship of maps to the 
state. They survey several examples of efforts by indigenous peoples, parish residents, artists, 
and even some geographers to use maps to challenge the authority of the state while exploring 
the potential and limitations of counter-mapping. 
The aforementioned concept is similar to that of Forester (1989) and Davidoff (1965) of 
planning against main-stream power that will be discussed in more detail in the following 
section. It is a process that attempts to counteract main-stream planning. However, the actors 
here are not planners as much as they are social activists, geographers and artists who are trying 
to protest the main-stream plans that affect their lives directly and gravely ignore their needs. 
Woods et al. (2010) discuss Palestine as a specific example of counter-mapping practices. 
To Woods et al. the West Bank, has been counter-mapped more than once. The State of Israel 
had counter-mapped the West Bank during their occupation of the territory in 1967. Israeli 
planners were not happy with the maps of Palestine that existed when they occupied the West 
Bank. These maps were covered with Palestinian names of cities (in Arabic), villages and 
historic and religious areas. According to Woods et al., the Israelis have counter-mapped the 
West Bank by producing maps that replace the original Arabic names with Hebrew names taken 
from the Old Testament of the Bible in order to be more coherent with the Jewish nature of 
Israel. Ironically, Woods et al. argue that Palestinians are now producing alternate maps that 
stress the original Palestinian/Arabic names. Examples of Palestinian counter mapping include 
the Atlas of Palestine 1948 (Abu-Sitta 2004), maps of Palestine produced by departments of 
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geography in Palestinian universities and even in symbols and monuments Palestinians construct 
in their cities and villages.  
2.4 Counter-planning 
Israel controls planning in most of the national territory of Palestine. Israel is an occupying 
force whose objectives are to enhance its control and sovereignty over the indigenous Palestinian 
people. Here the influence of the elite class on the planning process is minimized but not 
eliminated by their limited ability to influence planning decisions within the Palestinian planning 
institutions. Accordingly, this dissertation focuses on planning activities in the West Bank that 
counteract Israeli planning measures. The following section will discuss literature that pertains to 
planning against mainstream power, what I will refer to as counter-planning. 
Davidoff (1965) challenged the idea that planning is exclusive to the state. Being a 
professor of law, he viewed the planning process in a way similar to the adjudicating process. 
Davidoff states his major question: why are governments the sole party responsible for creating 
urban development plans? He asserts that community-based institutions and special-interest 
groups should be given the opportunity to prepare urban plans that reflect their own interests. 
Professional planners can be hired to produce urban plans in a professional manner. In that sense 
the planner's role is similar to that of a lawyer in that the planner is a professional advisor who 
provides professional advice to interest groups. The public, thus, are given the opportunity to 
prepare plans that reflect their interests and needs. To reach consent on a final urban plan to be 
approved, a planning commission could weigh the merits of the competing plans in a democratic 
voting process, very similar to the way a court hears and weighs arguments from different 
parties. The public sector here competes with interest groups in providing urban plans and should 
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not dominate the urban-development process. In a sense the public is given the chance to prepare 
plans that counteract the State’s plan and reflects the interests of local groups. 
Forester (1989) argues in a similar manner. To him, the planner should not treat powerful 
and powerless groups equally. The planner should analyze and filter all information and seek 
information from less-powerful groups that might not be able to contact the planner as easily as 
other, more-powerful groups. The planner should be progressive and proactive. Communication 
here is a key issue, both outgoing communication regarding what the planner says or makes 
public and incoming communication regarding how the planner deals with information sources 
and power. The planner should have the ability to analyze information and distinguish between 
positive and negative communication. Positive communication sheds light on the public’s needs 
and negative communication aims at promoting the interests of the powerful. Planners should do 
what they can to maximize positive communication and minimize negative communication. 
Some communication may be directed towards manipulating the decision-making process 
towards the interests of powerful groups. In that case, the planner should develop creative ways 
to reach and make the voices of the distressed heard. Voices of the powerful will most likely find 
their way to the planner much easier. With that stated, according to Forester this is the only way 
planners will be able to reach a comprehensive view of the urban context and the real interests of 
the community and thus be more capable of addressing the interests of the distressed. Forester 
acknowledges that planning involves both technical problem solving and politics. However, he 
argues that "[p]lanning analysts are not apolitical problem solvers or social engineers. Instead 
they are actually pragmatic critics" (Forester 1989: 18).   
There is not a large body of literature that discusses the concept of counter-planning. 
However, the term counter-planning has been used by a number of scholars. For example, the 
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term counter-planning was employed as a governmental policy in 1979 in the former Soviet 
Union. At that time the Soviet government required enterprises to present an updated plan with 
higher targets periodically. Enterprises were expected to present a plan that counters that specific 
enterprise’s previous plan. In other words, enterprises were counter-planning their own plans to 
set higher objectives (Gupta 1989, Hanson 1983). However, this concept of counter-planning is 
different from the concept that I employ in this dissertation.  
Counter-planning is also a concept that is present in health planning and refers to a 
pluralistic approach of health planning where hospitals themselves play a significant role in the 
health planning process, while being more capable of understanding the needs and issues facing 
their daily activity rather than the Health Systems Agencies (HSA’s) (Berry 1980, Brown 1978). 
Baum (1977) uses the term counter-planning in his discussion of how existential planning 
approaches should replace rational ones. Baum views counter-planning as a type of participatory 
or democratic planning that represents a way to change the rational, top-down planning approach 
that was salient in the 1960s. Roos (1974) also uses the term counter-planning in conjunction 
with the concepts of democratic and participatory planning. Within it community-based 
institutions play a strong role in influencing the planning decisions of the main stream capitalist 
planning process. 
By counter-planning I mean, then, attempts to influence the capitalist planning process . . .  
by means of creating new planning organs, new competitive alternative plans or opposition 
to plans (Roos 1974: 223). 
In general, counter-planning was viewed by a number of scholars as the type of planning 
directed against the dominant system of institutionalized power (Davidoff 1965, Forester 1989, 
Friedman 1969, Krieger 1971, Roos 1974). This concept of counter-planning is similar to the 
concept used in this research.  
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In this research I have examined the planning undertaken by Palestinian planning 
institutions in order to see if it is acting as a counter-planning process to Israeli planning actions 
and policies of separation and control. 
2.5 Planning in Palestine — Previous Literature 
Literature on planning in Palestine is sparse. Apart from master's theses prepared by 
planning students in Birzeit and Al-Najah Universities, academic work in this field is very 
limited. In the following section I will conduct a review of the main academic publications on 
urban planning in Palestine.  
Coon (1992) discusses the Palestinian urban planning process and how it is affected by 
Israeli occupation policies. He also thoroughly discusses the urban planning process; its 
procedures and stages and the problems it faces in the West Bank / Palestine. Coon's book is 
more than 15 years old and is based on research conducted even earlier in the 1980s. Coon 
(1992) does not discuss Palestinian planning institutions simply because they did not exist at that 
time. It was only until the 1990s, when the PNA was established that Palestinian-controlled 
planning institutions began to be introduced. However, Coon's work provides an understanding 
of the implications of Israeli policies on the Palestinian urban planning process. Coon argues that 
Palestinians basically lacked authority that is essential for any urban planning process. He also 
discusses that there are only two sources of natural resources in Palestine: agriculture and water. 
Coon argues that Israeli planning policies are aimed at controlling these resources and thus 
preserving Israeli superiority over the Palestinians. Planning in the West Bank was entirely 
controlled by the Israeli Military Government at that time, what came to be renamed later as the 
Israeli Civil Administration (ICA). 
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Bollens is another scholar who discussed the conflict in Palestine and many other parts of 
the world. Bollens (2000) discusses a similar concept in regards to the city of Jerusalem. Bollens 
provides a thorough discussion of the Israeli policies in East Jerusalem in particular and the West 
Bank more generally. He shows how these policies have worked to promote Israeli superiority 
over the city. Bollens argues that the goals of Israeli policy makers are to "extend the Jewish city 
geographically and demographically, control the heights for military security, reconnect the 
formerly partitioned areas by building a Jewish development bridge from west to east and build 
Jewish neighborhoods so that the division of the city in terms of political control and sovereignty 
is never again possible" (Bollens 2000: 65). 
 Abdulhadi (1990) discusses restrictions on the land use planning process in the West Bank 
since its occupation in 1967 to the 1980s. He demonstrates how the urban planning process has 
been totally dominated by the Israeli authorities and how it was used to implement Israeli 
policies for controlling the land.  
Dr. Samih Al-Abed (Abed 1998) discussed the urban planning process a few years after the 
formation of the PNA in his paper, "The Circumstances for Strategic Planning in Palestine." 
However, this paper focuses more on economic development and the challenges it faces. Lack of 
funding and the vague and unstable political climate are among the main issues listed that 
challenge an efficient strategic plan in the PNA’s areas. Similarly, a publication of the Ministry 
of Planning and International Cooperation (MOP) (Sha'at 2002) discusses the challenges that 
face a Palestinian strategic plan. However, both Abed (1998) and Sha'at (2002) do not consider 
actions that could be taken to try to overcome these challenges. 
Abdelhamid (2006) focuses on analyzing the development and changes in the urban form 
of Palestinian cities and towns. He also discusses the major factors and impacts that affected 
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urban morphology and the urban form of the Palestinian areas. Abdelhamid (2006) puts forward 
some recommendations for improving the performance of the Palestinian planning process such 
as capacity building of Palestinian planning institutions, enhancing public participation and 
upgrading planning laws and regulations. 
Araj (2010) may perhaps come closest to the focus of my research in her discussion of the 
planning conflict over space in Palestine. She focuses on the relationship between afforestation 
planning and the struggle over space in the Palestinian territories. Unlike this dissertation, 
however, Araj (2010) applies a more historic approach in her research. Her main source of 
information is document review, rather than field research, as is the case with this dissertation. 
She studies the planning actions of the British Mandate and the Israeli occupation and concludes 
that these actions aimed at controlling the Palestinian lands and enforcing the occupation. 
Although Araj studies these actions until recently, after the formation of the PNA, she did not 
research the Palestinian planning process as an institutionalized one under the PNA. Araj only 
sheds light on some individual Palestinian public attempts to resist Israeli and British plans 
through afforestation. Thus, she does not study the Palestinian planning process as is the case in 
this dissertation. 
In an unpublished paper (2012) Khamaisi documents how urban planning can serve as a 
tool for civilian resistance to Israeli plans. However, Khamaisi targets Arab communities inside 
Israel but not in the West Bank or Gaza. Khamaisi (2012) discusses how preparing urban plans 
for Arab villages inside Israel can be used to resist unjust, biased plans of the Israeli government 
that, according to Khamaisi, aim at limiting urban expansion and hindering the development of 
villages in favor of Jewish cities. From this point of view, Khamaisi's assertion is very similar to 
the counter-planning concept, by which local communities prepare plans to endorse their 
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interests and needs against plans of the main-stream power that ignore the interests of the 
minorities (Davidoff 1965, Forester 1989, Friedman 1969, Krieger 1971, Roos 1974). 
Other planning literature in Palestine deals mainly with planning on the local level, of 
certain case studies of specific localities and does not look at the planning process as a whole 
(Abu Gharbiyyeh 2001, Halapi and Ghadeyya 2003, Khamaisi 2006, Najjar 2008). 
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3 Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.1 Purpose Statement 
After the Israeli Occupation in 1967, all Israeli policies in the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
were directed at enhancing Israeli control and supporting the occupation. There has been a shift 
in these policies during the previous decade towards policies of separation (Bauer 2012, 
Chomsky 2010, Gordon 2008, Halper 2008). Policies of separation, including construction of the 
Israeli-built separation wall, Israeli bypass roads, construction of illegal settlements and the 
attempts to annex the Jordan Valley to Israel, are designed to isolate the Palestinians in urban 
islands that are totally surrounded by Israeli-controlled areas. Currently, the Palestinian National 
Authority (PNA) possesses active planning institutions. However, the researcher has observed 
that many of the plans prepared for Palestinian localities by Palestinian planning institutions do 
not take into account the area surrounding these localities. Many of these plans simply take the 
boundaries of Areas A and B as a given and just plan within them. In doing so, they do not take 
into account the Palestinian vision of an independent continuous state.  
The present dissertation is focused entirely on the West Bank. The Gaza Strip is separated 
from the West Bank as a whole unit. All Illegal Israeli settlements within the Gaza Strip were 
evacuated unilaterally by Israel in 2005. Concepts of separation of communities into islands and 
the categorization of lands into A, B and C areas do not apply in Gaza. The planning process 
within the Gaza Strip faces different challenges and is therefore not addressed here, although I 
recommend investigations of the planning process in Gaza as a subject for future research. 
 The main purpose of the research I have undertaken here is to understand the regional and 
national planning processes in the West Bank and assess whether these processes are acting as 
counter-planning strategies to resist Israeli plans of separation and thus contribute towards an 
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independent, contiguous Palestinian state. Furthermore, I provide recommendations on how to 
enhance the function of the Palestinian planning process as a counter-planning one by applying 
theories of planning against mainstream forces and theories of counter-planning.  
I employ qualitative methods and multiple case study-analysis of the planning process of 
three Palestinian communities. I then carried out a series of semi-structured interviews with 
public-sector and private-sector planners working on the regional and national planning levels in 
order to better understand the planning process and to assess if this process is functioning as a 
counter-planning strategy. My findings are directed to both scholars and official planners as a 
contribution towards a more effective regional and national planning strategy in Palestine.  
3.2 The Gap 
The review of literature that was conducted in Chapter 2 lead to the conclusion that 
previous research on planning in Palestine was either not dealing with Palestinian planning as a 
counter action for the occupation's policies or else it was undertaken in a different era and under 
a different set of circumstances. On the other hand, literature on counter planning and planning 
against dominant-power institutions dealt with a legitimate state or authority which is different 
than the case in the West Bank which resides under military occupation. 
The literature on planning in Palestine is either dealing with planning of individual 
localities, or simply analyzing challenges that face the planning process. Some literature on the 
planning process in Palestine was created before the formation of the PNA (Abdulhadi 1990, 
Abu-Ayyash 1976, Coon 1992), thus outdated and does not discuss a Palestinian planning 
process. Other literature can be found that offers recommendations for a more effective planning 
process (Abdelhamid 2006, Araj 2010, Sha'at 2002). However, this area remains highly under-
researched.  
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Coon (1992) and Abdulhadi (1990) discuss the planning process in the West Bank (and 
Gaza) before the formation of the PNA. The planning environment currently is significantly 
different. Before the formation of the PNA, the Palestinians did not have any planning 
institutions. The planning process was exclusive to the Israeli occupation. Only individual acts of 
resistance to Israeli plans existed, such as protests or building without permits and being forced 
to face demolition orders. No Palestinian planning institutions existed at that time. 
On the other hand, Davidoff (1965) and Forester (1989), In their work on planning and 
power, discuss planning that is directed against the dominant planning authority. Forester (1989) 
discusses how the planner should act within the power struggle of a community. For Forester the 
planner is a proactive social individual who should expend great effort towards hearing and 
responding to the voices of the least powerful who are less capable of influencing the decision-
makers. Davidoff (1965), on the other hand, questions the exclusivity of creating plans for the 
state. Davidoff argues that community-based organizations and interest groups are more capable 
of assessing the needs of the public than the central state. Thus, community-based organizations 
and interest groups should be given the ability to create plans. Within this process, the planner is 
a consultant or an advocate whose job is to make sure plans are professionally produced to 
reflect the interests of these social groups. The public can then vote for one, or a merger of more 
than one, of the plans created by these groups. Davidoff (1965) and Forester (1989) assume a 
legitimate state or authority.  This is apparently not the case in the West Bank where there is an 
occupation authority implementing policies of control and separation and not just a struggle of 
power between the power layers of a society.  
Moreover, literature on counter-mapping deals more with process of producing maps rather 
than the planning process. For example, Woods et al. (2010) discuss how maps created by 
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community activists, geographers, artists, or community-based organizations in Palestine are 
counteracting maps created by Israel by using the original Arabic names of places instead of the 
Jewish names imposed by the Israeli State. Woods et al. (2010) here, similar to other scholars 
who wrote on counter mapping, do not discuss any planning processes, or planning activities.   
This research employs concepts of planning against a dominant power developed within a 
different political context (Baum 1977, Davidoff 1965, Forester 1989, Friedman 1969, Krieger 
1971, Roos 1974) to the Palestinian planning process. Thus, it will link the literature on counter-
planning and counter-mapping to the literature on planning under the occupation in Palestine. 
3.3 Objectives 
My objectives for undertaking the research presented here were as follows: 
1. To document the current Palestinian planning processes on the regional and 
national levels and evaluate if they are actually acting as counter-planning 
processes to Israeli policies of separation as I have defined counter-planning in 
section 2.4.  
2. To demonstrate the efficiency of the concept of counter-planning and its importance 
as a Palestinian planning policy to support the Palestinian vision of an independent 
contiguous state, while at the same time resist Israeli policies of separation. 
3. To offer recommendations of planning actions the Palestinian planning institutions 
could employ to enhance their counteractions to the Israeli policies of separation 
and thus support the Palestinian’s national goals. 
3.4 Main Questions 
In order to meet the objectives I have outlined in the previous section, I have attempted to 
answer the following research questions as part of my dissertation research: 
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• How are Palestinian planning institutions on the national and regional level currently 
performing as overarching coordinating bodies?  
o How are master plans for Palestinian communities currently being prepared? 
o What criteria exist to approve master plans of localities? 
o What coordination currently exists between the different institutions concerned 
with mapping and planning in Palestine? 
o What strategies exist to ensure plans comply with the Palestinian national 
vision of a contiguous independent state?  
• How do Palestinian plans respond to Israeli plans in the West Bank? 
o How are planning institutions addressing Area C? How efficient are these 
plans? Are there alternative plans for Israeli ones? 
o What Palestinian process exists to approve Palestinian plans for areas currently 
under Israeli control? 
o How can Palestinian plans act as a reference for Palestinian politicians and 
decision makers?  
• Are Palestinian planning processes on the national and regional levels acting as 
counter-planning policies to Israeli plans? 
o What can be done to enhance the counter-planning effect of these plans? 
3.5 Research Methods 
In this research I have utilized a qualitative research methodology to examine the degree to 
which the Palestinian planning process is acting as a counter-planning strategy to Israeli planning 
in the West Bank. According to Creswell (2007), the qualitative paradigm is most suited to 
questions about processes and meanings. It provides a more in-depth and detailed understanding 
 50 
 
of the research subject and questions. Three case studies of Palestinian cities' planning processes 
are analyzed to provide an insightful understanding of the urban planning process in the West 
Bank. I conducted semi-structured interviews with key official planners to further deepen the 
understanding of the three case studies within the context of the planning process and in order to 
assess if the planning process is really acting as a counter-planning strategy. In the following, I 
provide a detailed explanation of the methodology. 
3.5.1 Multiple Case Study Analysis 
The case study approach provides an analytical framework within which research is 
conducted. A case study is an intensive analysis of an individual, or multiple unit(s) (in this case 
three Palestinian communities’ master plans). The method provides a systematic way of looking 
at these cases, collecting data, analyzing information and reporting the results. The case study 
approach is most suitable when the researcher needs to collect data from various sources. Yin 
(2003) recommends six types of data inquiry methods: documents, archival records, interviews, 
direct observation, participant observation and physical artifacts. The research I am presenting 
here draws from most of these types of inquiries: analyzing documents and archival data, semi-
structured interviews, and the observation of the researcher over a long period of time while 
working as a professional planner. A case study approach is thus an in-depth approach that 
allows the researcher to collect data from different sources and apply a variety of data analysis 
techniques in order to form a comprehensive understanding of the research subject (Creswell 
2007, Yin 2003). 
The main purpose of the first phase of the research is to understand the urban planning 
process in the West Bank. To accomplish this objective a multiple case study approach is used. I 
selected three communities in the West Bank for in-depth analysis with respect to urban and 
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regional planning. Multiple case studies are usually selected to best illustrate the research issue. 
Case studies, in a multiple-case-study approach, can be selected for different reasons, such as 
ease of access or data availability (Creswell 1994, 2007, Stake 2005, Yin 2003). However, 
Creswell (2007) prefers that case studies be selected to show different views of the research topic 
to form a purposeful sample. The communities selected vary in size, importance and function. 
The three communities provide different perspectives of the planning and counter-planning 
processes in the West Bank. The communities I selected as multiple case studies are Ramallah, 
Fasayil, and Rawabi, (Figure 7). 
Ramallah is a major city in the West Bank. It functions as a central hub for other 
Palestinian cities because it contains the headquarters of all official Palestinian institutions and 
Ministries. Ramallah is currently functioning as the main Palestinian city, both economically and 
socially. The City of Ramallah is located in the heart of the West Bank with a population of 
about 30,000 and an approximate area of 9 km2 (about 2,200 acres) (Ministry of Local 
Government 2011). Ramallah is a Palestinian city that provides a good context for studying the 
historical development of the planning process in the West Bank because it has gone through 
many historic eras and transformations since its foundation in the sixteenth century and 
transformation into a city in 1908. Ramallah is also a fast growing city and is running out of 
Area A and B land. Ramallah municipality is attempting to include Area C land in its new plan 
and thus it can be considered a case of counter-planning as well. 
The second case study is Fasayil. Fasayil is a Palestinian village located in the Jericho 
Governorate. It faces a serious lack of infrastructural services and its development is hindered by 
the current Israeli Civil Administration (ICA) planning policies that do not allow any 
construction outside Area B. Fasayil has a significant number of buildings that already exist in 
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Area C. These buildings are not licensed and are subject to demolition orders by the ICA. The 
ICA has defined boundaries for development of a master plan that include some buildings of the 
locality but excludes others. These boundaries are also so tight that they limit any future 
expansion of the locality. They basically reflect the Israeli planning policy for that area. A 
Palestinian master plan for Fasayil has been prepared that looks at the urban needs of the locality 
regardless of whether it is located in Area B or Area C. The Palestinian plan of Fasayil is 
counteracting the Israeli one. This Palestinian plan of Fasayil is studied thoroughly as a counter-
planning second case study in this dissertation (International Peace and Cooporation Center 
2011)13. 
The third case study chosen is Rawabi. Rawabi is a newly planned city. Rawabi presents a 
new trend for urban planning in Palestine, as newly designed cities are not common in Palestine. 
Rawabi is the first Palestinian city to be newly planned from scratch. It is currently being built. It 
is expected to have a population of approximately 40,000 within its area of 6 km2 (about 1,500 
acres) (Ministry of Local Government 2011). Planning for Rawabi is a new planning experience 
that may shed light on the concept of counter-planning. 
                                                 
13 A Palestinian NGO located in Jerusalem that is concerned with promoting an urban planning participatory 
democracy through an integrated approach of research, urbanism, community engagement and training. 
  
Figure 7: Location of case studies
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In the course of my research I thoroughly examined the three case studies . I reviewed all 
three current master plans (maps and reports)and situated the master plans within the 
surrounding urban context. I considered planning in each of the three case studies from two 
perspectives. First, I tried to determine how the cities function as urban centers and how they 
connect to sub cities and villages. Second, I tried to determine how the three case study sites fit 
within the larger urban context and connect to central and other major population centers in the 
West Bank. I then attempted to determine the degree to which these master plans take (or do not 
take) into consideration the surrounding urban context during the planning process in order to 
acquire an in-depth understanding of how master plans in the West Bank are actually created.  
3.5.1.1 Data Sources 
Master plans of the three case studies are available at the Ministry of Local Government 
(MOLG). The MOLG is the institution responsible for final approval of master plans and thus 
archives copies of all maps and reports.  
Data concerning the urban environment are available in the form of GIS layers at official 
institutions and NGOs that are working within different fields related to planning and social 
studies. Semi-structured Interviews 
The main objective of semi-structured interviews is to understand how the Palestinian 
planning process is addressing Israeli plans in the West Bank and how this process can act as a 
counter-planning strategy to Israeli plans. Toward that end, I conducted semi-structured 
interviews with official planners within the regional and national planning institutions. 
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Table 2 shows a list of these institutions and their work focus. 
3.5.2 Semi-structured Interviews 
The main objective of semi-structured interviews is to understand how the Palestinian 
planning process is addressing Israeli plans in the West Bank and how this process can act as a 
counter-planning strategy to Israeli plans. Toward that end, I conducted semi-structured 
interviews with official planners within the regional and national planning institutions. 
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Table 2: List of planning / mapping institutions in the West Bank 
N
o
. 
Institution Type Specialization Web page 
Gate keeper 
found 
 
1 OCHA–OPT 
United 
Nations 
Institution 
Closures, check 
points and wall 
http//www.ochaopt.org/   
2 
Stop the Wall  NGO Israeli Wall 
http://www.stopthewall.org/index.
shtml 
  
3 
ARIJ  NGO 
Jerusalem 
Studies 
http://www.arij.org/   
4 
B’tselem Israeli NGO 
Closures, check 
points and wall 
http://www.btselem.org/   
5 The Palestinian 
Hydrologists 
Group (PHG) 
 NGO 
Water / 
Underground 
water 
http://www.phg.org/ Yes 
6 
PWA  Governmental 
Domestic 
Water / Water 
networks 
http://www.pwa.ps/ Yes 
7 
Jerusalem Water 
Undertaking 
 Semi- 
Governmental 
Domestic 
Water / Water 
networks 
http://www.jwu.org/newweb/inde
x.php 
Yes 
8 Jerusalem 
Electricity 
Company 
 Semi- 
Governmental 
Electricity 
networks 
http://www.jdeco.net/ Yes 
9 Ministry of 
Planning 
 Governmental 
National 
planning 
http://www.mop–
gov.ps/new/index.php 
Yes 
10 
MOLG  Governmental 
Regional / 
Local planning 
http://www.molg.pna.ps/ Yes 
11 Palestinian 
Central Bureau of 
Statistics  
 Governmental 
Statistics data / 
Statistical areas 
http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/   
12 Ministry of 
Agriculture 
 Governmental Agriculture http://www.moa.gov.ps/   
13 The Palestinian 
Department of 
Antiquities and 
Cultural Heritage 
 Governmental 
Archeological 
places 
http://www.dach.pna.ps/   
14 Ministry of 
Transportation 
 Governmental Transportation 
http://www.mot.gov.ps/default.as
px 
  
15 Good Shepherd 
Engineering and 
Computing 
Company 
 Private Mapping http://www.gsecc.com/ Yes 
16 
REWAQ  NGO 
Archeological 
conservation 
http://www.riwaq.org/2010/index.
php 
Yes 
17 Palestinian 
National Initiative 
 NGO 
Closures, check 
points and wall 
http://www.almubadara.org/new/e
nglish.php 
Yes 
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As previously discussed in section  1.4, the two major entities responsible for reviewing 
plans are the Palestinian Higher Council on Planning and the  Regional Planning Committee 
housed within each Governorate. Every plan in Palestine has to go through approval on both the 
regional and national levels. Most of the Palestinian ministries have members / representatives in 
these two councils, both on the regional and national levels. However, the one ministry that 
heads both councils is the MOLG. The Regional Director of the MOLG of the specific 
Governorate is the head of the Regional Planning Committee, whereas, the Minister of Local 
Government is the head of the Higher Council on Planning. Thus, the MOLG is taking a 
coordination role, in addition to its modifying and review role and is the sole entity responsible 
for approving plans after they are approved by other municipalities.  
Accordingly, I focused my research on the MOLG at both regional and national levels. My 
goal was to interview key official planners in the central and regional offices of the MOLG. 
However, this does not mean that I excluded all other ministries. I also conducted interviews 
with planning officials from the Ministry of Planning (MOP).  
I interviewed planning officials within the MOP. As a result of these interviews I came to 
the understanding that  the MOP is responsible for drawing general guidelines for planning in 
Palestine. Appendix 1 represents a protocol design for the planned interview. It also contains 
suggested questions for the semi-structured interview. Table 3 shows the conducted interviews 
and interviewees.  
Creswell (2007) discusses the data analysis process within the qualitative research 
methodology. Preparing and organizing data for analysis, reducing into themes through coding 
and condensing codes and the representation of data using figures, tables and diagrams are all 
qualitative tools used for the analysis of data that were discussed. Creswell (2007) also cites 
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Stake (2005), specifying qualitative analysis methods typically used in case study approaches. 
Concepts of cross case study analysis and the aggregation of data into categories are discussed 
thoroughly in his book. 
Table 3: Conducted interviews 
  
Planning 
Level 
Number 
of 
Interviews 
Notes 
MOLG  
National 
Level 
6 
1 interview with the General Director of Planning 
Department. 
5 interview with key planners. 
Ministry of 
Planning 
National 
Level 
3 
1 interview with General Director of National Plan 
Department. 
2 interview with key planner. 
MOLG  
Regional 
Level 2 
Interviews with General Director of Regional Planning 
Committee. 
Total number of interviews 11 
 
Consistent with Stake (2005), I have conducted the following procedures through the data 
analysis process. First, I have transcribed all data collected through the semi-structured 
interviews into text and entered it into a word processing software. The transcripts were read 
thoroughly by the researcher until a comprehensive understanding was formed. Afterwards, I 
have produced a thorough description, based upon the review and readings of the collected data. 
Codes were then assigned to data collected from the interviews. As mentioned at the beginning 
of this chapter I have selected the case studies, among different experiences of planning / 
counter-planning in the West Bank to convey a more comprehensive research. Accordingly, 
codes that were found repeatedly within a specific case study indicated themes that are specific 
to that particular case study. Codes that are found repeatedly among the case studies can indicate 
themes that might be generalized for the planning process in the West Bank. Consequently these 
codes are aggregated and categorized into these themes. These themes are then studied in terms 
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of relationships. Hierarchical diagrams that visualize the cause / effect relationships into trees are 
prepared. Network diagrams representing the interaction and relationships between the themes 
are also prepared and studied. 
3.6 Reliability and Validity  
Reliability is a measure of the precision and consistency of the research measuring tools 
(Creswell 2007). However, in this research I have not attempted to measure quantities––as   in 
the case of quantitative research –– where there are specific accurate statistical laws of analysis. 
Qualitative data consists of flows of ideas and discussions in the form of transcripts. Thus, it is 
harder to judge degrees of precision. Reliability in quantitative research is a measure of 
consistency. Qualitative research is reliable if repeating the same question is more likely to result 
in similar answers (Babbie 1998).  
Validity, on the other hand, measures the extent to which a study answers the research 
questions (Creswell 1994). Creswell (2007) specifies that validity is a measure of the accuracy of 
a study. A research is valid if it really answers what it is trying to answer. Following is a 
discussion of procedures that can enhance this research’s validity and reliability. 
3.6.1 Reliability 
Qualitative research is reliable if the data collection and analysis is consistent. Consistency 
can be achieved by using standardized data collection and analysis practices that are widely used 
by scholars. Babbie (1998) argues that the reliability of research refers to the quality of 
measurement method that suggests consistency among the collection of data. Good quality 
taping of interviews, unified interview protocols and great attention to the coding process are 
factors that enhance reliability (Creswell 2007). Yin (2003) also stresses a carefully handled 
coding process as an important element in the reliability of research. 
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When analyzing case study data, consistency in the process of analyzing and coding should 
be assured by the researcher. Analytical maps created by the researcher should be simple and 
consistent. Presentation techniques can be in many cases deceiving or disorienting. Although 
maps might be true regarding the data they contain, they sometimes – according to Monmonier 
(1996) – can lie. Excessive use of colors and fancy presentation techniques, non-standard 
projection systems and variation of scales used, can create deceptive maps (Monmonier 1996). In 
order to ensure consistency of analysis, I have used a standard projection system for all analytical 
maps created. The Palestine Grid 1923 projection system is used and the scale is unified as much 
as possible. No fancy-looking presentation techniques have been used and color use is 
maintained at a minimum.  
Moreover, I have designed and followed a standard interview protocol. I have recorded 
most interviews except for one case when the interviewee specifically asked not to be recorded. 
In that case notes were taken and then converted to themes. During the transcribing process, I 
have given attention to the linguistic gestures of interviewees, such as metaphors and analogies, 
transitions and connectors (Babbie 1998, Weiss 1994). During the coding process, part of the 
transcripts was coded by a peer colleague, in addition to the researcher. Coding results were 
compared and discussed, with that peer, to ensure a consistent coding process.  
3.6.2 Validity 
Validity is a measure of the extent to which I answer the research questions posed (Babbie 
1998). Validity can also be seen as a measure of the accuracy of a study. It can be accomplished 
in qualitative research through prolonged field engagement, triangulation, thick description, 
clarifying bias and insider, peer and external reviews (Creswell 2007).  
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The researcher has about 12 years of experience in the planning field in the West Bank that 
can strongly be argued as a prolonged field engagement. To ensure the quality of findings, I have 
triangulated data analysis outcomes among the three case studies and the results of the 
interviews. I have, additionally, asked three interviewees and one peer planners to review and 
comment on the findings of the research. 
Babbie (1998) discusses several types of validity such as: face validity, content validity, 
construct validity and criterion validity. He argues that any research should demonstrate at least 
two of these types to be valid. 
Face validity is a preliminary check for validity. Face validity implies that a research seems 
logically valid within the norms of the study field. 
Construct validity is a more in-depth measure of validity. A research can be argued to have 
construct validity if its results fit within current theory and literature on a research topic (Babbie 
1998: 134). This research applies existing theories of planning against main-stream power to 
provide a framework for the analysis. Accordingly, the research questions are directly related to 
theories of planning and power, which in turn are directly related to plans and maps. The answers 
are situated in theories of planning against power.  
Content validity refers to the extent to which the analysis covers the whole spectrum of 
meaning of the research conceptualization. Again, a thorough review of literature on planning, 
planning against main-stream power, counter-mapping and counter-planning ensures the research 
covers the full meanings of these concepts. 
External validity refers to the degree to which a research is generalizable (Creswell 1994). 
Theory is used in qualitative research, as it is used in quantitative research as a form of 
generalization. Qualitative researchers use theory in different ways so as to generalize their 
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findings. Theory, in qualitative research, can be either a starting or an ending point of a research. 
Qualitative researchers might use theory as a starting point for their studies to form a broad 
explanation of behavior or social attitude. For example, ethnographers employ cultural themes to 
conduct qualitative research, such as social organization or language. Theory can also be used in 
qualitative research as a lens, or perspective, that orients the research questions and method of 
inquiry from the very beginning, such as a feminist approach or a racialized discourse (Creswell 
2014).  
Theory can also be the result – the end point – of a qualitative research, which is the case in 
this dissertation. In this dissertation generalization is achieved as a result of an inductive research 
process. The research begins by gathering detailed information from participants, then 
organizing this information into themes that are developed into broad patterns. Generalizations, 
or theories, are then achieved by studying these themes against existing literature, here literature 
on counter—planning and literature on planning in Palestine, (Figure 8). Comparing the found 
themes and the resulting generalizations, or theories, to personal experience of the researcher in 
the field of planning adds to the value of these generalizations (Creswell 2014). 
Generalizability to other parts of the world could be argued only by finding similarities 
between the results of this research and other similar researches from other parts of the world.  
 
  
Figure 8: Generalizing in qualitative research using an inductive research method
(Creswell 2014: 63) 
3.6.3 Ethics and Bias 
As part of this research, the researcher interview
directors of planning departments within official institutions. All interviews 
offering interviewees’ confidentiality and anonymity. The researcher 
interviewee is harmed as a result of her/ his participation. All interviewees are 
bias is anticipated. However, to minimize bias, no questions 
actions and policies. Alternately, interview questions 
in response to Israeli plans.  
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ed mostly professional planners and 
were
did/ will ensure no 
Palestinians, so 
were asked concerning Israeli 
focused on the Palestinian planning process 
. 
 voluntary, 
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It is also important to note that the researcher is also a Palestinian, who is at one end of the 
spectrum of the Palestinian / Israeli conflict. However, the researcher’s bias is being attempted to 
be accounted for by situating the analysis and conclusions in theory and existing literature. 
Moreover, this research is being conducted in order to meet the requirements of an urban studies 
doctoral program in the United States, which gives the opportunity for unbiased third party 
professors from the respected dissertation committee to review and give feedback and thus 
minimize the bias. 
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4 Chapter 4: The Planning of Ramallah 
4.1 Background 
Ramallah was founded in the mid-sixteenth century. Rashed Hadadin, the founder of the 
city, travelled across the hills of Jordan towards Jerusalem. Ramallah was founded in a wooded 
area six kilometers to the north of Jerusalem (Figure 9). Hadadin had five sons who settled in 
that location and formed the five families of Ramallah. Ottoman files from the sixteenth century 
show Ramallah as an agricultural community with approximately 400 residents (Khamaisi 2006: 
5). During the course of time, Ramallah grew in population. In 1807, the first Greek Orthodox 
Church was built and in 1869, the Friends School for Girls was opened.  
In 1902 the Ottoman government transformed Ramallah into a district that included 30 
towns. Mr. Ahmad Murad from Jerusalem was appointed as the first Governor of Ramallah. 
Ramallah officially became a city in 1908. The municipal council included one representative 
from each extended family (Ramallah Municipality 2012).  
Ramallah experienced various patterns of immigration. In the nineteenth century many of 
Ramallah's residents immigrated to the United States. Typically men would immigrate hoping to 
enhance their economic and social status, leaving their families behind. Money remitted from the 
immigrants to their families in Ramallah contributed to the fast economic growth of the city. 
Thus, the city prospered and grew. By 1946 approximately 1,500 of Ramallah's 6,000 residents 
were emigrants (Khamaisi 2006: 4).  
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Figure 9: Ramallah Location Map. 
(Map created by researcher based on data layers obtained from the Ministry of Local Government (MOLG)) 
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In 1948, Ramallah faced another type of inward immigration. Many Palestinians, who were 
evacuated by the Haganah from their towns and villages as a result of the 1948 war, immigrated 
and settled in Ramallah causing a dramatic increase in its population. 
Ramallah continued to grow and prosper as an urban society aided by remittances from 
family members living and working in other countries. When the Palestinian National Authority 
(PNA) was formed in 1993, it needed a city to place its official and governmental institutions in 
the West Bank. Jerusalem is claimed by the Palestinians as the capital of their foreseen, future 
state; however, the status of Jerusalem was postponed by the negotiating parties to the final stage 
of peace talks, which were scheduled to begin five years later. The PNA chose Ramallah as the 
temporary seat of government despite the fact that Ramallah was not assigned any official status 
that distinguishes it from other cities in the West Bank. One of the main reasons might be its 
proximity to Jerusalem and its location in the heart of the West Bank. Being the hub of the PNA 
governmental institutions brought new immigrants to Ramallah from other major Palestinian 
cities such as Nablus and Hebron seeking employment and work opportunities which caused 
another dramatic increase in the population of Ramallah. 
Ramallah currently is the major city in the West bank. It functions as a central hub for other 
Palestinian cities because it contains the headquarters of all official Palestinian institutions and 
ministries. Ramallah is currently functioning as the main Palestinian city economically, socially 
and politically. Ramallah has a population of about 30,000 and an approximate area of 9 km2 
(about 2,200 acres) (Ministry of Local Government 2011).  
It is also important to point out that as Ramallah and the surrounding communities grew 
they became part of a larger group of adjacent communities, namely the city of Al Bireh and 
town of Betunia. Ramallah, Al Bireh and Betunia are contiguous; there are no vacant areas 
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separating the three communities. It is important to consider the growth of the three communities 
together in order to understand the growth of Ramallah. Many immigrants to Ramallah from 
other West Bank cities live in Al Bireh or Betunia because of less expensive rent, or simply the 
availability of vacant apartments, but work, shop and spend their leisure time in Ramallah.  
4.2 Planning Ramallah 
In the remainder of this chapter, I discuss the planning efforts in Ramallah over time, from 
the British Mandate to the current period. My aim is to present an in-depth analysis of the 
planning process in light of salient planning theories and to situate this in the context of Israeli 
policies and the theories of counter-planning I mentioned in the previous chapter. 
4.3 The Pre-Israeli Era 
Laws relating to urban planning in Palestine originated at the end of the Ottoman era with 
the promulgation of the Provincial Municipalities Law of 1877. Under this law 22 municipal 
councils were established in major towns only. It was not until 1908 that the first municipal 
council of Ramallah was established. During the Ottoman period there was no actual urban 
planning taking place in Palestine. However, under the Municipalities Law of 1877 there was a 
system in place to award building permits to Palestinian local citizens in major towns that 
included Ramallah (Abdelhamid 2006). Fruchtman (1986) points out that urban planning during 
the Ottoman era was limited to the physical forms of buildings and roads and ignored all aspects 
concerned with social and economic situations of the planned communities. 
During the British Mandate period (1917–1948), planning authority was the exclusive right 
of the British authorities. The Office of the Planning Consultant (headed by architect Henry 
Kendal between 1935 and 1948) was the only authority entitled to prepare and approve regional 
and local urban plans (Abdelhamid 2006, Khamaisi 2006). The British planners were greatly 
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influenced by the modernist14 approach to planning. This influence might be one reason why 
British planners did not seek any participation from the public in preparing these maps.  
Plans for the West Bank, including Ramallah, were prepared by British planners who knew 
very little, if anything, about the local residents' habits, social life and needs. Planning concepts 
were imported from an industrial European society to be implemented in Palestine. Palestine at 
that time was mostly an agricultural society of small villages and towns. British plans did not, in 
any way, respond to the needs of the powerless majority of Palestinians living in Ramallah and 
other Palestinian cities. Palestinians were never asked for any input in these urban plans.  
Ironically, a very similar situation can be discussed regarding Chicago. The design of the 
city represented a middle and upper class vision for the city; definitely not the visions of the 
working class and less-affluent city residents. The planner here dealt with Chicago more as an 
architectural project. He tried to present urban and spatial solutions that he thought would be 
aesthetically appealing. These solutions dealt with the city as if nothing had existed before. The 
public were never asked for participation or input.  
Modernist planning ideas were salient during the first half of the twentieth century. 
Modernist planning ideas promoted scientific inquiry and objective research. According to the 
modernist planning approach, the planner is the expert who possess the knowledge and 
experience and is able to use scientific objective inquiry to identify urban problems and suggest 
solutions (Park and Burgess 1925).  British planners during the British Mandate era were 
affected, same as other planners of that time, with the modernist planning approach. From the 
                                                 
14 Since the beginning of the twentieth century and until the Second World War, the modernist / high—
modernist planning thought guided the urban development and urban–planning thought in the United States. This 
thought adopted a top – down planning approach where the planner is the expert who knows the solutions to the 
problems of the public. Therefore, Chicago School assumes that there is no need for feedback or any participation 
from the public in the planning process.   
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point-of-view of a modernist approach Palestinian local farmers knew little or nothing about city 
planning and their input was therefore irrelevant to the city-planning process. 
The planning process in Palestine during the British Mandate era was dominated by a small 
group of elite British planners. Many scholars have critiqued the domination of a small powerful 
group over the decision making and urban development processes. Hunter (1968) is one of the 
famous scholars who critiqued the domination of a small group of powerful elite over the 
planning process in the United States. He critiqued the exclusivity of decision-making to a very 
small group he referred to as the elite. Hunter (1968) argued that governance is dominated by an 
elite, while the great majority of the members of society do not play a role in governance and 
thus in urban-development policies. Hunter tried to identify the most powerful individuals who 
controlled governance in a city. He asserts that 40 individuals had relative monopoly over the 
decision-making process out of the 500,000 population. As a result, the urban development 
process was totally dominated by this elite group (Hunter 1968).  
The modernist planning thought exemplifies an extreme top-down planning approach that 
situates the planner –– and thus the state of which the planner is a member –– on the top of the 
decision-making pyramid. During the British Mandate era, this was the planning approach in 
Palestine, an approach that ignored the fact that the public knows their day-to-day needs better 
than elite planners and may have a greater chance in identifying urban problems and thus urban 
needs than foreign individuals coming from Britain. The extreme top-down urban development 
approach has been disputed by much of the contemporary urban literature (Healey 2006, Jacobs 
1961, Stone  1989). Therefore, the planning process in Palestine during the British Mandate era 
had ignored the needs of the local citizens to the benefit of an elite of British officials and a 
foreign colonizing country; Great Britain. 
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The British Mandate for Palestine ended in 1948, right after that the Nakbeh war broke out 
between the Haganah and the Arab countries. As a result, the State of Israel was established; the 
West Bank came under the Jordanian governance and the Gaza Strip under Egyptian one. 
The Jordanian authorities did very little to improve or change the planning system in the 
West Bank that was established by the British governing authorities. They only developed master 
plans for some West Bank towns (Abdelhamid 2006). The first master plan documented for 
Ramallah was the 1963 plan. During the Jordanian era, planning activity was exclusively 
assigned to the Jordanian government. The Jordanian policies were centered on developing the 
East Bank of the Jordan River and to a great extent ignored the development of the West Bank 
(Abdelhamid 2006, Abdulhadi 1990, Bollens 2000, Coon 1992). Like the British plans, the 
Jordanian master plans in the West Bank generally ignored the demographic and socio-economic 
development needs of the Palestinian population. Planners also failed to assign sufficient land for 
public buildings and economic activities which limited the economic and industrial development 
in the towns. Moreover, the planned road networks disregarded future needs and the increasing 
number of vehicles (Al-Gerbawy and Abdulhadi 1990, Khamaisi 1997). Today Ramallah, 
especially the city center, is a highly traffic-congested place with mostly narrow one-lane roads. 
Ramallah traffic problems can be largely attributed to the Jordanian master plans for the city in 
the 1960s. 
The Jordanian era brought no noticeable change in the field of planning from the British 
Mandate era. The top-down planning approach is still obvious, ignoring the needs of the local 
citizens.  The focus was on planning designed to meet the needs of non-residents, whether they 
were Jordanian officials concentrating on the development of the East Bank during the Jordanian 
era or British planners adopting European-inspired planning methods. It is important to mention 
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here that during both eras, the planning authorities were foreigners and did not identify with the 
local population, a fact that served to maximize the top-down modernist effect. In some ways the 
top-down planning approach was even more divorced from the needs of the local residents in 
Palestine than in other regions where top-down approaches were implemented.  Whereas the 
planning other cities designed on the basis of modernist principles such as Brasilia (Hall 1998) 
was carried out by planners who believed they were primarily serving the residents of these 
cities, .planners in Palestine, including Ramallah, were primarily concerned with implementing 
British or Jordanian policies and deliberately ignored the needs of local citizens. 
The modernist approach to planning resulted in planned cities that represented, in extreme 
cases, only the vision of the planner/architect, as in the example of Brasilia in Brazil (Hall 1998), 
or in less extreme cases, the planning vision of the middle or upper classes, one that ignores the 
majority of the working class, such as in the case of planning Chicago (Burnham and Bennette 
1908).  
Towards the end of the Jordanian Era in 1967, Palestinians had very little input if any, in 
the planning process which directly affected their day-to-day lives. They were only recipients of 
these plans with no power to change anything within them. The first regulation to try to garner 
input from local inhabitants was Jordanian Law No. 79 of 1966 (Abdelhamid 2006, Al-Gerbawy 
and Abdulhadi 1990, Khamaisi 2006). This law delineated three levels of the planning process: 
national, district and local levels. According to this law, the Jordanian Higher Council on 
Planning is responsible for addressing high-level planning policies which constitute a framework 
for District Planning Committees. The District Planning Committee is responsible for producing 
district (regional) urban plans which in their turn form guidelines for detailed locality master 
plans that are prepared by the elected local council or municipality. The 1966 law also defined 
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mechanisms for public input, by means of announcing the master plan before its final approval 
and opening the door to the public to object to planning decisions. Unfortunately, this law was 
applied only one year before the occupation in 1967.  
4.4 The Israeli Occupation Era 
Ramallah was one of few major cities that had an approved master plan (1963) when the 
Israeli occupation began in 1967. The 1963 master plan consisted of about 3.7 square kilometers. 
In addition to the old city, the Ramallah master plan of 1963 expanded to include the 
neighboring city of Al-Bireh. It also included areas northwest and south of the old city (Figure 
10). The plan consisted mainly of a local land-use plan for the city but did not take any regional 
aspects into consideration. 
During the first years of occupation, Israel kept the Jordanian planning law of 1966 in 
effect. Abdelhamid (2006) argues that this was probably due to the fact that Israeli decision-
makers did not expect the occupation to last. Nonetheless, the first amendment that Israel had 
made to the Jordanian law of 1966 did not occur until 1971 with the issuance of Israeli military 
order number 418. Military order number 418 came to be known as the Decree Concerning the 
Organization of Towns, Villages and Buildings in the West Bank (Abdelhamid 2006, Abdulhadi 
1990, Coon 1992). 
The Jordanian law number 79 of 1966 can be considered a step towards a more democratic 
planning process, because the local elected councils were responsible for creating detailed master 
plans that took into account the district or regional structural plan. Public participation was 
limited to two points during the planning process: the right to object and the fact that the detailed 
master plan was prepared by an elected local committee, a democratic representative of the 
public. There was no mechanism defined for public input during the preparation process of 
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master plans. Because it provided for more inclusive decision making, the Jordanian law may be 
viewed as a reflection of the postmodern planning thought that was developing in the 1960s; a 
way of thinking about planning at odds with the top-down modernist planning school that called 
for more public participation and input in planning (Dahl 1961, Davidoff 1965, Jacobs 1961).  
The Israeli Decree Concerning the Organization of Towns, Villages and Buildings in the 
West Bank introduced several modifications to the Jordanian Planning Law Number 79 of 1966.  
These modifications can be seen to have hindered the orientation towards a more democratic 
public-based planning process. The first amendment to the Jordanian law, according to the 
decree, was the abolishment of the District (Regional) Planning Committee. It transferred the 
regional planning authority and responsibilities to Israeli military planning officials, who were 
appointed by the Military Governor of the region (Abdelhamid 2006, Coon 1992, Khamaisi 
2006). Israel established the Israeli Supreme Planning Council which mirrored the Jordanian 
Higher Council on Planning during the Jordanian Era. Israeli military planning officials followed 
the Israeli Supreme Planning Council. According to the decree, all powers granted by the 
Jordanian law to the Minister of Local Government were transferred to this council. Secondly, 
the Israeli decree abolished the participation of local councils, for example municipalities, in the 
planning process. In doing so the Israeli decree transferred the totality of the planning process to 
the Israeli Supreme Planning Council and military planning officials. The planning process in the 
West Bank was now a purely top-down process totally controlled by the occupying authorities. 
Neither the Palestinian residents, nor the local Palestinian councils, had any input whatsoever in 
the planning process. 
Ramallah Municipality retained its authority to grant building permits within its master 
plan borders. However, Ramallah is the major city in Ramallah Governorate. The Ramallah 
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Regional Planning Committee lost its role as a regional planning authority for the city proper and 
the surrounding villages to the Israeli military planners. In other words, Israel confiscated all 
rights of the Ramallah Regional Planning Committee to plan for the Governorate’s development 
on the regional level. Any urban growth outside the approved master plan would have to be 
approved by the Israeli military planning officials who would only approve a proposed growth 
plan that did not conflict with Israeli policies of control and illegal-settlement building 
(Abdelhamid 2006, Abdulhadi 1990, Coon 1992). 
Israel thus controlled all building permits and land use plans outside the approved master 
plan area of Ramallah. All surrounding villages, except for Al-Bireh, did not have any approved 
master plans. Israeli policy makers used the militarily-amended planning law as an efficient tool 
to restrict Palestinian urban growth and limit the construction of buildings by rejecting building 
permits and thus apply its policies of control and illegal-settlement building (Abdelhamid 2006, 
Abdulhadi 1990, Bollens 2000, Coon 1992). 
This being said, it is important here to state the similarity of this situation with the assertion 
of many social scholars that in urban development, the state does not necessarily work on behalf 
of and for the benefit of local inhabitants. For example, Scott (1998) asserts that state officials 
will in many cases attempt to meet different goals than those that would serve to benefit local 
residents. Other scholars assert that the state will try to satisfy the needs of elite, or the upper 
class minority (Forester 1989, Logan and Molotch 1987, 2007). The top-down modernist 
planning approach is also evident here.  
The planning situation under the Israeli military occupation of the West Bank is, however, 
much more complicated. The very core of the state strategy is in clear conflict with the interests 
of the indigenous Palestinian population with respect to development and prosperity. Israeli 
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goals are all about gaining control over Palestinian lands and limiting the growth and 
development of Palestinian communities (Abdulhadi 1990, Abu-Ayyash 1976, Bollens 2000, 
Coon 1992). 
The first urban master plan to be approved for Ramallah under the Israeli occupation was 
in 1983, twenty years after the Jordanian-approved plan of 1963 (Figure 10). The 1983 Ramallah 
plan was designed within boundaries developed by the Israeli Supreme Planning Council. 
Surrounded by the adjacent cities of Al-Bireh from the east and Betunia from the west, Ramallah 
had the potential to grow to the south towards the city of Jerusalem and to the north, but that 
growth to the south is very limited compared to the amount of growth to the north of Ramallah.  
Building outside municipal boundaries involves a highly lengthy and costly permit process 
through the Israeli authorities that most Palestinians cannot afford. Even for those who can, 
approval is not guaranteed. Actually, the odds of being rejected to those of being accepted are 
7:3 (Jerusalem Legal and Human Rights Center 2011). In contrast to Palestinian occupied areas, 
the door was wide open for the planning and development of Illegal Israeli settlements in the 
West Bank. Illegal settlements were subject to a separate planning authority or approval process 
which most of the time exempted Israelis from the requirement to obtain building permits, or to 
prepare a master plan project (Abdelhamid 2006, Coon 1992). 
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Figure 10: Ramallah Municipality's Master Plan Development. 
(Map created by researcher based on data layers obtained from the MOLG) 
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Since 1967, Israeli officials have not only been very interested in annexing East Jerusalem, 
but also in annexing the surrounding areas in order to give the city a stronger geo-political depth. 
Israeli policymakers did not like the fact that West Jerusalem was directly on the Green Line15 
and on the borders with the West Bank. The plan was to annex as much land as possible around 
the city, including East Jerusalem, so that Jerusalem would become the heart of the Israeli state 
(Bollens 2000). The growth of Ramallah was therefore directed mainly to the north by Israeli 
planners. The new master plan of 1983 expanded west until it touched the boundaries of Betunia. 
To the east, Al-Bireh was already adjacent and left no space for growth. The only space left for 
growth was to the north and south. However, Israel had plans for the lands to the south to be 
annexed to Jerusalem. The Israeli-built separation wall led to the annexation of  a relatively large 
land area. The wall, along with military checkpoints, stopped all attempts of growth towards the 
south (Figure 10). This only left space for growth to the north. It even seems that the Israeli 
planners regret allowing limited growth of the city to the south; the Israeli-constructed separation 
wall cut off this part of the city, although it was approved within the municipal borders in 1983 
(Figure 10). 
The constraints upon growth due to Israeli planning policies are even more evident in the 
adjacent city of Al-Bireh. The city's growth to the south was also limited for the same reasons as 
Ramallah. In Al-Bireh's case, an already built-up area at the southern parts of the city at Al-
Ma'lufeyyeh area was excluded from the master plan. Instead, the master plan encouraged 
growth to the north into open areas. It is worth mentioning here that the city of Al-Bireh’s 
growth to the east is impeded by the Israeli illegal settlement of Pesacot. Even areas included in 
previously-approved master plans of Al-Bireh are excluded from the current plan due to Israeli 
                                                 
15 The Green Line is a political term that refers to the boundaries of the areas taken over by Israel in 1948 
after the Catastrophe War. These borders exclude the West Bank, including East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. The 
Green Line can be thought of as the political boundary between Israel and Palestine. 
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opposition. This exclusion is clearly because of their proximity to Illegal Israeli settlements, or 
the future expansion of these illegal settlements, as in the case of Pesacot illegal settlement 
(Figure 11).  The city of Betunia’s growth to the south and west is also hindered for the same 
reasons, viz., the existence and expansion of the Ofer Military Camp and Giv’at Ze’ev illegal 
settlement. 
During the Israeli era the planning process in Ramallah has mirrored planning processes in 
the rest of the Palestinian Territories. It was an extreme top-down approach completely carried 
out and implemented by the Israeli military planners in conjunction with the Israeli Supreme 
Planning Council. The main change from the Jordanian era is that the Israeli military orders 
abolished the parts of the planning process that enabled a narrow window of public participation 
and replaced it with a planning process that was in direct conflict with the Palestinian 
requirements of development and prosperity. Israel planning policies hindered the development 
of Ramallah and directed its growth towards the north for political reasons and in order to be in 
line with the policies of occupation, regardless of the city’s and inhabitants' needs and 
requirements. 
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Figure 11: Al-Bireh Master Plan Development 
(Map created by researcher based on data layers obtained from the MOLG)  
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4.5 The Palestinian National Authority Era 
Following the establishment of the PNA in 1993, Palestinian planning institutions began to 
be founded and function in the West Bank and Gaza. When the West Bank lands were divided 
into categories A, B and C, as previously explained, Ramallah as a major city was classified as 
an A area by the Oslo accords. According to the Oslo Accords, areas categorized as B were 
supposed to be transferred into the category A and C into B until eventually the whole 
Palestinian Territories are transferred to the A category under the administrative and security 
control of the PNA. Unfortunately, this did not happen on the ground, as the peace process 
between the Palestinians and Israel did not progress and faced many setbacks. Currently— 
approximately 20 years after the Oslo Accords—the West Bank is divided into islands of Area A 
and Area B surrounded by Israeli-controlled Area C land. 
The Palestinian planning process faced many challenges at the beginning of the PNA era. 
Newly-established planning institutions were untested. A clear legal framework had yet to be 
established to regulate these planning institutions and the planning process after decades of 
Israeli military-occupation regulations that hindered Palestinian development and prosperity. 
Furthermore and perhaps most importantly, Palestinian planning institutions had no planning 
authority in Areas C which comprises the majority of the West Bank territory. 
Ramallah faces its own set of challenges as well. The PNA demands Jerusalem as the 
capital of a future Palestinian State and wants to house the main Palestinian institutions in that 
city. Unable to achieve this goal because Jerusalem is still under occupation, the PNA placed all 
of its main institutions in Ramallah. The PNA chose Ramallah due to the fact that it is the closest 
city to Jerusalem. Palestinian officials believed locating the seat of government in Ramallah 
would most easily facilitate their transfer to East Jerusalem once that city came under PNA, 
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which of course has not happened. Ramallah grew rapidly since it became the temporary capital 
(not the official capital) of the PNA. The master plan of the city approved in 1983 was no longer 
enough to accommodate this rapid growth (Figure 12). After its formation, the PNA passed very 
few new laws. Instead most former Jordanian laws were reactivated.  The reasons for this vary 
and require a long discussion for which no space is available here. What is important here is the 
fact that the PNA reactivated most former Jordanian laws – including the Jordanian planning law 
number 79 of 1966 – as the governing planning regulation in the Palestinian Territories.  
 
Figure 12: Population Growth of Ramallah  
(Khamaisi 2006) 
The first planning effort in the PNA period was initiated by Ramallah Municipality in 
1997. City planners realized the city lacked a general plan to cope with the population growth 
represented by the increase of building permit applications and that it did not have a mechanism 
for accepting, rejecting, or providing guidelines for local public and private developers. 
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Palestinian planners believed these needs could not be addressed without the preparation of a 
new master plan for the city (Khamaisi 2006). 
The Ramallah Municipality Council and planning department took the initiative to prepare 
a new master plan for the city. The new master plan included the original jurisdiction from the 
British Mandate and Jordanian periods and brought Ramallah city to an approximate area of 14.5 
km2. The new addition to the Ramallah plan was all in Area A. The first step in the planning 
process ended in 1999 after the Palestinian Higher Council on Planning authorized the main 
outline plan for Ramallah, (Figure 10). 
Trying to cope with the continuous growth of the city, the MOLG decided in the year 2000 
to expand the jurisdiction of Ramallah by annexing an additional two square kilometers to the 
northwest of the city. The municipality once again took the initiative to prepare a master plan for 
the new area. The Municipality accepted this plan in 2004 and the plan was then approved by the 
Palestinian Higher Council on Planning. The approved 2004 addition consisted of two areas 
within B-categorized land. These two areas are separated by a category C area (Figure 10). 
In line with the planning efforts of the MOLG and the Ramallah Municipality, it can be 
seen that the proposed growth is constrained by the Area C boundary. No planning occurred, nor 
could be approved by the Israeli Authorities, outside Area B. This situation becomes very clear 
when looking at the southern area where growth was very limited for that reason and can be 
more evident when looking at the plan of the three adjacent cities: Ramallah, Al-Bireh and 
Betunia. Growth of Al-Bireh was halted from the east by the Area C boundary and Pesacot 
Israeli illegal settlement. Betunia’s growth to the west was limited by the Area C boundary and 
the Giv'at Ze’ev Israeli illegal settlement. To the south the three cities' growth was very limited 
and constrained by the Area C boundary, as Israeli policies strictly controlled the growth of 
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Palestinian cities towards Jerusalem (Bollens 2000). The three cities were surrounded from the 
east, south and west by the Area C boundary lines leaving the north side the only available area 
for expansion. Only one option of growth is available for Palestinian planners and that is Area B 
land to the north. Accordingly, it is feasible to suggest that planners just followed what is 
permitted by the Israelis, rather than trying to look for and allocate the best areas for urban 
growth. The Area C line in this instance functioned, in a similar manner, to the Israeli plans for 
Palestinian communities prior to the existence of the PNA. Area C boundaries are basically 
indicating where the PNA is permitted to plan. Thus, it is orienting the growth direction of 
Palestinian communities as per an Israeli vision. As a result, the direction of urban growth has 
caused in many cases the loss of valuable agricultural lands for the benefit of built-up areas, 
simply because there is nowhere else for the city to grow. An example of this instance is the 
Betunia Balou' area which used to be a very fertile area. The Betunia Balou' area is now totally 
built up and no agricultural activity is undertaken in that area anymore. Such valuable Palestinian 
agricultural land would have been spared if growth were directed towards other areas in Area C-
categorized lands. Such a plan that would have spared agricultural land and proposed growth in 
Area C would have been worth considering as a counter plan. 
The inability to plan in Area C has paralyzed the regional (district) planning level. 
According to the Jordanian Planning Law Number 79 of 1966, regional planning committees 
were responsible for preparing master plans for districts that would serve as guidelines for the 
detailed master plans prepared by Municipalities or Local Councils. Although a regional 
planning committee existed for each Palestinian Governorate, regional planning committees did 
not prepare regional plans at all. The role of regional planning committees was only to review 
and approve local master plans prepared by local planning authorities.  
 85 
 
Accordingly, the Ramallah master plans of 1999 and 2004 were developed in ignorance of 
the master plans for both the twin city of Al-Bireh and the adjacent locality of Betunia. This led 
to many planning problems including conflicts in land use between the cities (Ministry of Local 
Government and Ministry of Planning 2009: 51).  
According to the Jordanian Planning Law Number 79 of 1966, the Higher Council on 
Planning should have played the role of developing a national plan that coordinated the regional 
plans and at the same time created a planning framework. It did not in any comprehensive 
manner. Although there have been a few attempts to develop such plans, such as a regional 
planning process funded by Norway, none of these attempts have been officially approved by the 
Palestinian Higher Council on Planning, and thus made obligatory.  
4.6 Attempts at Counter-planning in Ramallah 
The Israeli Civil Administration (ICA) is using the Area C boundaries to limit the 
Palestinian cities' growth away from Area C. In doing so, Israel is interfering with the Palestinian 
planning process, as the permitted areas for growth (Area A and Area B) are not always the best 
choice that responds to the needs of that specific community. In fact, the opposite is more likely 
the case. Constraining urban growth within Area A and Area B boundaries serves the Israeli 
occupation plans and is most likely in conflict with the local Palestinian’s interests. The term 
counter-planning, as discussed in Chapter 2, refers to a stream of thought theorizing for base-
level planning that counteracts plans of the main stream power (Davidoff 1965, Forester 1989, 
Friedman 1969, Krieger 1971, Roos 1974). In accordance with my discussion of the concept in 
chapter two I refer to counter-planning activities here as any attempts made by the PNA’s 
institutions, especially Ramallah municipally, to create plans that challenge the Israeli restriction 
on planning in Area C. 
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Within the course of this research, I conducted interviews with key planners and relative 
stakeholders at the MOLG and the Ministry of Planning (MOP).  Those interviews revealed that 
there is a general orientation on the Palestinian official planning level to begin preparing and 
approving master plans that include areas in category C land. This orientation is in spite of the 
probability that these planning processes have to be undertaken without the approval of the 
Israeli Authorities and driven by a general feeling that there is no anticipated political agreement 
that would subject the lands categorized by the Israeli authorities as Area C land to the 
jurisdiction of the Palestinian Planning Authority. The Palestinian population growth rate in the 
West Bank compared to other parts of the world is considered high, at about 2.9 percent per year 
(PCBS 2010). Area B lands are becoming too densely populated and are separated from each 
other by Area C lands. Palestinian planning for Area C land is countering plans prepared by the 
State of Israel. Plans prepared by Israel, as I have discussed earlier, promote occupation plans of 
control that conflict directly with the local Palestinian inhabitants. In the following section, I 
discuss recent counter-planning experiences for Ramallah. 
4.6.1 2011 Plan 
During 2009, Palestinian planners in Ramallah Municipality, motivated by the rapid 
increase in population, started to prepare another addition to the city's master plan. The city was 
running out of Area B land and expansion of the city as called for in the city's previous master 
plan was separated by an Area C space (Figure 13). Taking these facts into consideration and 
acting within the general PNA orientation to begin planning in Area C, the municipality planning 
staff began to prepare a master plan for a new addition that lies partially in Area C. The first step 
by the municipality was to propose roads within the boundaries of the 2004 approved master 
plan that extend into Area C between the two separated parts of the plan (Figure 13). Roads in 
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the already-approved 2004 plan lie in Area B and do not require Israeli approval. Although the 
municipality did not approve the Area C-roads in the 2009 plan, opening the roads in Area B 
created a fact on the ground. However, Israeli military planners can still propose or try to 
implement a different plan for that area. If the Israeli planners decide to propose different layouts 
for roads in Area C, then the municipality and its inhabitants will be adversely affected. 
Accordingly, I find it reasonable to argue that because of Palestinian planning activity in 
Ramallah it will be more difficult for the Israelis to implement conflicting plans in Area C 
than if this area was simply left unplanned by the Palestinians. The Israeli Authorities would 
then have to provide a better excuse for curtailing development of the roads in question. 
Chomsky (2010) argues that Israel will always need the world’s sympathy and this might be one 
of the very few ways the Palestinians can use to achieve their national rights. 
If it is much more difficult for Israel to implement occupation plans for areas with a 
Palestinian planning vision and if an official Palestinian planning vision is the one that is 
approved by the Palestinian Higher Council on Planning, then it is reasonable to conclude that 
the Palestinian position in any negotiating process over territory would be much stronger if 
Palestinian plans for Area C were approved by the Palestinian Higher Council on Planning. 
Currently, Ramallah Municipality is in the process of having these plans approved by the 
Palestinian Higher Council on Planning. 
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Figure 13: New Additions to the Ramallah Master Plan 
(Map created by researcher based on data layers obtained from the MOLG) 
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Ramallah Municipality is currently preparing a new master plan that adds a new growth 
area to the north, adjacent to the addition by the 2004 master plan. This addition lies partially in 
Area C. The Municipality is additionally working to approve this plan. The 2004 master plan is 
still under consideration and had not been approved as of this writing. The approval process 
seems to be vague and unclear to the Palestinian authorities. However, the attempt could be 
considered a preliminary step in the right direction for a Palestinian planning process that 
counters Israeli occupation plans. 
4.6.2 Metropolitan Plan 
4.6.2.1 Regional Planning – Regionalism  
Planning on the regional level can be associated with a scholarly stream of thought known 
as regionalism and neo-regionalism. Dating back to the beginnings of the twentieth century, 
regionalism is a response to the outcomes of sprawl, disintegration, and discontinuity between 
the city and its surroundings. Patrick Geddes was among the first scholars to theorize for a 
regional planning approach (Geddes 1915). According to those who have adopted a regionalist 
perspective, the planning unit should be more than only the city. The planning unit should be a 
region. Regionalists believe that Metropolitan Planning should substitute for city planning. 
Metropolitan planning ensures integration and continuity between the city and its surrounding 
environment. Regionalists argue that this is a more efficient approach to planning. Regions can 
occur on different levels; varying from the locality to the globe (Birch 1977, Gillham and 
MacLean 2002). Regions can exist on more than one level and planning should take into 
consideration the interaction between those levels and the way they affect each other. 
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4.6.2.2 The Ramallah—Al-Bireh—Betunia Metropolitan Plan (RABM) 
In 2009 there was  an initiative to create a unified master plan for the entire Ramallah, Al-
Bireh and Betunia metropolitan area. This initiative was carried out by the MOLG, MOP and the 
concerned Municipalities and Local Councils in what came to be known as the Ramallah— Al-
Bireh— Betunia Metropolitan Plan (RABM). The RABM—in addition to the three main 
municipalities—included six surrounding villages (Figure 14). An area referred to by the MOLG 
as the Ramallah, Al-Bireh, Betunia Metropolitan Area (RABMA). The idea was to reactivate 
planning on the regional level in the West Bank which has been promulgated, but not actually 
implemented, during the Jordanian era in 1966 when regional planning level was cancelled by 
the Decree Concerning the Organization of Towns, Villages and Buildings in the West Bank in 
1971. 
The Palestinian Territories, including the West Bank, is divided into Governorates. 
According to the Jordanian law number 79 of 1966, each Governorate forms a planning region or 
district. Regional planning committees should plan on the governorate level. However, the 
RABM defines a different region (Figure 15). The RABM defines its own boundaries that 
include cities and villages within two Palestinian governorates, Ramallah and Jerusalem. 
Scholars and planning practitioners have defined regions on the basis of historic, social, 
economic, and geographic considerations (Ehrenfeucht 2002, Soja 2014). Social and economic 
considerations might change with the development of the society, or changes in the global or 
local economy. The definition of a region is thus subject to change, even if it may prove difficult 
to change the perception people have of a region they have lived within for decades.  Under the 
Israeli occupation the expansion of urban areas has been considerably limited, or channeled into 
Israeli politically desirable directions, due to Israeli planning policies discussed earlier. However, 
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some villages and cities, over time, have developed urban and spatial relationships. These cities 
and villages have grown so interdependent that they formed an urban cluster that cannot be 
ignored while selecting the boundaries of a planning region. These cities and villages, therefore, 
might be located in more than one governorate. Moreover, planning for the Ramallah 
Governorate or the Jerusalem Governorate as a whole might appear to be a difficult task. 
Ramallah Governorate, for example, has more than a hundred communities that are separated by 
Area C land, Illegal Israeli settlements, Israeli bypass roads, the separation wall and military 
check points. 
By starting work on the RABM, the MOLG has for the first time in the West Bank 
prepared a master plan for an area that is larger than one city. The metropolitan area includes a 
considerable amount of Area C land between the villages. The RABM is a positive step that the 
PNA institutions have decided to take to draw future Palestinian planning policies in Area C 
without waiting for approval from the ICA. The RABM addresses many important issues 
relevant to the planning process in the targeted communities. It presents growth 
recommendations regardless of Israeli measures on the ground in Area C, illegal settlements, and 
the separation wall (Ministry of Local Government and Ministry of Planning 2009: 47-49).  
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Figure 14: Ramallah—Al-Bireh—Betunia Metropolitan Plan 
(Map created by researcher based on data layers obtained from the MOLG) 
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Figure 15: Metropolitan Plan Relation to Governorates 
(Map created by researcher based on data layers obtained from the MOLG) 
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The RABM also addresses conflicts among Palestinian master plans, such as the one in the 
Ramallah industrial area. Ramallah's master plan includes an area zoned as industrial to the 
southwest of the city. This industrial area is currently in-between Ramallah residential areas to 
the northeast and Betunia residential areas to the southwest. As the two cities grew, the 
residential uses spread towards the industrial zone. Currently, small factories and industrial 
workshops are surrounded directly by residential areas. This is causing many environmental 
problems such as pollution, noise, and traffic congestion problems caused by large trucks 
transferring goods to and from the industrial zone. In an attempt to resolve this problem, the 
RABM proposes a new location for the industrial zones that can service the three cities together. 
(Ministry of Local Government and Ministry of Planning 2009: 51). It proposes an infrastructure 
development plan and a unified transportation master plan for all of the villages falling within its 
purview. The authors of the RABM created a metropolitan council in charge of its 
administration, a council made up of representatives of the targeted municipalities and local 
council members, members from the MOLG and a member from the MOP. 
The RABM, unlike individual local master plans, includes a Palestinian vision for 
connecting the three cities with the surrounding villages. It includes Palestinian plans for areas 
categorized as C. This vision for Area C lands, the included transportation, shared infrastructure 
and orientation of future community growth is developed based upon a Palestinian assessment of 
needs. This vision is totally different from that of the ICA oriented towards serving the Illegal 
Israeli settlements and enhancing the occupation’s control. Thus, when evaluated in terms of 
theories of planning against power (Forester 1989), theories of advocacy planning (Davidoff 
1965), and the concept of counter-planning (Friedman 1969, Krieger 1971, Roos 1974), the 
RABM can be viewed as a type of counter-planning to Israeli top-down planning policies.  
 95 
 
Although a step in the right direction towards a Palestinian counter-planning process, the 
RABM has its drawbacks. The RABM was completed in 2009 after the approval of the Ramallah 
and Betunia master plans. At the same time, it did not include any modifications or mechanisms 
for altering those master plans to comply with issues addressed and recommendations proposed 
in the RABM. The RABM specifies that it does not supersede any master plans and it is an 
informal plan only (Ministry of Local Government and Ministry of Planning 2009, 71). This 
creates discrepancies in the implementation process. Municipal councils might not find 
provisions of the RABM in their own city's interest. For example, relocating Ramallah's 
industrial zone will be highly costly for the Ramallah Municipality, while the beneficiaries are 
actually residents of Betunia. It is therefore understandable why Ramallah Municipality's 
planners and council members are not too enthusiastic about relocating its industrial zone.  
Moreover, Metropolitan Planning in Palestine does not have a legal regulatory framework 
as per the current implemented Law 79 of 1996. The metropolitan region is part of two 
governorates and thus cannot be considered under the effective Jordanian planning law of 1966 
to be a regional planning process. On the other hand, the municipalities consist of publicly 
elected members and have a clear legal framework and the power to plan and implement these 
plans, by the force of law if necessary, within their municipal boundaries. 
The RABM is based on the Palestinian Regional Plan of 1998 (Ministry of Local 
Government and Ministry of Planning 2009: 32). The Regional Plan of 1998 was funded by the 
Norwegian government but was never implemented. Accordingly, the plan is rarely taken into 
consideration by local planners when preparing local Palestinian master plans. This plan was 
superseded by the Palestinian Reservation Plan in (2004). Currently the Palestinian National 
Plan is being developed by a dedicated team of planners associated with the MOP. Neither the 
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Palestinian Reservation Plan nor the Palestinian National Plan is even mentioned in the 
Metropolitan Plan report. At the same time the Metropolitan Council has a low representation 
from the MOP; only one member, as compared to four members of the MOLG and multiple 
members of the Municipalities. Furthermore, the RABM has a weak connection to national-level 
planning in Palestine.    
Finally, there was not any direct public participation during the RABM planning process. 
Workshops conducted through the RABM preparation process were inclusive to municipality 
members, planning staff, and official stakeholders from the ministries. This can act as an 
additional obstacle in the implementation of the RABM, as municipal elections are supposed to 
be held every four years. New council members and new mayors will not necessarily agree with 
previous members' policies, especially since these policies were not based on any significant 
public input. 
4.6.3 Regional Strategic Development and Investment Plans (SDIP) 
In 2009, the MOLG started implementing a new policy in the planning process. The 
MOLG has made it a requirement for every community to prepare Strategic Development and 
Investment Plans (SDIP). Master plans are expected to follow the recommendations of the 
SDIPs. SDIPs follow a public-participation approach by conducting workshops and interviews 
with local citizens and relative stakeholders. The main objective of the SDIP is to define the 
needs of a community and the required key projects in order to develop that specific community. 
A Ramallah—Al-Bireh—Betunia SDIP was developed in 2011. This SDIP does not in any way 
mention the RABM. There is also no association between the SDIP and the National Spatial Plan 
that is currently being prepared. Although this SDIP has a more obligatory form for the 
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municipalities, as per the requirements of the MOLG, there is still a lack of coordination within 
the planning process, especially between the national and regional planning levels.  
There is no clear mechanism for projecting plans created on the national level, such as the 
national plan on the regional level. It is also worth mentioning here that the relationship in the 
other direction is also uncoordinated. Very little if any feedback from the regional level is sent to 
the national level. 
4.7 Conclusion 
Planning in Ramallah has gone through multiple historical stages, from the Ottoman 
Empire period in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to the present day. Planning in 
Ramallah has traditionally been a top-down approach, similar in many ways to the modernist / 
high—modernist planning ideology. The first attempt to involve input from the public within the 
planning process was initiated by the Jordanian Planning Law Number 79 of 1966. This law 
divided the planning process into three hierarchical levels: a national level, a regional or district 
level and a local level. The law created the institutional structure responsible for these planning 
levels. The Jordanian Higher Council on Planning was responsible for planning on the national 
level. The Regional Planning Committee was responsible for the regional level and the 
municipality was responsible for the local level. Municipalities were directly elected by the 
public and thus were considered to represent the public's needs. According to this law, members 
of the public were also given an opportunity to object to planning decisions if their properties 
were directly affected by the planning process. The Higher Council on Planning was responsible 
for drawing an upper level planning framework. Regional planning committees were responsible 
for coordinating between the local level and the national one; making sure local plans complied 
with national planning policies and conveying local needs to the Higher Council on Planning to 
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ensure they are taken into consideration in the national planning policies. Unfortunately, this law 
was approved one year before the Israeli occupation of 1967. Israel changed this law four years 
after the occupation, in 1971. Israel abolished the regional planning committees and transferred 
all the authorities of the Higher Council on Planning to an Israeli planning council that followed 
the Israeli Military Governor of the West Bank. In so doing, Israel controlled the planning 
process in the West Bank and used it to promote its plans of control. Limited planning authorities 
were given to existing municipalities, including Ramallah. The Israeli Supreme Planning Council 
imposed planning boundaries. Municipal authorities' plans were limited to areas within these 
boundaries. Palestinian municipalities had no input whatsoever outside those boundaries. The 
public had no input in the preparation of regional and national plans that were serving the Israeli 
policies of control and separation. 
After the formation of the PNA in 1993, the Jordanian Planning Law Number 79 of 1966 
was reactivated and became the official planning law of the PNA. Regional Planning 
Committees were reactivated and the Higher Council on Planning was reestablished from 
members from several Palestinian Ministries. Despite the fact that the regional planning 
committees were reestablished, the Palestinian planning institutions found themselves able to 
plan locally only within areas A and B due to the limitations imposed by the Oslo Accords. As a 
result regional planning committees had been paralyzed and once again the Area B-Area C 
boundary was very similar to previously imposed Israeli plans. In this way national planning 
policies were alienated from local-level planning processes. Area B-Area C boundaries served to 
limit the areas within which Palestinians are permitted to plan.  As a result, planning for many 
local communities was carried out without reference to the surrounding metropolitan 
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environments and neighboring communities, which is evident in the planning of Ramallah and 
the adjacent cities. 
Two major themes are associated with the Ramallah case study. The first involves legal 
and planning issues and the second is the lack of coordination in the planning process, both 
horizontally and vertically. The current legal system in the West Bank does not support a 
regional planning level. This combined with the existence of the occupation and the limited 
capabilities of the PNA in Area C fundamentally affects the planning process on the regional 
level. Planning on the regional level is nearly absent and in any event regional plans are only 
informational and not legally binding on municipalities. 
The second theme is the lack of coordination. There is a considerable coordination problem 
within the planning process in the West Bank, both among planning institution and regional 
plans, a logical outcome of the first theme. The lack of a Palestinian legal framework for the 
regional level made all regional plans non-binding. Thus, multiple regional plans could include a 
single area without coordination, or even sometimes with conflicts. The absence of the regional 
planning level also made the coordination between the national planning level and the local one 
almost impossible.  
The regional planning level in the West Bank is missing. No official institutions exist that 
are responsible for planning on the regional level. On the other hand, the national planning level 
vision currently is based upon the Preservation Plan, which only delineates, as suggested by its 
name, the agricultural and cultural heritage areas that should be preserved. According to 
interviewees working in Regional Planning Committees and the Higher Council on Planning this 
plan lacks accuracy because it was based upon inaccurate satellite images. Nonetheless, even if it 
is accurate, it does not provide a vision of the planning future for the whole Palestinian State, nor 
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the West Bank. The National Plan on the other hand is still in the preparation process and cannot 
yet provide a reference per se. 
However, in the last few years, the PNA has begun to carry out some planning initiatives 
on the regional and national levels that incorporate Area C land, including the RABM and the 
Ramallah—Al Bireh—Betunia SDIP. Such an orientation is the result, at least in part, of the 
belief that the peace process is not going anywhere and that possibilities are extremely low, at 
least in the foreseeable future, for transferring authorities in Area C to the Palestinians. 
These initiatives represent attempts at counteracting Israeli plans for Area C. They are 
drawing a vision of the indigenous local citizens that defies the Israeli one. From this point of 
view and projecting these actions on previous relevant literature (Krieger 1971, Friedman 1969, 
Roos 1974, Forester 1989, Davidoff 1965), these Palestinian planning initiatives on the regional 
and national levels, that incorporate Area C land, can be looked at as counter-planning acts. 
However, these acts of counter-planning are still immature. They lack a general, legal regulative 
framework that transfers them from isolated projects into a planning-institution policy. These 
projects lack a clear mechanism for approval even from Palestinian official institutions. The lack 
of a clear, regulative framework is causing some redundancy in such counter-planning acts. The 
discrepancies between the Ramallah master plan, the RABM, and the SDIP is a good example of 
this overlap. It highly probable that if regional planning policies in Area C were assigned as an 
official task to all Regional Planning Committees, this will save much duplication in work and 
discrepancies in the results.   
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5 Chapter 5: Fasayil 
5.1 Background 
Fasayil is a Palestinian village located in the Jericho Governorate approximately 20 
kilometers north of the city of Jericho and 26 kilometers from Ramallah (Figure 16). Fasayil lies 
in the western side of the Jordan Valley at the bottom of the western slopes, approximately 200 
meters below sea level. The western slopes limit any development to the west of the village. 
Israeli authorities have always paid special attention to the Jordan Valley in terms of policies of 
occupation. Most of the Jordan Valley area is allocated as Israeli closed military areas with a 
relatively greater number of Illegal Israeli settlements scattered across it compared to the other 
parts of the West Bank (Figure 17). The special attention be due to the fact that the Jordan Valley 
forms the Palestinian borders of the West Bank with Jordan and also be due to the fact that the 
Jordan Valley lands are fertile (Haddad, Erakat and Saba 2013). Most Illegal Israeli settlements 
in the Jordan Valley are agricultural ones that produce vegetables and citrus fruits (B'Tselem 
2011). Small clusters of Palestinian semi-nomadic Bedouin communities are scattered along the 
valley; some have been settled for a long time. For example the Bedouins in Upper Fasayil have 
been settled there for over 30 years (International Peace and Cooporation Center 2011). Most of 
the land in the Jordan Valley is classified as Area C. Four exceptions exist: a relatively large 
region of Area A that covers the city of Jericho in the South, and three smaller islands of Area B 
covering four small Palestinian communities: Marj Na'jah, Marj Al Ghazal, Al-Zubeidat and 
Fasayil. Some of the largest Illegal Israeli settlements located in the Jordan Valley are Mizpe 
Jericho and Ma’ale Efrayim. The closest Israeli settlements to Fasayil are Peza’el and Tomer 
(Figure 17). 
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Figure 16: Fasayil Location Map 
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Figure 17: Jordan Valley 
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Fasayil’s built up area is divided into two parts: Upper and Lower Fasayil. A settled 
Bedouin group forms the majority of the population in the Upper Fasayil region (established in 
the 1970s) and a more urbanized group in the lower one (International Peace and Cooporation 
Center 2011). The majority of Lower Fasayil lies in Area B while the Upper Fasayil lies 
completely in Area C. In line with Israeli policies, discussed earlier, many of the buildings in 
Upper Fasayil have been subject to demolition and demolition orders from the Israeli Civil 
Administration (ICA). Very few if any of the buildings built in Upper Fasayil had licenses 
because of the complicated and expensive licensing process from the ICA in Area C, as 
discussed in Chapter 4.  
5.1.1 The Current Planning Situation 
Fasayil’s population in 2013 is estimated at 1,224 (PCBS 2012). Approximately 40 percent 
village residents resides in Upper Fasayil with the remaining 60 percent in Lower Fasayil 
(International Peace and Cooporation Center 2011).  
In 2007 50 percent of Fasayil's residents were younger than 14 years old and only 1.5 
percent of village residents were over 65, indicating a young population that is candidate for a 
high growth rate (PCBS 2012).  In 2007, Fasayil was comprised of 182 housing units. Of these, 
69 percent were single houses, 21 percent apartments and 8 percent tents (the tents being mainly 
located in Upper Fasayil) (International Peace and Cooporation Center 2011). Currently 31 
percent of households in Fasayil contain more than eight individuals–– much higher than the 
West Bank average of 21 percent –– attributable to previous demolitions of structures in Fasayil 
and thus to the residents’ reluctance to build more houses for fear of demolition (PCBS 2012).  
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Fasayil's main access is through Road 90 that connects the southern and northern parts of 
the Jordan Valley. However, Palestinian access to this road is controlled by a series of 
checkpoints, such as the Hamra checkpoint in the north and Jericho checkpoint in the south.  
Agriculture serves as a major source of income for Palestinian communities located in the 
Jordan Valley. Fasayil also provides educational and health care facilities to surrounding 
Bedouin communities. For hospital care, higher education and solid waste disposal, Fasayil 
residents depend on the regional major cities of Jericho and Ramallah. Fasayil is also facing a 
serious lack of infrastructure and public services. 
Development in Lower Fasayil follows a grid-like pattern, whereas building allocation in 
Upper Fasayil is sporadic with a higher number of barracks. This can be explained by the 
Bedouin traditions of keeping livestock close to their homes. The buildings in Fasayil are mainly 
single story, with a large number of temporary structures in Upper Fasayil. 
5.2 Land Confiscation and Demolition Activities 
5.2.1 Land Confiscation 
Since the first years of the occupation in 1967, several square kilometers of village land has 
been confiscated by the Israeli Military Governor and the ICA. Most of the confiscated land, 
about 3.3 km2, were confiscated for the construction four Illegal Israeli settlements (Table 4). 
Israel also confiscated 67,000 m2 for the purpose of establishing a military base. Other village 
land was confiscated for the construction of Israeli bypass roads (Road 90 and Road 505) in 
order to connect the four Illegal Israeli settlements with other nearby ones and for the 
establishment of other Israeli military bases. The real threat of bypass roads lies in the buffer 
zone formed by the Israeli Forces along these roads, extending to approximately 75 m on both 
sides of the road. 
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Table 4: Illegal Israeli settlements around Fasayil 
Illegal settlement 
Name 
 
Year of construction 
 
Area confiscated (1000 
m2) 
 
Population  
 
Gilgal 1970 858 172 
Tomer 1978 1,049 233 
Nativ HaGdud 1979 215 102 
Peza’el 1981 1,242 54 
Total  3,363 561 
 
Source: (The Applied Research Institute – Jerusalem 2012) 
5.2.2 Demolition 
The ICA demolished 21 structures in Fasayil between the years 2006 and 2010. The ICA's 
declared reason for these demolitions was the lack of a building permit.  
Fasayil's problem surfaced with local and international NGOs and human right 
organizations in 2007 when the Israel Defense Forces issued a demolition order for the village 
primary school for being built without a permit. Residents of Fasayil, with the help of some local 
NGOs, petitioned the Israeli Supreme Court. The Jerusalem Legal Aid and Human Rights 
Center16 (Jerusalem Legal Aid and Human Rights Center 2011), for example, raised six petitions 
and was able to obtain interim injunctions against demolition, which temporarily froze the 
demolition orders. Unfortunately, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled in favor of the ICA demolition 
orders and on June 13, 2011, 20 structures were demolished, displacing resident families. The 
decisions of the Israeli Supreme Court are final as it is the highest judicial authority in Israel. 
Accordingly, there was no legal recourse left for these families. The Israeli Supreme Court again 
approved the demolition of two additional structures on July 14, 2011. The Supreme Court’s 
decisions are legally significant because they are likely to influence a similar outcome for the 
                                                 
16 A Palestinian human rights organization whose objective is to render legal aid to vulnerable Palestinian 
communities in combating human rights violations. 
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remaining petitions, threatening about another 40 families. Between 2009 and 2011 the ICA 
issued 44, stop-work17 and demolition orders against structures in Fasayil (International Peace 
and Cooporation Center 2011, Jerusalem Legal Aid and Human Rights Center 2011, Jordan 
Valley Solidarity 2011).  
Israeli Authorities are exercising the very same policies of enhancing occupation control in 
Fasayil that I pointed to in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. Fasayil is built on lands that are 
classified as Miri agricultural land under Ottoman law. Although Ottoman regulations permitted 
the conversion of agricultural land to residential use, Israel uses the Ottoman law selectively. It 
orders the residents to evacuate because these are agricultural Miri lands and ignores the fact that 
the Ottoman law permits its conversion for residential use. Israel is therefore implementing the 
Ottoman land-use laws selectively to control more land. It is trying to evacuate indigenous 
Palestinian villagers from their homes to gain more land either for expanding Jewish illegal 
settlements, or maybe for other economic or security reasons. To reiterate, Fasayil is located in 
the Jordan Valley, an area of strategic importance to Israel, as per Israeli claim. Israel is 
benefitting from the agricultural potential of the Jordan Valley and also considers the area, due to 
the border with Jordan, important for its security. 
The Jerusalem Legal Aid and Human Rights Center argues that Israel is seeking to evict 
Fasayil Bedouins from the land in order to make way for Israel illegal settlement expansion: 
Israel’s actions are neither justified by security or military necessity, nor carried out with 
the safety of the Bedouins in mind. Instead, Bedouin families are evicted from their 
ancestral lands to make room for the expansion and benefit of Jewish settlements,  . . . 
[these actions are] usually accompanied by violence and confiscation of livestock and 
                                                 
17 A stop-work order is an administrative order against any construction built in "Area C" without a permit 
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equipment, and completed without compensation. (Jerusalem Legal Aid and Human 
Rights Center 2011, 2). 
Fasayil provides a good example of how Israeli policies in the West Bank serve to enhance 
the occupation’s control over land, which is in direct conflict with the Palestinian residents 
planning and daily-life interests.  
5.2.3 Previous Plan 
Fasayil has an existing master plan that only covers Lower Fasayil (Figure 18). This plan 
was prepared by the Israeli planner, Shlomo Khayat, who was hired in the 1980s by the Israeli 
Military Government to create master plans for many Palestinian communities in the West Bank, 
including Fasayil. The Israeli plan of Fasayil was approved by the Israeli Supreme Planning 
Council in 1988. Before this plan, as there was no Palestinian planning body, no other master 
plans existed for the locality. The 1988 plan has been the only planning vision for Fasayil since 
its approval and until the year 2011 when the International Peace and Cooperation Center (IPCC) 
presented a new master plan.  I will discuss the IPCC master plan in a subsequent section of this 
chapter. As with other plans prepared by Israeli planners during the same period, such as the 
Ramallah 1987 master plan discussed in the previous chapter, the Fasayil 1987 plan did not take 
into account any public input.  
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The plan only includes Lower 
Fasayil and covered a total area of 
0.147 km2 out of the total village lands 
area of 46.826 km2 (About 0.5 percent) 
(The Applied Research Institute – 
Jerusalem 2012, Jerusalem Legal Aid 
and Human Rights Center 2011). 
According to this plan about 10 percent 
of the total planned area was allocated 
as public facilities, while the rest was 
designated as residential. The 1988 
master plan's preparation process was 
merely office work, a top-down 
process that is enforcing the 
occupation’s policies over village 
inhabitants. Not only were the boundaries of this plan very tight around the existing built-up 
area, but they even excluded houses and structures already built. These buildings were later 
subjected to demolition orders from the Israeli military. Moreover, the upper part of the village, 
which is only about 500 meters away from the lower part, was entirely excluded. Further, 
structures in the Upper Fasayil have existed since the 1970s (International Peace and 
Cooporation Center 2011, The Applied Research Institute – Jerusalem 2012). As a result of 
Israeli plans, these structures were considered by the ICA as illegally built and were thus 
threatened with demolition. Unlike the planning process for Fasayil that resulted in the 1988 
Figure 18: Fasayil Previous Plan 
(International Peace and Cooporation Center 2011) 
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plan, a democratic urban plan would have taken into account the local residents' needs prioritized 
organizing the building process for the community and ensured the required level of services for 
residents, instead of regarding the whole community as illegal and subject to demolition. 
5.3 Israeli Proposal 
In 2007 and under the pressure of the Quartet18 represented  at that time by the British 
Prime Minister Tony Blair, Israel agreed to a planning process for 14 Palestinian communities in 
Area C, including Upper Fasayil. At that time the Palestinians had no planning vision or maps 
for the 14 communities. As the Palestinian planning institutions were preparing to start working 
on the plans for the 14 communities, the ICA had, within a few weeks, plans prepared for all of 
them. The fast response from the Israeli side can be explained by two reasons. The first is that 
Israel policy makers already have made plans for the West Bank. The overriding objective, as 
discussed at the beginning of this dissertation, are to control as much land as possible and 
through that control to enhance the occupation's power. The second reason is that Israeli planners 
could not care less what the local residents' needs are. They had to create plans for these 
Palestinian communities under Quartet Committee pressure and that is exactly what they did. 
Boundaries were assigned to these communities by Israeli official planners in a way that not only 
precludes future expansion of the municipalities but even leaves parts of the communities outside 
the planned area and subject to demolition as I pointed out earlier. 
                                                 
18Sometimes called Diplomatic Quartet or Madrid Quartet was established in Madrid in 2002, recalling the 
Madrid Conference of 1991. It consists of a foursome of the United Nations, the United States, the European Union, 
and Russia. Its main purpose is mediating the peace process in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Tony Blair is the 
Quartet's current Special Envoy. 
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Upper Fasayil represents a good example 
of Israeli planning for West Bank communities. 
The ICA defined a boundary line of 
development for the community (Figure 18) 
that includes some buildings of the village but 
excludes others. The development boundary 
covers an area of 0.108 km2. The total built-up 
area in Fasayil is 0.171 km2 thus 0.063 km2 of 
Upper Fasayil was located outside the proposed 
planned perimeter. As a result, 45 buildings 
located in this area outside the blue line plan 
will remain illegal and subject for demolition. 
Although the new development boundary 
legitimatizes, from an Israeli perspective, many 
of the structures in Area C, these boundaries at 
the same time do not meet future needs of 
growth for these communities. Additionally, as 
it leaves many existing structures outside these boundaries, Palestinian acceptance of this plan 
would mean accepting the demolition of buildings that lay outside the development boundaries. 
Accordingly, the plan of Fasayil, as was the case in other plans for the rest of the 13 
communities, was rejected by the Palestinian negotiating team, and thus by the official planning 
institutions. 
Figure 19: Israeli Proposed Plan  
(IPCC, 2011) 
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5.4 Palestinian Counter-planning Actions 
After the Israeli plans for the 14 communities in Area C were rejected by the Palestinians 
on the political level, the Minister of Local Government, as the head of the Palestinian Planning 
Higher Council, ordered the creation of a committee of Palestinian planning officials from the 
Ministry of Planning (MOP) and the Ministry of Local Government (MOLG). The sole purpose 
of this committee is to create urban plans for Palestinian communities in Area C which can 
provide for local needs of growth, sufficient infrastructure and socio-economic services while at 
the same time legalize structures built in these areas to protect them from Israeli demolition. 
The first problem faced by the committee is legal. As I have discussed earlier, Palestinian 
planning institutions do not have the legal authority to plan in Area C, as per the Oslo Accords. 
Thus the Palestinian planning institutions cannot submit plans to the ICA for approval, as they 
have no legal status to do so. Trying to find a way around this, the committee decided to 
cooperate with the local councils of these communities and to plan through them. The local 
councils, at the end, are elected bodies and derive their legitimacy from the public. According to 
the planning committee plan, the MOLG will provide financial and technical support to local 
councils of these communities. In return the planning process will be carried out in close 
coordination with the Palestinian Higher Council on Planning. When plans are ready and 
approved by the planning committee and the local council, local councils will then have the 
responsibility of taking these plans to the ICA for approval. 
For planning in Upper Fasayil and other Area C Palestinian communities, the MOLG 
contracted the International Peace and Cooperation Center (IPCC) to carry out the planning 
efforts. The IPCC is a planning institution that is owned and operated by Palestinians who reside 
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inside Israel.19 The planning committee thought that hiring an Israeli-based planning 
organization would make interaction with the ICA easier. However, interviews conducted with 
planners from the IPCC reveal that being an "Israeli" office had no effect on the Israeli 
acceptance of the proposed plans. At the end Israeli officials at the ICA knew that this institution 
is working for the benefit of Palestinian planning institutions to counter their proposed plans. 
5.4.1 Fasayil Master Plan 2011 
Fasayil's local council hired the IPCC, as per the MOLG request, to carry out a new master 
plan of the community. Financial and technical support was provided by the MOLG. The main 
objective of the IPCC plan was "[T]o provide tools for legal and sustainable development of the 
Fasayil community" (International Peace and Cooporation Center 2011: 1). The IPCC started the 
planning process by collecting documented data from existing institutions and conducting field 
visits and surveys to collect undocumented data. Data regarding all demographic, social, 
economic and infrastructure were collected, documented and analyzed. The community was 
planned based on a projection of the current population for the next 20 years. Population 
projections were conducted on the basis of historic population growth ratios and PCBS data. 
Contrary to the ICA master plan of 1988 that left many buildings outside planning boundaries 
subject to demolition orders, the current master plan will accommodate all existing structures and 
a population growth projection for the next 20 years. Moreover, the IPCC plan treated both parts 
of Fasayil as a single community and used the area in-between to accommodate for future urban 
growth (Figure 20 and Figure 21).  
                                                 
19 Palestinians who remained in their hometowns after the Catastrophe war in 1948. Palestinians inside Israel 
have a unique political situation. 
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Figure 20: IPCC Proposal to Connect Upper 
and Lower Fasayil  
(International Peace and Cooporation Center 2011) 
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Figure 21: IPCC Master Plan of Fasayil 
(International Peace and Cooporation Center 2011) 
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Following the data collection and analysis phase, development goals for the master plan 
were defined. Development goals were defined by the IPCC planning team on the basis of the 
results of the data analysis and discussions among the planning team, the local council and the 
MOLG planners. Planning goals as explained in the IPCC master plan report are: 
• Legalizing homes and preventing demolition orders from being issued. 
• Allocating enough area for expansion of the locality based on the 2030 projection 
needs. 
• Developing a road network to ensure effective mobilization of the residents in 
Fasayil and ensure the existence of a clear road hierarchy to ease traffic. 
• Allocating more land for public places to meet the needs of the residents of 
Fasayil based on a 2030 needs prediction for the population. 
• Preserving the rural character of the locality and, at the same time, develop the 
locality to ensure urbanized social culture. 
• Integrating the two communities of Upper and Lower Fasayil through shared 
services and infrastructure (International Peace and Cooporation Center 2011: 
17). 
Until this stage of the planning process, no real public participation activities such as public 
meetings or workshops were conducted by the IPCC planning team, which one might consider a 
drawback to the plan in its potential capacity as a counter-plan to Israeli planning for the area. 
Theories of counter-planning and planning against –mainstream power define counter–plans as 
plans that are prepared by the local community to counter plans of –mainstream planning 
institutions that do not meet the local communities' needs and aspirations. When I asked them 
about why relatively few public participation activities were conducted, planning team members 
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and MOLG planners stated that planners needed to advance with the planning process quickly to 
try to protect structures threatened by demolition. Therefore, circumstances left no time for any 
public participation. While this might not appear be a very convincing reason, it is also the case 
that a minimal amount of public participation existed through the publicly-elected members of 
the local council.   
After the main goals of the project have been agreed upon by the planning team –– made 
up of  the local council and MOLG planners––public input was elicited and taken into account 
by the planners. Two public workshops, five months apart, were conducted with local residents 
to discuss the development framework (Figure 22). Feedback from the first workshop was used 
by the planners to develop a planning framework that was discussed in the second workshop.  
Both workshops led to a final development framework for the anticipated master plan.  
Taking into account the planning process for Fasayil that I just described, the IPCC master 
plan is significantly more democratic and meets more of the local citizens' needs than the Israeli 
plan proposed earlier by the ICA. The ICA plan was created in a top-down fashion in support of 
the policies of the occupation, regardless of the needs of the local residents. On the other hand, 
the intent of the IPCC planners was to protect the interests of the local residents and their 
buildings and involved a significant amount of public participation. But did this plan really 
function as a counter-planning act? I will try to answer this question in the following section. 
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Figure 22: IPCC Fasayil Planning Process 
(International Peace and Cooporation Center 2011) 
  
5.4.2 A Counter-planning Act? 
The next step in implementing the IPCC master plan was approval. Here the Palestinian 
National Authority's (PNA) institutions faced a legal problem again. There were two options 
available for action. The first option for the PNA was to practice its right, as a state, on the 
ground20 and approve the plan unilaterally. However, following this course of action will have 
consequences. First of all, it will open the door to a confrontation with the Israeli Authorities and 
perhaps with extra-regional parties like the Quartet Committee.  Secondly, along with authority 
comes responsibility. The question here is, Can the PNA take the responsibility of issuing such 
an approval? In other words, if building licenses or infrastructure construction permits were 
                                                 
20 On the 29th of November, 2012 the United Nations General Assembly voted for to accord Palestine a non-
member-state status in United Nations. 
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issued by the Palestinian institutions according to a unilaterally Palestinian approved master plan 
and if the Israeli authorities issued demolition orders for what it considers illegally-constructed 
buildings, would the PNA be able to reverse the demolition orders or even offer the affected 
individuals or institutions any compensation for their losses? The answer is definitely no. The 
PNA cannot confront the Israeli military and does not have the financial resources to offer 
support or compensation to those Palestinians who might be affected by demolition orders. 
As a result, the PNA finds itself with no choice but to act according to the second option, 
which is trying to seek Israeli approval of this master plan. But again, how could Israel approve a 
plan that is actually counteracting its own plans for the area? 
It is common sense that Israel would probably not approve such a plan. However, the point 
here is the rigidity of the master plan and how much is it grounded in the needs of the local 
citizens. At the end, it is totally different for the Palestinian local councils, or local citizens, to 
argue that they reject the Israeli plans for no documented reason than it is to argue that the plans 
are our plans designed with our community needs in mind and that the Israeli plan is stripping us 
of these basic essential needs. Chomsky (2010) argues that Israel is constantly in need of 
convincing the world that it is a democratic country and respects human rights. From this point 
of view, Israel will have much more difficulty in demolishing buildings that are within a 
Palestinian master plan, rather than demolishing structures that are only outside planned areas –– 
even if the boundaries of the planned areas are, in the first place, proposed by the Israeli 
Authorities. 
I argue that this is exactly the case here. The PNA's decision was to apply for approval 
from the ICA. The master plan for Fasayil was able to stand for itself. At least the ICA could not 
reject it from a technical point of view. Once the plan was submitted to the ICA and accepted for 
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consideration, the area that the master plan included is by law declared an area under planning. 
Consequently, all demolition orders were frozen. Until this moment, the IPCC urban plan was 
never approved. However, the IPCC master plan was submitted to the ICA on May 2011, since 
then and for more than two years now, no structures were demolished. Freezing the demolition 
orders for two years, by itself, is a gain for the residents.  
Considering the IPCC master plan of Fasayil in conjunction with theories of counter-
planning (Davidoff 1965, Forester 1989, Friedman 1969, Krieger 1971, Roos 1974) discussed in 
chapter two of this dissertation, I would argue that the plan is an act of counter-planning. The 
plan depended, if only partially, on public participation. Planners took the input of local citizens  
into consideration by involving the elected local council in the entire planning process and by 
conducting public workshops for input and discussing options. The plan was also created to 
counteract an existing Israeli plan that was prepared by the ICA which conflicts, as a plan of the 
Occupation, with the interests of the local citizens. Not only was it in conflict, many buildings 
owned by the citizens, as a result, were subject to demolition orders. The new IPCC master plan 
was successful in preserving the local buildings from being demolished at least for two years. 
The new plan, contrary to the Israeli one, took into consideration future growth and the socio-
economic services needs for the community. Forester argues that a planner is an interactive 
player whose responsibility extends beyond creating plans that respond to the powerful class's 
needs. According to Forester (1989) and Krumholz (1982), the planner should seek to 
acknowledge the needs of the powerless, those who cannot get their voices heard. This is what 
the planner was seeking, the interest of the locals and not the interest of the state or an occupying 
authority. The planner here is trying to plan to counteract the plan of the state. The plan thus is in 
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line with the counter-planning stream of thought and therefore can be considered as a counter-
plan to the Israeli one. 
Counter-planning can act on different levels. Although this plan is an act of counter-
planning on the local level, the question remains: Does it also function as an act of counter-
planning on the regional and national levels? Taking into account that the regional planning level 
in the West Bank is practically missing and the fact that the national planning level still depends 
on the unfinished and inaccurate Preservation Plan, discussed think one could certainly argue 
that the IPCC plan for Fasayil was created without looking at the surrounding communities, 
Jericho Governorate, or a national vision for the West Bank. Although the IPCC plan is working 
as a counter-planning act on the local level, it is not doing the same on the regional and national 
levels because of the lack of a regional and national vision. 
5.4.3 Countering the Counter-Plan! 
As discussed earlier, it is not always easy for Israeli authorities to argue for a vision for 
West Bank communities that conflicts with the local Palestinian citizens' interests, if there was/is 
an existing Palestinian planning vision. The ICA neither approved nor rejected the IPCC plan. 
Actually, the Israeli response was interesting. The ICA, after receiving the IPCC plan, issued a 
work tender for private-sector planners for the purpose of creating master plans with defined 
boundaries for several Palestinian communities, including Fasayil. The ICA defined the very 
same border it proposed before  the IPCC created a plan for Fasayil. According to the ICA, this 
border cannot be exceeded in any planning process and under any circumstances.  
The ICA here is counteracting the IPCC plan! In a sense the ICA is acting in the same 
manner as the IPCC did, but according to its own perceived interests. The ICA is trying to create 
a new master plan for Fasayil that responds to the interests of the occupation of control. The ICA 
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wants to be able to argue for the illegality of structures outside the boundaries of this plan and 
thus implement its plans of demolition and land confiscation for the benefit of Illegal Israeli 
settlements. However, it is going to be difficult if not impossible to argue that a plan with the 
boundaries found in the Israeli-authorized plan responds to the needs of the local citizens. The 
occupation is in effect countering the local citizenry's act of planning. What is very interesting is 
that the private company that won the planning job is a Palestinian engineering and architecture 
company. This act from a Palestinian company can, and I would argue, should be considered an 
act against the Palestinian interest. When official planners in the MOLG and MOP were asked 
why this company was not stopped from acting, the answer was that there is no law against it. 
Once again, the issue of legal framework is mentioned again, but from a different perspective 
this time. No Palestinian planning regulation or law exists that can stop private-sector planning 
institutions from coordinating with the ICA and planning against the Palestinian orientation, or 
vision. Currently planning regulations fall short from more than one perspective in responding to 
the challenges facing the current planning reality in the West Bank. 
5.5 Conclusion 
A relatively recent orientation — among PNA decision — makers is to begin planning in 
Area C.  Consequently, planners are attempting to respond to the needs of the local residents and 
at the same time provide support for residents to better withstand Israeli plans of separation and 
control. As seen in the Fasayil case, Israeli plans not only aimed at limiting the urban growth of 
the community, but also left a considerable number of buildings outside the planned area as a 
way of legitimating the demolition of many Palestinian-owned structures.  
The Palestinian response, by providing alternate Palestinian point-of-view plans, countered 
the Israeli plans by providing a different scenario within which already-built community 
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structures are conserved and areas for future urban development are provided. In the Fasayil case 
study, all demolition and stop-work orders issued by the ICA were frozen as a result of 
Palestinian plans. In a worst-case-scenario, Israeli authorities will reject these plans. In Fasayil 
the IPCC plan was submitted two years earlier and the Israelis have not completely rejected it 
yet. In the worst case scenario, the IPCC plan has bought time for the inhabitants of threatened 
buildings before their properties are demolished. The Palestinian plans acted as counter-plans to 
Israeli ones. Buying time before the demolition takes place can be essential in such a politically 
unstable situation, as demolition orders may be reversed if areas are transferred to the PNA under 
an interim or final agreement. 
Other forms of counter-planning are the SDIPs whether local, such as single—community  
SDIPs, or regional SDIPs such as the Salfit and Jericho Governorates. SDIPs opened the door for 
a wider public participation process. Joint—council plans represent another form of counter—
planning. Joint—council plans include more than one adjacent community that might, or might 
not, be separated by C areas. Metropolitan Plans are also considered to be a form of counter—
planning as they include, in many cases, a Palestinian vision for Area C lands such as the 
RABM. 
However, Palestinian counter-planning faces many challenges. The first challenge is a legal 
one. In order to find a way around this legal deficiency, the PNA has adopted criteria for 
planning in Area C that will provide support to local councils to create master plans based on 
public participation and solid information for the needs of local residents and for a stronger 
position acquiring ICA approval. Israel would then have to provide reasons to reject such plans 
to representatives of the European Union, the United States, and the Russian Federation. Israel 
 124 
 
will always need the sympathy of the world’s countries and this might be one of the very few 
methods the Palestinians can use to accomplish their national rights (Chomsky 2010).  
Signs on counter-planning activity by Palestinian institutions are found. These counter-
planning activities are still facing many challenges, such as the deficiencies of Palestinian 
planning institutions and the lack of a comprehensive vision. 
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6 Chapter 6: Rawabi 
6.1 Introduction 
Rawabi is the first newly-planned city in Palestine's modern history. Rawabi is nine 
kilometers north of Ramallah and 25 kilometers south of Nablus (Figure 23). From the hilltops of 
Rawabi there is a panoramic view of the Mediterranean's eastern coast line, located 40 
kilometers to the west. The Jordanian capital, Amman, is 70 kilometers to the east of Rawabi.  
6.1.1 Why discuss Rawabi? 
Rawabi is being promoted as a national, patriotic project that aims at resisting the 
occupation and thus contributes to the building of the Palestinian state. Mr. Bashar Al-Masri, a 
key figure in implementing the project, has asserted, "Building a city is, in a way, fighting the 
occupation. It is the more progressive way, it is the professional way, it is the human way and it 
is the modern way" (Purkiss 2013: 1, Tan 2013: 1). Amir Dajani, Deputy Managing Director of 
Rawabi, also asserts that the new city "is seen as an iconic project in the Palestinian vision of 
statehood" (Purkiss 2013: 1). Even some international scholars argue the same way.  Sak asserts 
that, "I see a new phase of Palestinian resistance in Rawabi. It will still be hard, but it has 
promise" (SaK 2013: 1). Many, then, are arguing that Rawabi is a project that is resisting the 
occupation. In other words, it is seen as an urban project that counters the occupation. This 
concept is very close in principle to the counter-planning concept that I have described in this 
dissertation. I therefore believed it important to include a chapter on Rawabi City in this 
dissertation and to try to assess if is the city really is a counter-planning project. 
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6.1.2 Background 
The land area of the city, approved by the Palestinian Higher Council on Planning in 
October 2008, is 6,300,000 m2 (1556 acres). The city is being built on phases. The current phase 
extends to a land tract of 760,000 m2 (about 12 percent of the total allotted area). It includes 23 
neighborhoods, a commercial center and a range of public facilities. When construction expands 
in the subsequent phases to the full area of the city`s municipal boundaries, Rawabi is projected 
to accommodate a population of 40,000 (Rawabi 2011).  
Plans for Rawabi include about 5,000 housing units and a central, mixed land-use area with 
retail shops, office area, restaurants, banks, medical facilities, a hotel, movie theaters, and 
cinemas (Rawabi 2011). 
The idea of building Rawabi was first proposed by Bashar Al-Masri, a Palestinian 
businessman, and the founder and managing director of Bayti Real Estate Investment Company 
(Bayti). Bayti is jointly-owned by Qatari Diar Real Estate Investment Company and Massar 
International, of which Al-Masri serves as the general director and chairman. 
Rawabi now is being marketed by the Bayti Real Estate Investment Company as an 
environmentally friendly sustainable city that provides a place for young Palestinian families to 
live, work, and grow. Rawabi is also being marketed as a national project of the foreseen future 
Palestinian independent state (Rawabi 2011). 
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Figure 23: Rawabi Location Map 
(Map created by researcher based on data layers obtained from the Ministry of Local Government) 
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Rawabi was first announced during the Jenin Economic Conference held in the city of 
Jenin in 2008. Consequently, a public-private partnership agreement has been signed between 
Bayti Real Estate Investment and the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). As per the 
agreement, the PNA guarantees governmental support for an enhanced business environment for 
the development of Rawabi by providing taxation and infrastructure subsidies to the investors. 
According to the agreement, the public sector is also committed to contributing to the provision 
of infrastructure and public services through donor funds. The public sector was committed as 
well to facilitate the granting of necessary licenses and permits. For its part, Bayti Real Estate 
Company committed to an investment of at least $850 million and the construction of at least 
5,000 housing units (Rawabi 2011). 
6.2 Rawabi: A Controversial City 
Since 2008, when the city project was first announced at the Jenin Economic Conference, 
Rawabi has been the subject of much debate. While the founders of the city argue that it is a 
great step forward towards a future independent Palestinian state, many Palestinians argue that 
this city is more or less occupation-friendly: it is a city that looks like an Israeli settlement, very 
easy controlled by occupation forces and thus welcomed by the Israeli authorities. 
Bashar Al-Masri, as mentioned previously, argues that building Rawabi is a way of 
fighting the occupation (Tan 2013: 1). Al-Masri's argument is at the very core of the concept of 
counter-planning; Rawabi, according to Al-Masri, is a modern and civilized way to fight 
occupation or, in other words, resist occupation plans––a Palestinian urban development 
countering Israeli plans. Therefore, in this view, development of Rawabi is a Palestinian counter-
planning act against the occupation’s policies. In the following sections of this chapter I will 
consider the merits of this argument. 
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Supporters of the city argue that the considerable amount of employment opportunities and 
economic benefits it creates is one of the largest investments made by and for Palestinians in the 
history of the West Bank. It is also a key factor in supporting the Palestinian economy and is an 
essential component of the future state. They argue the city is also a green and environmentally-
friendly one that embodies concepts of sustainability. Among the plans for making Rawabi green 
include harvesting rainwater from roofs, a pedestrian-only city center, wind energy turbines, and 
electric car charging stations (The Hidden Transcript 2013). 
While many might agree with this pro-Rawabi assertion, many others do not. They argue, 
for example, that Rawabi is a city designed to fit Israeli occupation requirements (Abunimah 
2012, Yehya 2012). First of all, from an architectural standpoint Rawabi is a city that looks like 
an Israeli illegal settlement. It is located on the top of a hill with geometrically designed curved 
wide roads,21 and a unified architectural style, a style that is very different from traditional 
Palestinian cities that have grown organically over long periods of time (Figure 24, Figure 25 
and Figure 26).  
  
                                                 
21 Palestinian cities and villages have usually organic (not designed) patterns of roads and buildings that have 
grown naturally over decades or centuries which is very different from the geometrical design of Israeli illegal 
settlements built within significantly shorter periods of times. 
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Figure 24: 3 Dimentional Image of Rawabi (Rawabi 2011). 
 
Figure 25: Abu Ghnaim Israeli illegal settlement (Illean 2012) 
 
Figure 26: Rawabi Near-by Palestinian Village of Bir Zeit  
(Wikimedia Commons 2011) 
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Opponents of the city also argue that the development of Rawabi is in line with the policies 
of the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu (Abunimah, 2012; Yehya, 2012). When 
Benjamin Netanyahu first became Prime Minister of the Israeli government, he announced a 
policy of "economic peace", a policy based upon creating a better economic climate for the 
Palestinians and especially for those living in the West Bank. The policy was based at the same 
time on ignoring the political aspect of the Palestinian-Israeli struggle and ignoring Palestinian 
demands for a livable independent state. Accordingly, the policy was rejected by both Palestinian 
officials and the general Palestinian public. Abunimah (2012) and Yehya (2012) argue that 
Rawabi is in line with this Israeli policy and does not accomplish anything towards a foreseen 
future Palestinian state. Yehya (2012) takes this even further when he argues that the city plan 
itself is designed in a way that makes it easy for the Israeli Defense Forces to control the city 
quickly. 
However, Rawabi's opponents are not only Palestinians. Al-Masri argues that the project is 
facing objections from what he calls "radicals on both sides" (Tan 2013). Israelis from nearby 
illegal settlements have rallied and protested against the Rawabi project claiming it is threatening 
their security (Ma'an News Agency 2010). 
Given the pros and cons associated with the development of Rawabi, can city be 
considered an act of counterplanning , or is it consistent with the occupational policies? In the 
following sections of this chapter I will try to answer this question. 
6.3 Rawabi, Neoliberalism and the Growth Machine 
Rawabi is a highly controversial project. As I have pointed out, proponents of the city's 
development argue that the city provides a tangible public benefit and is a step towards a hoped-
for Palestinian state, while opponents conceive it as a Israeli-settlement-like project that utilizes 
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Israeli resources as well as Palestinian ones and facilitates Israeli control over the Palestinian 
people. So, which of these contradicting views is more accurate in light of the theory and 
practice of counter-planning? Can Rawabi be considered an example of counter-planning? Or is 
it an Israeli-occupation friendly city, as some of the city's opponents argue? 
6.3.1 Planning and Neoliberal Policies 
Policies associated with the term "neoliberalism" were implemented in Chile under the 
Augusto Pinochet regime that came to power after a military coup in 1973 (Mirowski and 
Plehwe 2009). In the late 1980s, US President Ronald Reagan and UK Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher re-introduced the thought of neoliberalism more widely on an international scale. 
Neoliberalism is based on capitalist concepts, but it limits even more the role of government in 
all socio-economic aspects of life and thus gives the private sector and open-market policies 
greater role and influence. Whether neoliberal policies have been possible to implement in their 
entirely or not, it is clear that since the early 1970s the public sector has increasingly retreated 
from the planning process in place of profit-driven businesses. Within the context of the United 
States, Hackworth (2007) argues that national cutbacks in urban expenditures required cities to 
find new sources of revenue, revenue that has increasingly become available only through 
private-sector investments. According to Hackworth, neoliberal policies have increased the 
power of private-sector businesses which became more influential in the urban development 
process. Public cutbacks in urban expenditures force cities to compete for resources in the 
private capital market. The point is those profit-driven financial institutions (commercial banks, 
thrifts, institutional investors) and their intermediaries, such as bond rating agencies, replaced 
public sector regulatory agencies as overseers of urban development. 
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In Rawabi as in US cities, the private sector is guiding the development of an urban area, 
and for similar reasons. the PNA, is currently in greater need of financial resources than many 
American cities were in the 1980s and 1990s.  
Rawabi is one outcome of the Jenin Economic Conference. Khalidi and Samour (2011) 
strongly criticize the PNA for trying to apply a neoliberal strategy in such a politically and 
economically-unstable area of the world at a time when the neoliberal system is facing huge 
challenges in great capitalist economies such as the United States and Europe. They even argue 
that "[T]he only clear economic outcomes of [neoliberal Policies] have been the steady erosion 
of Palestine’s development potential, the degradation of its human capital and the gradual 
depletion of its natural resources" (Khalidi and Samour 2011: 7). Khalidi and Samour (2011) 
argue that the Palestinian National Plan 2011 and the 2008 Palestinian Reform and 
Development Plan (PRDP) it incorporates are incorporating an economic policy agenda set forth 
in the so-called "Washington Consensus" orthodoxy advanced by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) since at least the late 1970s. The neoliberal orthodoxy is 
based on four main principles regarding an independent Palestinian state:  
• Assuring public security and the rule of law 
• Commitment to building accountable institutions 
• Effective service delivery; as a means of gaining legitimacy from citizens and investors 
• Private-sector growth 
The first three principles can be viewed as necessary for the success of the fourth. In other 
words, the four principles can be viewed as a strategy for a successful private-sector investment 
environment more than a successful statehood building strategy (Khalidi and Samour 2011).  
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Due to open market policies of neoliberalism the increasing power of financial institutions 
will probably result in urban development policies that are compatible with a business-oriented 
vision. Such urban development policies will most probably ignore and even act against the 
interests of the working class, the distressed, and the powerless poor. Hackworth (2007) argues 
that the deterioration of public housing and the gentrification of low-income and working-class 
neighborhoods are results of the warm relationship between city governments and private 
investors as a result of the neoliberal era in urban governance in the United States.  
During the neoliberal era, the public sector has stepped back from the urban development 
process, but only to allow for more influence from the private sector. Scholars such as Friedman 
(1987) and Healey (2006)  argue that the public sector should interfere in markets to empower 
socially-embedded institutions that better reflect the interests of the poor. Other scholars argue 
for a lesser amount of influence from the middle – and upper — class business and public-sector 
elites (Davidoff 1965, Forester 1989). In the neoliberal era, the public sector steps back to open 
up opportunities for the private sector, which as a result has developed a much stronger influence 
on development policies as the interests of the less powerful are increasingly marginalized.  
It is hard to discuss urban development strategies in the neoliberal era without discussing 
globalization. Globalization is a parallel phenomenon to the free market policies of 
neoliberalism. With the growing power of transnational business firms and financial institutions 
in the neoliberal era, local businesses find it extremely difficult to compete with the enormous 
financial power wielded by transnational corporations.  
Khalidi and Samour (2011) argue that the PNA is being pressured to apply such open-
market policies by the United States, the European Union, and the World Bank. The very limited 
financial resources of the PNA are facilitating the utilization of financial aid as a pressure tool 
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towards this end. The PNA finds it very difficult not to comply with international economic 
trends if the PNA wants the foreign (Western) financial aid to continue. 
However, globalization can have a devastating effect on local economies, even though it 
might seem promising at the beginning. Free market policies means that local governments step 
back from their responsibilities of supporting local economies. As a result, local businesses find 
themselves forced to compete with large-scale international companies and industries. In many 
cases, this results in the deterioration of local economies, businesses and industries. As a result of 
neoliberal policies, the rich become richer and the poor are left poorer. A quick glance at living-
standard indicators in the West Bank might suggest the same. Palestinian official statistics show 
that, while the average expenditure by capita has more than doubled between the years 1998 and 
2011, the poverty rate increased by more than 3 percent (PCBS 2012) ( Table 5). 
In other words neoliberal policies have caused economic elites to gain more power relative 
to the poor and the middle class. Rawabi represents a similar case. Rawabi is mostly owned by 
an international Qatari company that can utilize huge financial resources. The Qatari company 
acquired all the land from private landowners necessary to build the city in 2007, prior to the 
announcement of the city. Local businesses and even the PNA find themselves in a position 
where they are unable to compete. Consequently, the Qatari company finds itself in a powerful 
position where other parties have to comply with their policies. Therefore, it is likely that neither 
the PNA nor local planners will have the ability to influence the decision-making process within 
Rawabi. Decisions then will instead be made by Bayti Real Estate Company officials who will 
be more concerned with a better economic return of the project than responding to the public's 
planning needs.  
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Table 5: Poverty and living standard indicators in the West Bank 
Indicator Year 1998 Year 2011 
Average expenditure per 
capita WB. 
 
427 NIS 959 NIS 
Poverty – WB 14.5% 17.8% 
(PCBS 2012) 
Other scholars are in agreement with Khaldi and Samour's position regarding the PNA's 
neoliberal policy. Israeli and Western policies in the West Bank are based on supporting the 
implementation of a neoliberal policy and supporting the political and economic elite in 
Ramallah without any guarantees for ending the occupation, or reaching a solution. In a 
conference in Vienna, Adam Hanieh (2013) asserts that the whole Middle East has been "struck 
hard" with impoverishment as a result of Western-oriented neoliberal policies implemented in 
the region. To Hanieh neoliberal policies in the Middle East are being supported by the West, 
mainly the United States and the European Union. Hanieh (2013) argues that increasing intra-
regional capital flows, especially, from the Gulf region is a Western neoliberal policy whose aim 
is to encourage relationship normalization between Israel and Arab countries. Ironically, Rawabi 
is mainly funded by a company that has its headquarters in Qatar, one of the rich Gulf countries. 
Hanieh argues that neoliberalism is supporting the international economic elite and the Gulf 
state’s domination in the region.  
Israeli scholars argue that the influences of neoliberal policies of the West in the region 
have affected Israel as well. Plitnick (2012) argues that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu is implementing a neoliberal policy under the pressure of global recession and high 
levels of inflation. According to Plitnick, neoliberal policies work to deprive the poor of needed 
services and thus widen the gap between the rich and the poor in Israel. Plitnick goes further to 
attribute violence against minorities in Israel and against Palestinians to this widening gap: 
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"under these circumstances, the violence against Africans and Palestinians is far from surprising. 
Indeed, it seems likely that the conditions inflaming that violence are likely to continue. And so 
will such incidents" (Plitnick 2012).  
Rawabi can therefore be strongly linked to neoliberal policies in the region. The Rawabi 
project can be seen, in fact, as part of those neoliberal policies pushed by the West and the global 
economy. If I am correct then the question remains: Can neoliberal policies in any way 
counteract Israeli policies? Khaledi and Samour (2011) answer this very question. To them 
neoliberalism cannot in any way replace the liberation of occupied lands. On the contrary, open 
market policies can only mean more domination by the Israeli occupation over the Palestinian 
economy and thus work to enforce the occupation. Under the Oslo Accords, the PNA does not 
have a local currency and cannot abide to commercial agreements with international parties 
without Israel’s approval. Hanieh (2013) agrees. To Hanieh neoliberal policies can only promise 
better economic conditions, but are highly likely unable to keep this promise! One of the main 
outcomes of these regional policies is the creation of the so called "Qualified Industrial Zones" 
(QIZ). QIZs are intra-regional industrial zones that, accompanied by increased capital flow from 
the Gulf region to the Palestinian Territories, aim at facilitating commercial relations between 
Israel and the surrounding Arab countries. Thus, both Hanieh (Hanieh 2013) and Khaledi and 
Samour (2011) view the neoliberal policies as part of a normalization process Israel is attempting 
to bring about in order to facilitate normal commercial and diplomatic relationships between 
Israel, the Palestinians and the surrounding Arab countries, a process viewed by many (Hanieh 
2013, Khalidi and Samour 2011) as one that legitimizes the occupation. Neoliberal 
policymaking, in this view, is converting the Palestinian-Israeli struggle from a political one –– 
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as an issue of right for the Palestinian people –– to an economic one.  It is, in other words, the 
exact opposite of a counter-planning process.  
6.3.2 The Growth Machine 
Logan and Molotch (1987) authored what is perhaps one of the most comprehensive 
scholarly works to elaborate on the effect of private-sector influence on urban development. The 
book expands on Molotch's original scholarly work (1976) which introduced the concept of the 
growth machine. Governments mostly look at the development process of cities from a growth 
point of view. Growth creates more jobs and contributes to a better economy, government 
officials argue. Logan and Molotch (1987) explain that a major reason that drives governments 
to address growth is the influence private-sector elites. Real estate in general and specific parcels 
of land parcels in particular are viewed by investors as opportunities to secure considerable 
profits. Land parcels have values and these values can increase greatly by directing growth or 
development towards the areas where these lands are located. To put it simply, Logan and 
Molotch (1987) argue that private investors try to and actually do affect urban development 
policies by attempting to raise land values and thus maximize their profits. It is here that Logan 
and Molotch (1987) distinguish between two types of value: "value of investment" and "value of 
use." Whereas the value of investment is a major concern for private-sector investors, value of 
use is the main concern of the general public who just need land to build a home and make a 
living. Logan and Molotch (1987) argue that because of the increasing impact of the private 
sector elites on governments, governmental development policies are more directed towards the 
value of investment and ignore the value of use. As a result, the needs of working and middle 
class- families are largely ignored. A legitimate question therefore is: If the public sector is so 
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affected by higher-income and business interests, then how can planners make sure the interests 
of other people in society are met? 
Rawabi is an example of the growth machine concept Logan and Molotch discuss (1987). 
In Rawabi, the private sector has taken over the public sector's role and responsibility for urban 
planning. The city’s location was proposed by the city's owners and developers, without any 
input from Palestinian planning agencies or planners. The lands necessary to build the city were 
all purchased by Bayti Real Estate Company before the project was announced in 2007 (Rawabi 
2007). These lands, before the city project was announced, were considered remote, outside the 
planning boundaries of any city's or village's master plan. Thus these lands were purchased at 
very cheap prices compared to land prices in surrounding areas. Currently, land prices 
surrounding Rawabi, despite the fact that they are in Area C, have more than doubled since the 
announcement of the Rawabi City project, a development in line with the concept of the growth 
machine advanced by Logan and Molotch:  
 Place entrepreneurs form pro-growth coalitions with governmental units and other 
 economic interests to focus infrastructure and urban development in areas that 
 intensify the profitability of their own interest." (Logan and Molotch 2005: 110).  
6.3.3 Public-Private Partnerships 
Although Rawabi is a privately-owned project, the Palestinian Government has offered it a 
considerable number of subsidies, such as tax exemptions and infrastructure funding. It is thus 
legitimate to question the feasibility of providing these subsidies out of public money towards a 
private project, which leads to a discussion of private-public partnerships.  Public-private sector 
partnerships are one way the public and private sectors cooperate in the urban development 
process. Local governments—as financial resources are shrinking in current economic distress 
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periods—are increasingly turning to public-private partnerships for redevelopment assistance. 
This is enabling private-sector institutions to exercise functions typically performed by the public 
sector. Rawabi, as previously stated in this section, is a product of such cooperation of the public 
and private sectors.  While public-private partnerships can enhance project funding  they can also 
direct public money, such as taxes, toward private purposes (Erie, Kogan and MacKenzie 2010). 
Fainstein (2001) argues that governments should carry out extensive research before a 
decision to participate in a public-private partnership is made. Subsidies offered by the public 
sector can simply outweigh the public benefits expected to be gained from these projects. 
Fainstein (2001) supports public-private partnerships provided that the public sector performs 
adequate research to ensure that the subsidies it offers are really worth the public benefits. Critics 
of public-private partnerships claim public money is diverted to the private sector through 
incentives and that the subsidies are greater than the benefits received. If a government is seeking 
private partners to help facilitate urban development, the decision to do so should be thoroughly 
considered to make sure the incentives offered to the private sector are worth the benefits to the 
community. 
The Rawabi project has made use of many governmental subsidies, including tax cuts and 
donor funding. Many international donor agencies have funded the implementation of the 
infrastructure of the project. For example, the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) has financed the road infrastructure of the project. While donor grants 
are not paid to Rawabi directly from the PNA, the fact remains that this money is considered as  
financial aid to the Palestinian people. Many local planners argue that all of the subsidies 
provided to the developers by the Palestinian government is, in effect, converting taxpayer funds 
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into huge profits for the benefit of a private-sector investment company, Bayti Real Estate 
Company. 
6.4 Planning of Rawabi 
Rawabi is the first planned-from-scratch city in the West Bank and in Palestine. Although, 
a new concept to Palestine, newly designed and planned cities similar to Rawabi feature 
prominently in the Western planning literature.  
Perhaps one of the most critiqued planners of newly-designed cities is Le Corbusier.  Le 
Corbusier followed a modernist / high—modernist, top-down, approach to planning, an approach 
that has resulted in planned cities that represent, in extreme cases, only the vision of the planner/ 
architect. As in the case of Brasilia in Brazil or the earlier example of Chicago (Hall 1998), the 
planning vision of the middle and upper classes dominate and ignores most of the working class.  
Brasilia's urban plan, prepared by Lúcio Costa, was based on modernist / high–modernist 
planning principles associated with Le Corbusier. Strong geometrical grid lines form the base of 
the design. Wide, vehicle-oriented streets represent the transportation network with minimum 
space for pedestrian circulation. High-rise concrete and glass rectangular blocks form the city’s 
buildings. The plan ignored public places for social interaction. Public participation was 
minimal. Hall (1998) argues that the city was a huge failure and, like other scholars, offered a 
strong critique of Le Corbusier: "The remarkable fact about Le Corbusier is just how 
phenomenally unsuccessful he was in practice " (Hall 1998: 211). Unfortunately, as Hall claims, 
"[T]he evil that Le Corbusier did lives after him" (Hall 1998: 204).  
In another example of a newly planned city, Peattie (1987) similarly argues, in the context 
of her study of Ciudad Guyana,  that planning and urban design of the city served as an 
instrument of control and as a tool for shifting power and resources toward large corporate 
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bodies and toward an economic elite. The city was planned by La Corporación Venezolana de 
Guayana (CVG). Peattie focuses her analysis on the different perspectives of the planning 
process, differences that stemmed not only from the different disciplinary backgrounds of team 
members but also from team—members' differing positions in the political and economic 
structure of Venezuelan society. Peattie points to the tendency of the CVG, which was allocated 
away in the capital Caracas, to focus more on design and the architectural image of the final 
product rather than to think of the final outcome as continuation of the past and present history of 
the city. The resulting city was one that responded to the vision of the planners, but not to the 
aspirations of its inhabitants. To Peattie the newly planned city, as a result, was full of urban 
problems and did not meet the requirements of its inhabitants.  
The Indian city of Chandigarh is another good example of the failure of newly-planned 
cities to meet their planners' expectations (Sarin 1982). Sarin explains how the planning process 
in Chandigarh has failed to respond to the needs of the poor. Ironically, Sarin discusses how 
alien, imported concepts of development and urban planning were used by the city's planners –– 
along with local Indian professional support –– to benefit local elites and respond to the local 
elites' own vision and conception of progress.  
Sarin (1982) also discusses other cities in the developing-world such as Tema in Ghana, 
Cuidad Guyana in Venezuela and Brasilia. Sarin argues that they all share a similar problem, the 
ignorance of the needs of poorer social groups. Of course the problems facing planners and other 
professionals trying to design a prestigious new town are in many important aspects very 
different from the needs and aspirations of the poor local inhabitants. Planning for Rawabi shares 
the owners' interests in designing a prestigious new town as was mentioned in the case of the 
other cities discussed by Sarin.  
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The actual master plan of Rawabi was created mainly by AECom, an international 
engineering company that is headquartered in the United States. Planning experts from local 
Palestinian universities were invited to participate in the planning process (Rawabi 2010). 
However, interviews I conducted with planning professors reveal that plans for Rawabi were 
almost complete when they were invited to participate. The plans were ready apart from minor 
last-minute modifications. The location, boundaries, and most of the land-use planning were 
already done. AECom is a prominent and massive engineering company. However, AECom 
knows very little, if anything, about the planning needs of Palestine, a view shared by most 
interviewees. 
The planning of Rawabi shares many similarities with that of the examples of newly-
planned cities discussed in the previous paragraphs.  Rawabi was designed and planned by 
AECom, an international firm located abroad in the United States. It is hard to imagine that 
Western planners and designers working for AECom could adequately understand the needs of 
local citizens in Palestine. Similar to above—discussed examples, Rawabi was designed 
according to imported planning and architectural concepts that reflect more a vision of an elite 
class than the requirements of local residents. 
The building process of Rawabi has not been finished yet. However, the planning process 
of the city is, to a great extent, following the trend of these foreign-planned cities that have failed 
to meet the needs of the locals as documented by many urban scholars (Burnham and Bennette 
1908, Hall 1998, Peattie 1987, Sarin 1982) to have failed as cities. 
6.4.1 Rawabi Master Plan 
The Rawabi master plan encompasses a total area of about 6,300,000 square meters. The 
part of the plan currently being implemented — which may be referred to as the phase one –– 
 144 
 
extends to over 760,000 square meters. Phase one  is associated with a detailed master plan with 
construction drawings for all buildings. The master plan details a mixed-use economic activity 
center surrounded by residential buildings of different apartment areas and types. Social, 
economic, and religious services are provided for in the plan along with green areas (Figure 27). 
The entire master plan area of Rawabi extends over Area A and Area B territory (Figure 
28). The city is built on non-Area C land in the Ramallah Governorate (Figure 28).  It therefore 
appears that Israeli policies were instrumental in determining where the city was eventually 
located. Taking into account that the city of Ramallah is the economic hub of the West Bank, it is 
likely that the location of the project was selected because it existed in a Palestinian-controlled 
area closest to the economic center of the West Bank. Looking at Figure 28, one can also notice 
that the southwestern boundary of the master plan is the same as the boundary of Area B. 
Accordingly planners appear to have been careful not to include any Area C land in the master 
plan of the new city (Rawabi Home 2010). 
Rawabi can therefore hardly be seen as countering any Israeli plans. A Palestinian urban 
plan countering Israeli plans should at least be placed in an Area C where there are Israeli plans 
to be countered. 
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Figure 27: Rawabi Master Plan  
(Rawabi Home 2010) 
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Rawabi's location was selected by Bayti Realestate Company to be completely located 
within Area A. Even the projected 16–20 year expansion plan lies totally in Area A (Figure 28). 
The location of the city could have been predicted for any profit-driven, private-sector project. 
Any action that might facilitate the implementation of the project, reduce work time, or cut costs 
would have been welcome. One of the main concerns for investors would have been aquiring the 
required licences and permits in the shortest period of time and with the least resistance. Area A 
development needs no approval from the Israeli side, providing evidence that the location of 
Rawabi was selected because it is entirely in an Area A in the Ramallah and Al-Bireh 
Governorate.  
Another implication is that the location may not have actually been chosen because it was 
found to be the best place for developing a new city. I am not arguing here that the location is not 
suitable for building a new city. I am simply arguing that the location of the city may not have 
been studied beyond the fact that it is the only categorized A area in Ramallah and Al-Bireh 
Governorate large enough for a city such as Rawabi to be built, an argument raised by many 
Palestinian urban planners I interviewed within the course of this dissertation research. "If this 
was a project built to resist occupation, as Al-Masri claims, then why was it all built in Area A?" 
a planning professor stated during one of my interviews. "Rawabi's location was selected by 
Bayti Company as it is closest to Ramallah, the economic hub of the West Bank and at the same 
time easiest to obtain permits for" another local professional planner added.  
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Figure 28: Rawabi and its Surroundings 
(Map created by researcher based on data layers obtained from Ministry of Local Government) 
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How does the building of Rawabi affect surrounding villages? Would these villages be 
dependent on Rawabi or Ramallah? Are there other villages in the West Bank that are in more 
need of a new city that can act as an economical, social and service center for them? These 
questions were not addressed when the location of the city was decided. 
6.5 Conclusion 
The new Palestinian city of Rawabi is a controversial project. Supporters of the city claim 
it is a national project and a step towards the future independent Palestinian state. Rawabi is 
probably the largest construction project ever built in Palestine. It provides a great number of 
employment opportunities both directly by onsite job opportunities and indirectly through the 
purchase of resources and services from existing businesses.  
On the other hand, opponents of the project view the city as an Israeli– settlement-like 
project. The city is sited on a top of a hill and features apartment buildings as the main type of 
housing. Its streets drive parallel to contour lines, without taking parcel boundaries into 
consideration, a practice that is very similar to the design of Israeli roads inside illegal 
settlements (Figure 24 and Figure 25). Opponents of the project also point out that the 
construction of the city is making use of Israeli as well as Palestinian resources which, at least 
for them, undermines the claim that it is a patriotic national project. 
Bashar Al-Masri, the main figure behind the project once stated that "radicals" from both 
sides (Israeli and Palestinian) do not like the city. Promoting the project in this way, as a 
peaceful moderate city, is not without merit. Rawabi is, after all, a private-sector, profit-driven 
project. Rawabi is a project that is compatible with neoliberal open market and private-sector-
enabling policies. Rawabi was first announced at the Jenin Economic Conference, in 2008. 
Therefore, Rawabi can thus be best understood as a profit-driven project. 
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The PNA is exercising an open market, neoliberal policy through its National Plan, the 
Statehood Plan, and the 2008 Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP). It is beyond 
the scope of this dissertation will to assess whether neoliberal policy is a good choice for the 
PNA or whether the PNA finds itself forced to comply because of international pressure. 
However, neoliberal policies are directed at supporting an attractive private-sector investment 
environment and such policies have consequences. Rawabi is a large private-sector investment 
and the Palestinian government is openly supporting such a project. 
Rawabi is a product of a public-private partnership. The private sector, represented by 
Bayti Real Estate Company and Bashar Al-Masri, are investing in this project and in return the 
Palestinian government is providing subsidies that will help the project succeed. Governmental 
subsidies include the allocation of donor funding for project infrastructure implementation and 
facilitating and accelerating processes of obtaining the required permits and licenses. The 
Rawabi developers have also taken advantage of purchasing real estate at very low prices. Most 
of the land required for the project was purchased from local Palestinian citizens by Bayti Real 
Estate Company before the announcement of the project in 2007. It is highly debatable whether 
or not the national benefits of the project are worth the investment of tax-payer funds expended 
on it. Many planners believe that all of the subsidies provided accrue to the owners as profit. 
This argument can also be supported when the planning process of the project is reviewed. 
Rawabi's master plan was prepared by AECom, an international engineering company. 
Very little input was acquired from Palestinian planners and came at very late stages after the 
location boundaries were already selected and the master plan was almost finished. City planners 
sited the city entirely in Area A, which is consistent with a profit-driven type of thinking as the 
licensing process is easier. It can also be more attractive for international financing agencies. In 
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other words, because it is in Area A the project will advance more smoothly and thus is more 
attractive from a capitalist point of view. I did not find any studies of the relationship of the 
project to its existing surrounding Palestinian villages. Some surrounding villages are very close, 
yet no studies were conducted on how they will benefit from the new city's development. 
Additionally, this research did not find any studies that address whether this area of the West 
Bank is most suitable and in need of a new city. The only reason that could be found for 
selecting this location is that it is the largest Area A land area in the Ramallah and Al-Bireh 
Governorate, where most of the Palestinian economic activity is located. Moreover, the 
economic benefits of the project to the public are debatable, given the amount of subsidies it has 
been awarded by the PNA.  
In the end, I conclude that Rawabi is not countering any Israeli plans. Although it might 
bring some economic benefits, such as employment opportunities and natural resource demand, 
it cannot be viewed as a Palestinian counter-planning act. After all, the entire project is located in 
Area A. The Israeli government recognizes in accordance with the Oslo Accords that all 
planning responsibilities in Area A are under the jurisdiction of the PNA.  
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7 Chapter 7: Discussion of Main Themes 
After the formation of the PNA in 1993, the Jordanian Planning Law Number 79 of 1966 
was reinstated and became the official planning law of the PNA. Despite the fact that regional 
planning committees were reestablished, Palestinian planning institutions found themselves able 
to only plan locally within areas A and B, due to the limitations of the Oslo Accords. This fact 
has paralyzed the regional planning committees. As a result, national planning was alienated 
from local-level planning and the planning of local communities was carried out without taking 
account of surrounding areas. In many cases, this has resulted in isolated urban plans of local 
communities that do not integrate and in many cases conflict each other. 
In the following sections of this chapter I will discuss main themes gleaned as a result of 
the analysis of case studies as well as the interviews I conducted during the course of this 
research. As mentioned in the methodology chapter, interviews were conducted with key 
planners in both the public and private sectors. Themes are the results of information that were 
found repeatedly in the answers provided by the interviewees. Other themes consistent with case 
study findings will also be discussed hereinafter in this chapter.  
7.1 Legal and Political Issues 
Most interviewees, particularly those working within the Palestinian Higher Council on 
Planning and within the Regional Planning Committees, stressed that the current legal 
framework is too problematic to be implemented in the West Bank, specifically on the regional 
level, due to current political situation and agreements. As I stated earlier, the current legal 
framework stems from previous Jordanian laws. The inability to activate this law, mainly on the 
regional planning level, was underlined by planners as a major planning problem. According to 
most, if not all interviewees, the regional planning level in Palestine is notably absent. The 
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Jordanian Law Number 79 of 1966 explicitly provides for the foundation and responsibilities of 
the regional planning committees. The most important among the responsibilities is the 
preparation and approval of regional plans. Regional plans require final approved by the 
Palestinian Higher Council on Planning. According to interviewees, a new legal framework 
establishing a regional planning level is necessary, as the Jordanian Planning Law Number 79 of 
1966 has been adopted as the implemented planning law at the PNA.  
Currently in the West Bank, the planning responsibility in Area C is appointed to the ICA. 
Palestinian planning institutions, according to the Oslo Accords, cannot approve any plans in 
Area C. Regional plans, by definition, include open areas between cities and villages. Most open 
areas in the West Bank are classified as Area C and thus are not within the Palestinian planning 
institutions responsibilities. 
Accordingly, when the PNA's institutions were first formed, governorates were structurally 
organized with no departments that were capable of preparing regional plans. Governorates, 
according to the Palestinian institutions' organization structure, do not have planning 
departments. Regional Planning Committees are only miniature forms of the Palestinian Higher 
Council on Planning. They are formed from members of the same Ministries' offices of a specific 
governorate. According to the Jordanian law, Regional Planning Committees function to prepare 
and approve regional plans through the governor's office, which is not the case with the PNA’s 
institutions. Being a miniature form of the Higher Council on Planning, regional planning 
committees function only to make sure local plans meet the technical requirements of the Higher 
Council on Planning. Accordingly, Regional Planning Committees are not responsible for 
creating or approving regional plans. In fact, no specific institution or department is responsible 
for planning on the regional level.  
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The existence of the institutional structure I have just described can also be attributed to 
Israeli Occupation planning activities in the West Bank before the PNA era. When Israel first 
occupied the West Bank, it abolished the regional planning committees that were functioning 
during the Jordanian Era and created the Israeli Regional Planning Committees that were the 
"arms" of the Israeli Supreme Planning Council. The Palestinian institutional planning structure 
can be viewed as an extension of the Israeli structure. However, this structure might not be 
suitable for planning according to a Palestinian vision as it was supposed to be planning as per an 
occupation agenda of control and annexation during the Israeli Era! 
Why didn't the Palestinian decision-makers or official planners pay attention to this point? 
The reason is not obvious. But if we take into account the Palestinians lack of planning 
experience at the beginning of the PNA’s formation and the inherited attitude that we can only 
plan what the Israelis allow us to and we combine them with the large number of Palestinian 
communities in Area B and A that needed to be planned after twenty-seven years of an Israeli-
dominated planning process, it is conceivable that planning in Area C was not a priority at that 
time. It did not become a priority until much later, the middle of the 2000s, when Palestinian 
planners began to see the need for regional planning. 
Regional planning involves creating master plans for communities located in Area C, in 
addition to areas A and B. Area C lands form about 60 percent of the West Bank. Unilateral 
plans for Area C are problematic for the PNA. By signing the Oslo Accords, the PNA agreed that 
they have no control over Area C at least during a transitional stage working towards a future 
Palestinian state. In the first few years after signing the Oslo Accords the PNA would have been 
accused of violating the accords if it had even tried to create plans for Israeli-controlled areas. 
Now that the transition period has extended to nearly twenty years, more people are demanding 
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planning in Area C territories. Their voices are now even louder and bolder after the United 
Nations General Assembly's recognition of Palestine as a state on the 29th of November 2011. 
Legitimacy for Palestinian planning can now be seen as deriving from rights of a state over its 
lands rather than from an international agreement (the Oslo Accords). 
Authority is necessarily accompanied by responsibility, or at least should be. Planning in 
Area C is still legally problematic for the PNA’s institutions. PNA institutions can easily take the 
decision to create plans for Area C and approve them through their institutions, but does the 
PNA have the ability to implement those plans on the ground? The answer is no. If a Palestinian 
urban plan is approved unilaterally for an Area C territory, then Palestinian local councils will be 
issuing building permits there. However, Palestinian institutions will have no means of 
protecting these buildings from Israeli demolition orders nor will they have the ability to 
compensate the owners. Therefore, the PNA finds itself with no other alternative then to try to 
seek Israeli approval of its plans. Since Israel will most likely approve Palestinian Area C plans 
that are compatible with their own plans for Area C, Israeli-approved Palestinian plans for C 
areas are highly questionable as counter plans. 
In order to seek Israeli approval for the plans of Palestinian communities in Area C, 
Palestinian planning institutions find no legal framework again to represent these communities. 
The Israelis do not recognize any authority for the PNA in Area C. Trying to find a way around 
that, the PNA offers technical and financial support for Palestinian Area C communities in return 
for being closely involved in the perpetration of a master plan process. The ICA recognizes the 
elected local councils as representatives of the local citizens of these communities. Palestinian 
master plans are being prepared as an attempt to counteract Israeli plans accordingly. Fasayil is a 
very good example of these plans. These plans had demonstrated limited success, such as 
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delaying and freezing demolition orders. But to what degree will they be a success? This is a 
question yet to be answered, as the orientation to plan Palestinian communities in Area C is still 
relatively new within the PNA. Very few, if any, plans were actually approved by the ICA. 
There were other attempts by the Palestinian Planning institutions to prepare regional plans 
for some areas. Regional plans were prepared by the MOLG for some Governorates such as 
Salfit and Jericho. Again the regulatory framework has proven to be a problem. There was no 
specific official Palestinian institution or department that could approve regional plans. A 
decision had to be taken by the Council of Ministers on the political level. Other regional plans 
such as the RABM remain non-binding as they were not approved by any state institution. 
The legal framework of the planning process, especially on the regional level, remains 
highly problematic as many conflicting issues come into play. The implemented Jordanian law, 
the previous Israeli planning structure, the Palestinians' authority in Area C according to the Oslo 
Accords, the Palestinian rights as a people and a state and the Israeli occupation all interact and 
in many cases conflict in a very complicated planning environment. The absence of the regional 
planning level within the Palestinian planning process leaves a huge gap in the Palestinian 
planning system. This leads to the next point of discussion: lack of coordination among 
Palestinian planning levels and institutions. 
7.2 Lack of Coordination 
Another theme that surfaced from the interviews was the lack of coordination. 
Coordination is lacking both horizontally and vertically. Planning on the local level did not take 
into consideration the higher planning levels. At the same time and in many cases, there were 
multiple plans targeting the same communities without any coordination among them. The 
deficiency in the legal system may be considered a major reason for the lack of coordination. 
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The non-mandatory nature of regional plans left the door open for multiple, overlapping and 
sometimes conflicting plans for the same areas. The absence of the regional planning level 
contributes strongly to the lack of planning coordination as well.  
On the horizontal level, multiple plans might exist for the same community. For example, 
Salfit Governorate has a Strategic Development and Investment Plan (SDIP) for the whole 
Governorate, including Area C. On the other hand, the city of Salfit (the main city in the 
governorate) has an SDIP specifically for the city. The irony is that both plans were prepared by 
different work teams and were funded by different donors but are not integrated. In fact, neither 
plan even mentions the other nor acknowledges its existence. The same can be discussed about 
the Ramallah Governorate. There is the RABM that includes 9 communities, there is the 
Ramallah–Al Bireh–Betunia SDIP, there is an SDIP for each of the three cities and there is a 
master plan for each city. Coordination among all of these plans is very limited, if exists at all. 
Vertically, the coordination is also almost non-existent. The absence of the regional 
planning level is a major factor here. According to the Jordanian Planning Law Number 79 of 
1966, the regional planning committees are responsible for creating plans based upon feedback 
from the local level that are compatible with the Higher Council on Planning's policies. In other 
words, the regional planning level is supposed to function as a coordination mechanism both 
upwards and downwards to ensure an integrated planning process. The absence of the regional 
planning level has disconnected the national from the local level.  
Further, the national planning vision is still pre-mature. The only approved national level 
plan is the Preservation Plan of 2004. This plan, other than the fact that it only marks areas that 
should be preserved from urban expansion, suffers from inaccuracy issues, as indicated by 
official planners from both the regional and national levels. The Spatial National Plan is still in 
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its primary phases and may take years to finalize. Therefore, the local planning level is 
functioning with very little if any coordination. The lack of coordination on the local planning 
level was a major issue I observed during many years of working as a planner in the West Bank 
and was the main reason that triggered the idea for this research: planning without a vision of 
integration towards a Palestinian goal of a contiguous Palestinian State. 
The other issue that I will discuss here is that of timing. Many planning projects, especially 
on the regional level, seem to have been conducted simply because funding was available, or 
because a new requirement of the Palestinian planning institutions has been implemented. For 
example, the RABM was prepared at a time when Ramallah already had an approved master 
plan. A Metropolitan Plan trying to act as guidance for the master plans of cities within the 
region were developed while some cities already had approved master plans. The master plan is 
mandatory for the local councils by law; however, the Metropolitan Plan has no Palestinian legal 
reference and therefore is a directional plan.  The question here is How can a directional plan 
affect a pre-approved master plan? The Metropolitan Plan can hardly affect the pre-approved 
master plan, except in regards to future expansion issues. The same can said of cities for which 
new SDIPs were prepared, despite the fact that these cities had pre-approved master plans. The 
SDIP is supposed to act as guidance for the master plan but the master plan is already approved. 
Examples of these cities are Jericho and Salfit. The inadequacy of the legal framework surfaces 
again here. The lack of an efficient legal framework for the regional planning level is minimizing 
the effect of regional plans as directional-only plans. Regional plans are not binding on 
municipalities. They are, in other words, optional or informational only. This inefficiency is also 
encouraging an overlapping of regional plans covering the same area. In conclusion, all of this is 
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contributing to a very weak coordination process horizontally between various regional plans and 
vertically between national and local planning levels. 
7.2.1 Attempts at Enhancing the Planning Coordination Process 
Given the lack of coordination, it is also important to mention here that there are now some 
attempts for enhancing the planning coordination process between the different planning levels 
and institutions. Although these attempts are still in their preliminary stages, their very existence 
can be considered as evidence of awareness of this deficiency and thus the need for actions that 
will enhance integration of the planning process.  
One attempt for enhancing the coordination process between planning levels is an endeavor 
to link SDIPs to the National Plan that is prepared by the Palestinian government. The National 
Plan should not be confused with the National Spatial Plan that is still being prepared to reflect a 
spatial vision of planning in the West Bank and Gaza. The National Plan is primarily an 
economic plan concerned with national development as sectorial development. The National 
Plan proposes key projects to be implemented for the development of these sectors. Budgets for 
these projects are estimated by the Palestinian ministries and as a result the total financial aid 
required from international donors, or from local income, is calculated. An SDIP is a 
development plan that can be prepared for the local or regional levels. An SDIP basically follows 
a public participation approach to result in a set of key projects that trigger development in that 
specific community, or region. Thus it acts as a guide for the preparation of the master plan. 
Until recently, the National Plan was completely isolated from other levels of planning. No form 
of coordination existed. Beginning in 2011, the MOLG has requested from planners to stem 
development projects proposed in SDIPs from the projects proposed in the National Plan. It is 
still a one way, top-down relationship. Development projects in the National Plan are proposed 
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by the government. There is no mechanism for the National Plan to take into consideration key 
projects that result from public participation processes in SDIPs. In other words, there is no 
bottom-up coordination process. SDIPs can only specify that this proposed project is using an 
allocated budget from the National Plan. 
An orientation in the Palestinian Higher Council on Planning for joint planning areas can 
be viewed as another attempt for enhancing planning coordination efforts. The Higher Council 
on Planning has required many adjacent Palestinian communities to have joint local councils and 
thus to prepare a single SDIP and master plan for all the adjacent localities. Many examples in 
the West Bank exist, such as the Bani Zaid Joint Local Council, Baqa Al-Sharqeyya and Nazlat 
Joint Local Council. This sort of horizontal coordination on the local level between adjacent 
communities can minimize, or even eliminate, planning conflicts between adjacent communities, 
such as the case of Ramallah and Betunia’s master plans. 
In 2011 the Planning Coordination Committee was formed by a decree from the Council of 
Ministers. The responsibility of the Planning Coordination Committee is to enhance planning 
coordination in Palestine. The Planning Coordination Committee is responsible for linking the 
National Plan to the SDIP and endorsing joint local councils planning. Thus, its formation can be 
considered a step forward in enhancing coordination on more than one planning level. 
Coordination within the planning process in the West Bank can be considered very weak 
both horizontally and vertically. This weakness is negatively affecting the planning process. A 
lack of horizontal coordination between various planning projects is resulting in multiple plans 
for the same areas and can be considered a waste of time and resources. On the other hand, the 
lack of vertical coordination is leading to the planning of Palestinian communities in isolation of 
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their surroundings and thus unintentionally contributing to the Israeli policy of isolation and 
impeding the Palestinian vision of a contiguous state. 
7.3 Deficiency of Palestinian Planning Institutions 
Interviewees noted that much of the official planning in the West Bank suffers from 
weaknesses in three separate areas; deficiencies in planning personnel is one, financial weakness 
is another and the weakness of implementation mechanisms is a third. In what follows I will 
discuss planning institutions' weaknesses from each of these three perspectives. 
When the PNA was first formed, planning institutions had to be created or reactivated. The 
new institutions depended on new employees who had very little if any planning experience, 
largely because the planning process during the Israeli Era was essentially Israeli military 
planning geared toward enhancing the occupation’s control over territory as discussed earlier. 
Even if there were Palestinian employees who had worked with the Israeli planners, they were 
used to working with the ICA within a totally different planning environment and thus planning 
process. The same may also be said about private-sector planners, who were also used to dealing 
with an occupation force. When dealing with an occupation force, one's planning attitude is 
different. First, planners were limited to planning only those areas permitted by the Israeli 
Military Governance, or Israeli Civil Administration as it was, later on, renamed. On the other 
hand planners would try to include as much lands as possible within their plans, regardless of the 
future needs of the community being planned. The more lands they can include, the more lands 
they protect from Israeli colonization. Second, the standard for acceptance of master plans was 
not related to the needs of local citizens on the basis of a logical estimation of future needs. 
Rather, the standard for acceptance was the requirements of the ICA. This attitude to plan only in 
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areas where the Israelis permit you to plan, when continued in the PNA era, may very hinder 
counter-planning activities, or planning based on the needs of local residents. 
After nearly nineteen years of experience, planners in Palestinian planning institutions have 
acquired a significant amount of experience.  The same may also be said of private-sector 
planners. However, the Palestinian planning institutions were forced to function initially with a 
lack of experience as they prepared many master plans for Palestinian communities, many of 
which are still in effect. Now planners have more experience but have to deal with planning 
problems that were caused by master plans that were produced by inexperienced planners.  
From a financial point of view, Palestinian institutions had and still have deficiencies that 
are no less harmful to the planning process than that concerning a lack of experienced staff. 
Palestinian institutions depend mainly on international donors for their financial resources. Being 
part of the Palestinian institutions, the same is true of planning institutions, local councils and 
municipalities. Funds can be acquired from the United States, Europe, Japan or Arab countries.  
Depending mainly on outside financial resources can, in many cases, hinder planning 
projects. International donors prefer to allocate their money to projects that are acceptable to all 
parties which in many cases may serve to exclude projects concerned solely with local residents' 
needs or that may contribute to a Palestinian future vision of a contiguous state. After all, it is 
very hard to convince a donor to allocate money to a project that might be rejected by the Israelis 
and thus never come to fruition. Thus, for many years prior to 2007, the PNA had failed to 
convince donors to invest in planning projects that include Area C.  In 2007, during the Jenin 
Economic Conference Israel accepted, under pressure from the Quartet Committee, to allow 
some Palestinian planning in Area C. It was not until then that some donors expressed an interest 
in investing in projects undertaken in Area C.  
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Accordingly, it is therefore probable that the dependence of Palestinian planning 
institutions on external funding has affected decisions to implement Palestinian planning projects 
likely to be rejected by Israeli authorities and therefore has precluded the Palestinian ability to 
counter-plan. Because by definition a counter-plan is a plan that counters the plans of those in 
power, which in this case is the Israeli occupation’s plans, any Palestinian attempt to counter-
plan will most probably not be welcomed by Israel. Thus, it will not present an attractive 
opportunity for foreign donors. 
Deficiencies in Palestinian planning institutions are also evident from an implementation– 
or "on-the-ground" point of view. When the West Bank was divided into A, B and C areas, the 
PNA possessed law enforcement forces only in Area A. Area A mainly formed the built-up areas 
of the major cities in the West Bank. This means that even though the PNA have the authority to 
plan in Area B, the PNA do not have the means to force these plans on the ground in these areas. 
Therefore, trespassing on road rights-of-way, not committing to floor area ratios, or building set-
backs and building more stories than allowed in the master plans are common practices in Area 
B and Area C among local citizens. There is no force on the ground, other than the local 
councils, that can follow up on the implementation of master plans in Area B and Area C. Local 
councils do not have any law enforcement authority. 
As a result of the unregulated and unplanned activities of local citizens that conflict with 
master plans, master plans become impossible to implement and thus unusable. One result is the 
formation of built-up and largely unplanned areas with very high population densities, areas in 
which people suffer from many social problems resulting from overcrowding. Examples of such 
areas are Al-Ram and Kufr Aqab, north of Ramallah. 
 163 
 
7.4 Lack of Readiness or Vision 
An important theme that was repeated in many of the interviewees' responses across the 
three case studies is the lack of an overall planning vision. Whenever there was a need for plans 
or urban solutions for communities, especially in Area C, the Palestinian planning institutions 
did not have it. At the same time, the ICA was ready with plans that supported Israeli political 
policies of occupation and control. In many cases, this has left the PNA in a weak position in the 
peace negotiations. It is harder to reject Israeli plans when a Palestinian vision for the targeted 
areas is missing. The basis for rejecting Israeli plans could be much stronger if based upon a 
study of the needs of the locals––an urban plan. In many cases when a Palestinian vision was 
needed, it could not be provided because the Palestinian planning institutions were not ready. An 
example of this –unpreparedness is when Israel agreed, under the Quartet Committee’s pressure, 
for plans to be prepared for 17 communities in Area C. The Palestinian Higher Council on 
Planning, or any other Palestinian planning institution, did not have any vision for these 
communities, nor did it have any strategy for developing urban plans in those 17 communities. 
The ICA, however, in a very short period of time provided plans for the 17 communities. 
Because the Palestinian planning institutions did not have anything prepared, the Israeli plans 
were very hard to dispute and the Palestinian planning institutions wasted a chance to legalize 
and plan according to a Palestinian vision for those targeted communities.22  
The lack of a future vision can be attributed to many factors. First of all, the National 
Spatial Plan that is supposed to provide a comprehensive planning vision for Palestine is still 
being prepared. There are no signs that it will be ready soon, as it is facing many problems such 
                                                 
22 Another example of this predicament occurred in Gaza, when Israel unilaterally pulled out of the Gaza 
Strip in 2005 and evacuated the Israeli illegal settlements there. The Palestinians found themselves with no planning 
vision for these evacuated illegal settlements. The lands for the evacuated Israeli illegal settlements remained vacant 
for years, in a very highly populated area like Gaza, due to the lack of a planning vision. 
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as the capacity of the planning staff and the availability of financial resources. The Preservation 
Plan that is currently in use cannot serve as a basis for a vision as it only delineates the areas that 
should not be built on and that should therefore not become part of the country's urban 
expansion. (The Preservation Plan cannot serve as the basis for a vision even if we ignore the 
fact that it contains many inaccuracies.) 
Moreover, the lack of vertical coordination among the three Palestinian planning levels that 
I discussed earlier is a major factor contributing to the lack of a Palestinian planning vision–
particularly the absence of a mid-level-planning tier (i.e., the regional planning level). The 
Higher Council on Planning's role, on the other hand, is restricted to reviewing public appeals 
and making sure that master plans do not contain any technical-planning errors, such as over-
sloped roads. Many argue that the Higher Council on Planning can play a more active role in 
coordinating different communities' master plans. 
Another reason for the lack of a planning vision is the lack of plans for Palestinian 
communities in Area C. There are about 150 Palestinian communities in Area C. Until the year 
2008, the Palestinian planning institutions ignored these communities apart from a few cases 
such as the case of Aqaba village /Tubas. The act of incitement that drew the PNA's attention to 
the importance of planning in Area C was the previously discussed incident when Israel 
announced, at the Jenin Economic Conference, its approval to have plans ready for the 
Palestinian communities when the Palestinian planning institutions found themselves with no 
strategy or preparedness to do so. 
As a result of this incident, the Minister of Local Government decided in 2008 that the 
Ministry should start creating master plans for all Palestinian communities in Area C. Although 
this might have been envisioned late, it can also be viewed a step in the right direction for 
 165 
 
forcing Palestinian planning institutions to be ready with plans that can respond to the Israeli 
ones the moment a confrontation is needed. Over the past five years, master plans with a 
Palestinian vision have been created for Area C Palestinian communities. Many planners 
interviewed claim that Palestinian planning institutions are today much more prepared to 
confront Israeli plans than they were in the past. The case study of Fasayil can be a good 
example of this preparedness. 
Palestinian planning institutions ignored planning in Area C for about 15 years after the 
Oslo Accords were signed. During this 15-year period the Palestinian planning institutions had 
no ability to respond convincingly to Israeli plans for these communities. Despite the fact that it 
came late, the decision to begin preparing maps for Palestinian communities in Area C was a 
step in the right direction as the Palestinian planning institutions today, five years after this 
decision, are arguably better prepared to plan for Palestinian communities in Area C. Palestinian 
planning institutions also lack a vision that might explain the relationships between Palestinian 
cities in a contiguous Palestinian state.  
Nevertheless, no matter how few counter-planning efforts there have been, what counter-
planning activity that has existed has proven to benefit local citizens in many cases. The case of 
Fasayil is one example. Although the International Peace and Cooperation Center (IPCC)-
proposed plan in Fasayil has not been approved by the ICA, it was successful in stopping 
demolition and stop-work orders for four years and until this day. Locals have been able to live 
in their homes and use public facilities in the village since 2009 without any demolition actions 
from the Israeli army. Although this might be seen as a temporary benefit, in a highly unstable 
political environment it may be considered a measure that can keep the local residents in their 
homes until a permanent political solution is reached between the Palestinians and the Israelis. 
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In the Ramallah case study, proposed roads in Area C that are included in the latest urban 
plan provide an explanation for the planned roads in Area B and a future vision for contiguity 
between separated parts of Area B. 
7.5 Counter-planning Actions 
Until 2008, the planning process in the West Bank dealt only with master plans created for 
Areas A and B that had been under the planning authority of the PNA, plans that had very 
minimal, if any, counter-planning qualities. If counter-planning is a planning activity that meets 
the local citizens' needs against plans of an oppressive state (Davidoff 1965, Forester 1989, Roos 
1974), then these plans cannot be argued to have any counter-planning value. After all, the plans 
were applied to areas where the Israelis have approved them to be applied in the first place. The 
master plans in question were merely land-use plans applied within borders approved by Israel. 
From that perspective, the plans could not have any effect on current Israeli plans in Area C that 
aim at isolating Palestinian communities from each other and enhance the control of the military 
occupation.  
Over the last five years this situation has begun to change. The first step was a decision in 
2008 made by the PNA’s Minister of Local Government to start planning in Area C from the 
perspective that these are Palestinian lands according to international law and Palestinian 
planning institutions need to provide better living conditions for their inhabitants. Since then 
some enhancements to the Palestinian planning system have been applied. Some of these 
enhancements can be looked at as forms of a counter-planning activity. 
Strategic Development and Investment Plans (SDIP) can also be viewed to be a form of 
counter-planning. Counter-planning activity is discussed by many scholars as a form of public-
based democratic planning that responds to the needs of the local citizens in the face of 
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mainstream power (Davidoff 1965, Forester 1989, Friedman 1969, Krieger 1971, Roos 1974). 
SDIPs represent a planning framework for the master plan. The SDIP is prepared through a 
series of local public meetings and workshops with relevant stakeholders in order to provide a 
vision for the local community prioritize key projects and define a planning orientation for the 
master plan. By 2010 SDIPs began to be required by MOLG for Palestinian communities. The 
only public input, before SDIPs were proposed, was the right to appeal after the master plan was 
almost complete and advertised. SDIPs have, therefore, enhanced the public participation 
component in the planning process and provided a framework for the master plan. From this 
point of view, SDIPs can be viewed as a counter-planning action. SDIPs, however, are limited in 
that they are required for the local community and basically provide a planning framework for 
Area A and Area B only that does not affect Israel's plans in Area C. Looking at it from this 
perspective, SDIPs have a minimal amount of counter-planning.   
Some SDIPs have been created for entire governorates, such as Salfit and Jericho. These 
SDIPs come into direct contact with Area C land and thus with Israeli plans. Bearing in mind 
that governorate SDIPs have positively affected the democratization of the urban planning 
process, these SDIPs can be viewed as counter-planning activities because they are creating a 
Palestinian vision for areas that previously had only been planned according to a vision of 
occupation. However a major drawback remains; these SDIPs lack a legal framework that can 
make them obligatory. They also lack the ability to be implemented as the PNA does not have 
any jurisdiction in Area C. However, these plans remain as visions for these areas which the 
Palestinian planning institutions and decision makers can use to counter ICA plans. 
Following the decision made by the Minister of Local Government in 2008, a conceptual 
document for planning in Area C was issued in 2010 by the Higher Council on Planning. The 
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document emphasizes the importance of planning in Area C. It drafted the orientation of the 
Higher Council on Planning for creating plans for Palestinian communities in Area C. The first 
concept delineated emphasized that the Palestinian Planning Council and MOLG should make 
every effort possible to create master plans for Area C communities that respond to the 
requirements of the local citizens without taking into account any boundaries proposed by the 
ICA. The planning of Fasayil by the IPCC is one good example of this orientation within the 
Palestinian planning institutions.  
In orientation similar manner, master plans for many Palestinian communities in Area C 
were prepared by Palestinian planners, in support of the MOLG, during the previous three years. 
Abdullah Alyounis, Al Walaja, Al-Nabi Sumuil, Al Ramadin, and Abu Farwa villages are all 
examples. Most of the master plans for these communities have not been approved by the ICA, 
although they were submitted to the ICA. Despite their current status, however, the master plans 
submitted to the ICA can still counteract Israeli plans by providing a Palestinian vision and 
documentation outlining the needs of local residents.  
The 2010 conceptual document concerning planning in Area C provided and clarified the 
duties of the Higher Council on Planning led by the MOLG. The first duty is to raise funds for 
planning projects. Funds can be obtained from the Ministry of Finance (locally), or from 
international donors such as the USA, the European Union, or Arab countries. Secondly, the 
document defines the role of the MOLG for planning Palestinian communities in Area C as 
primarily one of advocacy. Advocacy here should not be confused with the Davidoff concept of 
advocacy planning (1965). An advocacy role of the MOLG means simply that the MOLG will 
not be officially involved within the planning process. The Ministry will only advise a planner to 
be contracted by a local community council. The advised planner shall be known to the MOLG 
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and familiar with the Ministry's approach to planning. The Ministry will also monitor the planner 
closely during the whole planning process to ensure local citizens' needs are adequately assessed. 
The 2010 conceptual document specifies that the MOLG should focus on developing the health, 
education, transportation, electric power and water sectors. 
To sum up, the counter-planning activity of the Palestinian planning institutions is 
relatively stronger on the local level than it is on the regional one because of the current practice 
of creating master plans for all Palestinian communities in Area C, a planning process involving 
a joint effort through close coordination among planners, the MOLG, local councils, and the 
larger community.  Public participation is facilitated through public meetings and stakeholders' 
workshops. On the regional level, governorate SDIPs can also be viewed as a form of counter-
planning even if the non-mandatory nature of the SDIPs limits their effectiveness. Counter-
planning efforts on the regional level are therefore generally much weaker than those on the local 
level. 
On the national level, there are no serious counter-planning efforts. No national vision 
exists to guide Palestinian communities and regions –– and the Palestinian planners that serve 
them –– towards a coordinated planning process that could lead to a contiguous future 
Palestinian state.  
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8 Conclusion 
This dissertation is about the planning process in the West Bank/ Palestine in an attempt to 
assess whether planning there is serving a counter-planning function against Israeli urban 
policies. Counter-planning is viewed by a number of scholars as a type of planning directed 
against the dominant system of institutionalized power (Davidoff 1965, Forester 1989, Friedman 
1969, Krieger 1971, Roos 1974). Counter-planning as I have defined it in this dissertation 
similarly means Palestinian planning activities that defy dominant Israeli-occupation planning. 
Within the course of this dissertation I considered three case studies: Ramallah city, Fasayil and 
Rawabi.  
I found that there is currently very little counter-planning activity in the Palestinian urban 
planning process. Counter-planning is only occurring in the context of the Palestinian National 
Authority's (PNA) recent decision to support planning in Area C where Israel, in accordance 
with the Oslo Accords, is in control and has the authority to plan. The support of planning in  
Area C may be considered counter-planning because the planning counters Israeli plans for Area 
C. The Area C plans are, to a certain degree, responding to the needs of the indigenous local 
citizens, stopping Israeli demolition orders, and attempting to provide for the basic needs of the 
citizens that the Israeli plans totally ignore and even contradict. From this perspective and in 
light of relevant scholarly literature on counter-planning (Davidoff 1965, Friedman 1969, 
Forester 1989, Krieger 1971, Roos 1974), planning in Area C may be viewed as counter-
planning acts. However, such acts of counter-planning are minimal and remain relatively 
undeveloped. 
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8.1 Reasons for the Relative Lack of Counter-planning in the West 
Bank/Palestine 
The relative lack of counter-planning in the West Bank/ Palestine is attributable to several 
factors that I refer to as: legal reasons, lack of coordination, deficiency within Palestinian 
planning institutions and the lack of readiness or vision.  
8.1.1 Legal Reasons 
Currently, the planning law that is being implemented in the West Bank is the Jordanian 
Law Number 79 of 1966. Despite the fact that this law addresses the planning process on the 
national, regional and local levels, regional-level planning is underdeveloped in the West Bank. 
Regional planning level was abolished by the Israeli Authorities after the occupation of 1967. 
Now after nearly 20 years since the formation of the PNA effective regional planning is still 
lacking. The regional planning level, according to the Jordanian planning law, acts as the link 
between the national and local planning levels to ensure that the local plans take national policies 
into account and vice versa. That stated, it is clear that local plans are being created for 
Palestinian communities that do not include any vision of those communities' relationships to 
their surrounding environment and how they fit in to overall national policies and Palestinian 
aspirations for an independent contiguous state. 
The absence of the regional planning level can be attributed, in part, to the nature of 
authorities (powers) delegated to the PNA in accordance to the Oslo Accords. "Natural" 
regional-level planning areas actually consisted of –largely-undeveloped— areas in between 
Palestinian communities, areas that are most likely classified as Area C where the PNA has no 
power to plan. Thus, a regional planning institution, if existed at the early stages of the PNA, 
would not have had any work to do at that time because areas of regional planning are within 
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Israeli planning authority in Area C. However, this is likely to indicate a short vision of the 
PNA’s planning institutions. If planning institutions were more future-directed, they would have 
worked harder on activating the regional and national planning levels to make sure they are 
ready for the end of the occupation. 
Equally important, no legal cover can be found under the Oslo Accords that neither 
legitimizes nor permits the PNA's to plan in Area C. Thus the PNA does not have any authority 
to approve and authenticate any regional or national plans. However, the recent 
acknowledgement of Palestine as a State by the United Nations General assembly on the 
November 29, 2011 may act as a basis for the PNA to demand its right as a state to plan in these 
areas. Further, Area C land should have been transformed to Area B or Area A by now, 
according to the timeframe of the transitional period of Oslo Accords. 
8.1.2 Lack of Coordination 
In spite of the legal obstacles that face the planning process on the regional and national 
levels, there have been some attempts to create regional plans in different areas of the West 
Bank. A national spatial plan is also under creation, although it is not known yet when and how it 
will be accomplished. 
Many of the regional and National planning attempts, and especially those on the regional 
level in particular, lack proper coordination. In the Ramallah case study it is clear that there are 
different urban plans on different levels carried out by different planning teams without 
coordination on either the horizontal or vertical level. On the horizontal level, local and regional 
planning activities occur more or less independently and without reference to one another.   At 
the same time there are multiple regional plans for the same geographic area. The Ramallah—
Al-Bireh—Betunia Strategic Development and Investment Plan overlap with the Metropolitan 
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Plan for the same area. None of the plans have taken the findings or the recommendations of the 
other into consideration. Scarce public funds were expended to do the same job twice.  
There is a similar lack of vertical coordination of planning activities.  For example, the 
Ramallah—Al-Bireh—Betunia SDIP and the Metropolitan plan (regional level plans) were both 
created after the master (local level) plans for the major cities were finished and approved by the 
Palestinian Higher Council on Planning. Thus it is very hard to modify any of the local plans to 
comply with the recommendations found in the two regional plans. In many cases, the 
municipalities themselves were not ready to modify the master plan. After all, the regional plans 
are not mandatory due to the existing legal framework for planning I discussed earlier. 
8.1.3 Deficiency of Palestinian Planning Institutions 
Many of the official planning institutions in the West Bank suffer from deficiencies on 
more than one level. Specifically, deficiencies were indentified in three areas; deficiencies of 
planning staff, financial deficiencies and deficiencies in implementations mechanism.  
When the Palestinian National Authority was first formed the Palestinian planning process 
depended on new employees who had very little, if any, experience in the planning process. 
Private sector planners, on the other hand, who were used to dealing with an occupation force did 
not have any experience in planning under the Palestinian National Authority umbrella. Planning 
standards, to most private-sector planners, were the requirements of the Israeli authorities. This 
attitude: to plan only in areas were the Israelis permit you to, continued to be active during the 
PNA era, and can be considered a main reason to hinder any thoughts to counter-plan, or plan 
based on the needs of the local community. 
After about twenty years of functioning, Palestinian planning institutions have built a 
significant amount of experience within its planning employees. The same can also be discussed 
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about private sector planners. However, Palestinian planning institutions were forced to function 
during the first years with this lack of experience and prepare a considerable amount of master 
plans for Palestinian communities. Many of these plans are still in effect. Now the more-
experienced Palestinian planners and planning institutions have to deal with planning problems 
that were caused by master plans that were produced earlier by inexperienced planners.  
From a financial point of view, Palestinian institutions, including planning institutions, 
depend mainly for their financial resources on international donors. International donors prefer to 
allocate their funds in projects that are acceptable from all sides, including the Israeli authorities. 
This can in many cases exclude projects that have a high possibility to be rejected by Israeli 
authorities, such as urban plans that might counter-act some Israeli ones. It wasn't until 2007, 
during the Jenin International Economic Conference, when some donors, in specific European 
donors, expressed interest to invest in planning projects that target C categorized areas. The 
dependence of the Palestinian planning institutions on external funding, due to lack of local 
financial resources, highly jeopardizes the Palestinian ability to plan in disputed areas, and thus 
the ability to counter Israeli plans.  
Deficiencies in Palestinian planning institutions can be observed from an implementation  
ability point of view, as well. The Palestinian Authority has no executive power that can follow 
up the implementation of plans is Area C and Area B. Examples of areas that suffer urban chaos 
are Al-Ram and Kafr Aqab, South of Ramallah. 
Palestinian planning institutions are vulnerable from more than one perspective. These 
institutions have to deal with urban plans prepared during the first years of the Palestinian 
Authority when it lacked planning experience, dependence on external funding hinders the 
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Palestinian Authority's ability to counter act Israeli plans and the Palestinian Authority lacks the 
executive force that can follow up on the implementation of urban plans in Area C and Area B. 
8.1.4 Lack of readiness or vision 
Palestinian planning institutions weren't ready whenever there was an urgent need for plans 
or urban solutions for communities, especially in Area C. Contrary, and at the same time the 
Israeli Civil Administration was most of the time ready with planning solutions that reflect 
Israeli political policies of occupation and control, when such plans were required. This has 
weakened the Palestinian Authority's position in the peace negotiations. It is harder to reject 
Israeli plans when a Palestinian vision for targeted areas is not present. The instance, that 
occurred during the Jenin International Economic Conference, when Israel agreed, under the 
pressure of the Quartet, for plans to be prepared for 17 Palestinian communities in Area C, and 
the Palestinian side weren't able to get them ready in time, is a good example of the lack of 
readiness of Palestinian planning institutions. 
Palestinian planning institutions lack also a vision that might explain the relationships 
between Palestinian cities in a contiguous Palestinian state. This lack of future vision can be 
attributed to many factors, such as the absence of a National Spatial Plan, that is supposed to 
provide a comprehensive planning vision for Palestine. Moreover, the absence of the regional 
planning level, discussed earlier, hinders the coordination between the local and national 
planning levels and therefore is a major factor contributing to the lack of a Palestinian planning 
vision.  
Another reason for a lack of planning vision is the lack for plans for Palestinian 
communities in Area C. Until the year 2008 the Palestinian planning institutions totally ignored 
these communities except for some shy attempts, such as Aqaba village /Tubas. Palestinian 
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planning institutions ignored planning in Area C for about fifteen years after the Oslo Accords 
were signed. During this period Palestinian planning institutions had no ability to respond 
convincingly to Israeli plans for these communities. However, although late, the decision to 
begin preparing maps for Palestinian communities in Area C is a step in the right direction. 
Palestinian planning institutions today, after five years of this decision, are better prepared 
concerning plans for Palestinian communities in Area C. 
8.2 Significance of being under occupation 
Planning problems identified above; legal/ legislative, lack of coordination, deficiencies of 
planning institutions and the lack of future vision can all be found in many other places of the 
world, not necessarily only in areas under conflict. However, in a place such as Palestine, with 
the presence of the Israeli military occupation, the effect of such problems on the urban 
environment and thus on the ability to peruse the Palestinian vision of an independent contiguous 
state, can be greatly magnified. Israeli policies have always been aimed at enforcing facts-on-
the-ground to enhance Israeli control on the occupied lands (Abdelhamid 2006, Abdulhadi 1990, 
Al-Gerbawy and Abdulhadi 1990, Bauer 2012, Bollens 2000, Coon 1992). The deficiencies in 
the Palestinian planning process can facilitate the implementation of these Israeli plans. That 
might have a devastating effect on the future of the Palestinian urban environment and the 
Palestinian vision of an independent contiguous state. 
Israeli policies aim to change unilaterally the geo-political landscape of Palestine by 
enforcing facts-on-the-ground (Abdelhamid 2006, Bollens 2000, Coon 1992). The lack of a 
Palestinian counter-planning policy due – partially at least – to the above found deficiencies in 
the Palestinian planning process is hindering counter planning activity and thus, making it much 
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easier and quicker for Israeli Authorities to enforce their plans of control and separation on the 
ground.  
Palestinian counter-plans can help highlight the Palestinian planning needs and clarify 
conflicts between these needs and the Israeli policies. Chomsky (2004) discusses that one way 
the Palestinians posses to try to enforce their plans is to educate the "international community" 
on the importance of these plans to the Palestinian people. Palestinian counter-plans can be of 
great help in clarifying the very negative effects of Israeli policies on the local Palestinians 
through highlighting the conflict between Palestinian needs and Israeli policies. International 
support of Palestinian counter-plans can hinder, or at least delay, the implementation of Israeli 
on-the-ground policies. This can of great importance taking into account that it is occurring in a 
conflict, politically highly-unstable, environment where a political agreement can be reached at 
any point of time.   
Planning of Fasayil is an example of the great importance of Palestinian counter-planning 
policies. The Palestinian plan for the village (International Peace and Cooporation Center 2011), 
although never approved, has stopped the demolition of many homes and buildings for a 
considerable period of time. Although the demolition orders have been stopped temporarily, but 
if at any time a political agreement is reached, these structures would have been spared 
demolition permanently.  This  
Israeli policies of separation (Bauer 2012, Chomsky 2010, Gordon 2008, Halper 2008) are 
in direct conflict with the Palestinian vision of a contiguous independent state. The more Israel is 
successful in enforcing facts-on-the-ground towards its policies of separation, the more it is 
harder for the Palestinians to accomplish the Palestinian vision of a contiguous state. Palestinian 
counter-plans can push Israeli plans back and — if not stop—delay them. The least facts-on-the-
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ground implemented by Israel, the better the chance Palestinians will have in achieving their 
political and planning vision!  
Planning deficiencies within the Palestinian planning process are magnified by the fact that 
they are occurring under occupation. Israeli plans that are rapidly being implemented are making 
the Palestinian vision harder to achieve. If the deficiencies within the Palestinian planning 
process were to be addressed by Palestinian planning officials then the Palestinian planning 
process could be made more efficient in countering Israeli plans of separation and control, and 
thus stop, or at least delay, Israeli plans that are in direct conflict with the Palestinian ones. For 
Palestinians this can mean the difference between being able to, or not being able to, achieve 
their vision of an independent contiguous Palestinian State.   
8.3 Newly Planned Neighborhoods 
As a newly planned city, Rawabi is claimed by those who developed it to be a major 
planning act that is resisting the Israeli occupation. This concept of resisting occupation through 
the construction of a new urban area is very similar to the concept of counter-planning, or 
planning to resist a powerful authority's plans. However, Rawabi is a profit-driven project 
undertaken in the context of a neoliberal policy framework. These policies are most likely 
intended as an economic policy that replaces the tendency towards liberation. Although some 
claim that the neoliberal policies in the region are part of a strategy of normalization between 
Israel, the Palestinians and the surrounding Arab countries, other scholars (Hanieh 2013, Khalidi 
and Samour 2011, Plitnick 2012) believe a neoliberal policy framework conflicts with the 
Palestinian struggle to end the occupation and build an independent Palestinian state because it 
releases Israel from the possibility of international pressure to comply with UN resolutions and 
international laws to end its occupation.  
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Therefore, neoliberal policies in the region are in conflict with counter-occupation policies. 
The establishment of Rawabi, itself a result of neoliberal policies, is arguably in conflict with 
planning policies countering the occupation and thus cannot be considered a counter-planning 
act.  
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8.4 Recommendations 
As per the findings of this dissertation, discussed in the previous section, the following 
actions are recommended for the Palestinian planning process in order to enhance its role as a 
counter-planning policy and thus meet the needs of the locals and the Palestinian vision of an 
independent state more efficiently. 
• Developing a Planning Legal Framework that Legislates Planning Outside Area B 
As it develops an overall planning vision, or even as local planners deal with issues 
pertaining to planning in Area C, the PNA is faced with the fact that there is no legal framework 
for adopting national/ regional plans. What is needed is a Palestinian law that legislates and 
organizes planning in the entire Palestinian lands on the basis of international law, UN 
resolutions and the fact that all Area C land was supposed to be transferred to Area A ten years 
after the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993.  This calls for action on the political level, to be 
undertaken by such authorities as the Palestinian Government or the Palestinian Legislative 
Council. 
A legal framework for adopting national/ regional plans should be accompanied by a 
campaign to educate international parties and the patrons of the peace process about the 
importance of Area C to the Palestinians and of their right to plan there as stated in the Oslo 
Accords and in accordance with their historic rights. Such a campaign might be the only way that 
would make it harder for the ICA to take unilateral actions (such as demolition orders) against 
Palestinian plans for Area C, or plans for Area A or Area B that involve Area C. 
• Enhancing Coordination Among Different Planning Levels 
As the Ramallah case study made clear, a lack of horizontal and vertical coordination exists 
among planners and planning efforts. The coordination process should be enhanced to optimize 
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the use of public money. One possible way to achieve this is to make a specific ministry the sole 
party responsible for the planning process. The lack of coordination within the planning process 
is directly linked to the lack of an active legal legislative planning framework. Plans on the 
regional and national planning levels are not mandatory. If these plans could be approved legally 
by planning institutions, it will minimize the occurrence of duplicated or conflicting plans.  
• Development of a More Developed Planning Vision on Both the Regional and 
National Levels 
The Palestinian Physical National Plan is still relatively undeveloped and requires a 
considerable amount of work. A national plan would provide a vision for a more integrated 
planning process and provide a vision of the overall picture and the vision towards a future 
independent state rather than creating discreet plans for Area A and Area B without clearly and 
unambiguously taking the surrounding urban environment (Area C) into account. A national plan 
would provide higher-level guidelines for local-level planners so that the planning process at the 
local and regional levels can take account of the overall urban environment as one large unit 
rather than many discreet smaller units. 
• Adopting Brave Decisions 
Adopting brave decisions is actually linked to the development of a planning legal 
framework that legislates planning outside Area B. If such a framework were developed and 
adopted then the PNA should begin approving plans in Area C based on the previously 
mentioned rights to do so. The international community’s role here is essential. The PNA should 
educate international organizations and donors that these actions are part of the Palestinian’s 
right to plan and the fact that these Area C lands should have been transferred to the jurisdiction 
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of the PNA a long time ago. This could be one way to stop—or at least make it harder for—
Israel to demolish or stop work and urban development in those areas. 
8.5 Further Research 
• Palestinian planning process and counter-planning activity in the Gaza Strip.  
This research has targeted the West Bank only. The planning environment in the Gaza 
Strip is different because, among other things, the Area A, Area B and Area C land 
categorization system does not apply there. Even though planning there is different, the 
Gaza Strip is an essential part of any future Palestinian State. Literature regarding the 
planning process in the Gaza Strip is very limited. Such research could be a valuable 
contribution to literature on planning in Palestine.   
• The neoliberal policy in the Middle East and its Effect on the urban planning 
process in Palestine.  
Western neoliberal policies are affecting the practice and outcomes of city planning in the 
Middle East and in Palestine. More research is needed on the effects of neoliberal 
policies on the lives of citizens under occupation in Palestine. 
• Israeli urban plans in the West Bank and their effect on Palestinian communities. 
Israeli authorities have plans for the West Bank that are probably contributing to its 
policies of control or separation, which I have pointed to during the course of this 
research. It would be very useful to analyze the Israeli plans in detail in an effort to see 
how the plans are affecting the growth of Palestinian communities and the day-to-day 
lives of the Palestinian citizens. 
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Appendix 1: Semi-Structured Interview Protocol 
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Semi-Structured Interviews Protocol 
 
Participant’s name:______________________ 
Date & time:___________________________ 
Location of the interview:____________________________________ 
 
Research introduction: 
One of the most challenging problems facing planners in Palestine is that many Palestinian 
localities are isolated into islands, a result of Israeli policies since the year 2001 when Israel 
started building a wall that separates Palestinian communities from the larger areas of which they 
are a part. My research is designed to examine the Palestinian planning process on the regional 
and national levels in an effort to make policy recommendations on Palestinian planning actions 
that may be able to counteract Israeli policies of separation and thus contribute to the objective of 
a contiguous Palestinian state. 
 
Question 1: From your point of view, How are master plans for Palestinian communities 
initiated? 
Notes: 
 
Question 2: What criteria exist to approve master plans of Palestinian communities? 
Notes: 
 
Question 3: What type of coordination currently exists between the different institutions 
concerned with planning in Palestine? 
Notes: 
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Question 4: What plans exist to accommodate for population growth of Palestinian 
communities? How do these plans take into consideration the natural resources? 
Notes: 
_______________ 
Question 5: How do master plans take into account the surrounding communities? Are there any 
strategies to ensure future contiguity, if needed? What are they? 
Notes: 
_______________ 
 
Question 6: how are higher level services - hospitals, universities - planned? Is there any 
coordination between the distribution of high level services and the connecting transportation 
network on the other? How? 
Notes: 
_______________ 
Question 7: What transportation plans, if any, do Palestinian planning institutions have to link 
Palestinian cities and communities? How do these plans take Israeli transportation network into 
consideration? 
Notes: 
_______________ 
 
Question 8: How does the transportation network take into account the locations of economic, 
social and cultural main centers? 
Notes: 
_______________ 
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Question 9: Are there any plans for shared infrastructure or shared public services between 
communities? What are they? 
Notes: 
_______________ 
Question 10: Does urban plans take into account the conservation of natural resources? How? 
Notes: 
_______________ 
 
Question 11: What Palestinian process exists, if any, to approve Palestinian plans for areas 
currently under Israeli control?  
Notes: 
______________ 
Question 12: How can these plans act as a reference for Palestinian politicians and decision 
makers? 
 
Notes: 
 
 
The researcher would like to thank the participant for his or her time and cooperation. All 
efforts will be made to convey this information accurately and will be employed with a view to 
improving the urban planning process in the West Bank / Palestine. 
To follow up:  
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Appendix 2: Text of United Nations Security Council Resolutions that are 
Referred to in the Manuscript23 
In this appendix I reproduce the text of United Nations Security Council resolutions 
regarding Israeli settlement in the Palestinian territories. Resolutions 446, 452, 465, 471, and 476 
all state that Israeli settlements or other "measures taken by Israel to change the physical 
character, demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the Palestinian and other 
Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, or any part thereof have no legal 
validity." The assertion in this dissertation that Israeli settlements are illegal is based on these 
United Nations resolutions.  
I have also included the text of United Nations Security Council resolutions 242 of 1967 
and 267 of 1968. Resolution 242 of 1967 "calls upon Israel to reciprocate by withdrawing its 
forces from land claimed by other parties during the 1967 war" and resolution 267 of 1968 
"censures in the strongest terms all measures taken [by Israel] to change the status of the City of 
Jerusalem.   
                                                 
23 The full text of United Nations Security Council resolutions can be accessed at 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/index.shtml. 
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Resolution 446 (1979) 
of 22 March 1979 
 
 
The Security Council, 
 
Having heard the statement of the Permanent Representative of Jordan and other statements 
made before the Council, 
 
Stressing the urgent need to achieve a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, 
 
Affirming once more that the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 1/ is applicable to the Arab territories occupied by 
Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem, 
 
1. Determines that the policy and practices of Israel in establishing settlements in the 
Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967 have no legal validity and 
constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the 
Middle East; 
 
2. Strongly deplores the failure of Israel to abide by Security Council resolutions 237 (1967) of 
14 June 1967, 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968 and 298 (1971) of 25 September 1971 and the 
consensus statement by the President of the Security Council on 11 November 1976 2/ and 
General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967, 32/5 of 28 
October 1977 and 33/113 of 18 December 1978; 
 
3. Calls once more upon Israel, as the occupying Power, to abide scrupulously by the 1949 
Fourth Geneva Convention, to rescind its previous measures and to desist from taking any action 
which would result in changing the legal status and geographical nature and materially affecting 
the demographic composition of the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, 
and, in particular, not to transfer parts of its own civilian population into the occupied Arab 
territories; 
 
4. Establishes a Commission consisting of three members of the Security Council, to be 
appointed by the President of the Council after consultations with the members of the Council, to 
examine the situation relating to settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, 
including Jerusalem; 
 
5. Requests the Commission to submit its report to the Security Council by 1 July 1979; 
 
6. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the Commission with the necessary facilities to 
enable it to carry out its mission. 
 
7. Decides to keep the situation in the occupied territories under constant and close scrutiny and 
to reconvene in July 1979 to review the situation in the light of the findings of the Commission. 
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Adopted at the 2134th meeting by 12 votes to none, with 3 abstentions (Norway, United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America). 
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Resolution 452 (1979) 
of 20 July 1979 
 
The Security Council, 
 
Taking note of the report and recommendations of the Security Council Commission established 
under resolution 446 (1979) to examine the situation relating to settlements in the Arab territories 
occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, contained in document S/13450, 
 
Strongly deploring the lack of co-operation of Israel with the Commission, 
 
Considering that the policy of Israel in establishing settlements in the occupied Arab 
territories has no legal validity and constitutes a violation of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, 
 
Deeply concerned by the practices of the Israeli authorities in implementing that settlements 
policy in the occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem, and its consequences for the local 
Arab and Palestinian population, 
 
Emphasizing the need for confronting the issue of the existing settlements and the need to 
consider measures to safeguard the impartial protection of property seized, 
 
Bearing in mind the specific status of Jerusalem, and reconfirming pertinent Security Council 
resolutions concerning Jerusalem and in particular the need to protect and preserve the unique 
spiritual and religious dimension of the Holy Places in that city, 
 
Drawing attention to the grave consequences which the settlements policy is bound to have on 
any attempt to reach a peaceful solution in the Middle East, 
 
1. Commends the work done by the Commission in preparing the report on the establishment of 
Israeli settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem; 
 
2. Accepts the recommendations contained in the above-mentioned report of the Commission; 
 
3. Calls upon the Government and people of Israel to cease, on an urgent basis, the 
establishment, construction and planning of settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 
1967, including Jerusalem; 
 
4. Requests the Commission, in view of the magnitude of the problem of settlements, to keep 
under close survey the implementation of the present resolution and to report back to the 
Security Council before 1 November 1979. 
 
 
Adopted at the 2159th meeting by 14 votes to none, with 1 abstention (United States of 
America). 
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Resolution 465 (1980) 
Adopted by the Security Council at its 2203rd meeting 
on 1 March 1980 
 
The Security Council, 
 
Taking note of the reports of the Commission of the Security Council established under 
resolution 446 (1979) to examine the situation relating to settlements in the Arab territories 
occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, contained in documents S/13450 and Corr. 1 and 
S/13679, 
 
Taking note also of letters from the Permanent Representative of Jordan (S/13801) and the 
Permanent Representative of Morocco, Chairman of the Islamic Group (S/13802), 
 
Strongly deploring the refusal by Israel to co-operate with the Commission and regretting its 
formal rejection of resolutions 446 (1979) and 452 (1979), 
 
Affirming once more that the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 is applicable to the Arab territories occupied by 
Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem, 
 
Deploring the decision of the Government of Israel to officially support Israeli settlement in the 
Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, 
 
Deeply concerned over the practices of the Israeli authorities in implementing that settlement 
policy in the occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem, and its consequences for the local 
Arab and Palestinian population, 
 
Taking into account the need to consider measures for the impartial protection of private and 
public land and property, and water resources, 
 
Bearing in mind the specific status of Jerusalem and, in particular, the need for protection and 
preservation of the unique spiritual and religious dimension of the Holy Places in the city, 
 
Drawing attention to the grave consequences which the settlement policy is bound to have on 
any attempt to reach a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, 
 
Recalling pertinent Security Council resolutions, specifically resolutions 237 (1967) of 14 June 
1967, 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968, 267 (1969) of 3 July 1969, 271 (1969) of 15 September 1969 
and 298 (1971) of 25 September 1971, as well as the consensus statement made by the President 
of the Security Council on 11 November 1976, 
 
Having invited Mr. Fahd Qawasmeh, Mayor of Al-Khalil (Hebron), in the occupied territory, to 
supply it with information pursuant to rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, 
 
1. Commends the work done by the Commission in preparing the report contained in document 
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S/13679; 
 
2. Accepts the conclusions and recommendations contained in the above-mentioned report of the 
Commission; 
 
3. Calls upon all parties, particularly the Government of Israel, to co-operate with the 
Commission; 
 
4. Strongly deplores the decision of Israel to prohibit the free travel of Mayor Fahd Qawasmeh in 
order to appear before the Security Council, and requests Israel to permit his free travel to the 
United Nations headquarters for that purpose; 
 
5. Determines that all measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, 
demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the Palestinian and other 
Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, or any part thereof, have no 
legal validity and that Israel's policy and practices of settling parts of its population and new 
immigrants in those territories constitute a flagrant violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention 
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and also constitute a serious 
obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East; 
 
6. Strongly deplores the continuation and persistence of Israel in pursuing those policies and 
practices and calls upon the Government and people of Israel to rescind those measures, to 
dismantle the existing settlements and in particular to cease, on an urgent basis, the 
establishment, construction and planning of settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 
1967, including Jerusalem; 
 
7. Calls upon all States not to provide Israel with any assistance to be used specifically in 
connexion with settlements in the occupied territories; 
 
8. Requests the Commission to continue to examine the situation relating to settlements in the 
Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, to investigate the reported serious 
depletion of natural resources, particularly the water resources, with a view to ensuring the 
protection of those important natural resources of the territories under occupation, and to keep 
under close scrutiny the implementation of the present resolution; 
 
9. Requests the Commission to report to the Security Council before 1 September 1980, and 
decides to convene at the earliest possible date thereafter in order to consider the report and the 
full implementation of the present resolution. 
 
----- 
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Resolution 471 (1980) 
of 5 June 1980 
 
The Security Council, 
 
Recalling once again the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and in particular article 27, which reads, 
"Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their 
persons... They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected 
especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof ... ", 
Reaffirming the applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War to the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including 
Jerusalem, 
 
Recalling also its resolutions 468 (1980) and 469 (1980),  
 
Reaffirming its resolution 465 (1980), by which the Security Council determined "that all 
measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, demographic composition, 
institutional structure or status of the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 
1967, including Jerusalem, or any part thereof have no legal validity and that Israel's policy 
and practices of settling parts of its population and new immigrants in those territories constitute 
a flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War and also constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and 
lasting peace in the Middle East" and strongly deplored the "continuation and persistence of 
Israel in pursuing those policies and practices", 
 
Shocked by the assassination attempts against the Mayors of Nablus, Ramallah and Al Bireh, 
 
Deeply concerned that the Jewish settlers in the occupied Arab territories are allowed to carry 
arms, thus enabling them to perpetrate crimes against the civilian Arab population, 
 
1. Condemns the assassination attempts against the Mayors of Nablus, Ramallah and Al Bireh 
and calls for the immediate apprehension and prosecution of the perpetrators of these crimes; 
 
2. Expresses deep concern that Israel, as the occupying Power, has failed to provide adequate 
protection to the civilian population in the occupied territories in conformity with the provisions 
of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War; 
 
3. Calls upon the Government of Israel to provide the victims with adequate compensation for 
the damages suffered as a result of these crimes; 
 
4. Calls again upon the government of Israel to respect and to comply with the provisions of the 
Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, as well as with 
the relevant resolutions of the Security Council; 
 
5. Calls once again upon all States not to provide Israel with any assistance to be used 
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specifically in connexion with settlements in the occupied territories; 
 
6. Reaffirms the overriding necessity to end the prolonged occupation of Arab territories 
occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem; 
 
7. Requests the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of the present resolution. 
 
Adopted at the 2226th meeting 
by 14 votes to none, 
with 1 abstention (United States of America) 
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Resolution 476 (1980) 
 
Adopted by the Security Council at its 2242nd meeting 
on 30 June 1980 
 
The Security Council, 
 
Having considered the letter of 28 May 1980 from the representative of Pakistan, the current 
Chairman of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, as contained in document S/13966 of 
28 May 1980, 
 
Reaffirming that acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible, 
 
Bearing in mind the specific status of Jerusalem and, in particular, the need for protection and 
preservation of the unique spiritual and religious dimension of the Holy Places in the city, 
 
Reaffirming its resolutions relevant to the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, in 
particular resolutions 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968, 267 (1969) of 3 July 1969, 271 (1969) of 15 
September 1969, 298 (1971) of 25 September 1971 and 465 (1980) of 1 March 1980, 
 
Recalling the Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War, 
 
Deploring the persistence of Israel, in changing the physical character, demographic 
composition, institutional structure and the status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, 
 
Gravely concerned over the legislative steps initiated in the Israeli Knesset with the aim of 
changing the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, 
 
1. Reaffirms the overriding necessity to end the prolonged occupation of Arab territories 
occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem; 
 
2. Strongly deplores the continued refusal of Israel, the occupying Power, to comply with the 
relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly; 
 
3. Reconfirms that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, 
the occupying Power, which purport to alter the character and status of the Holy City of 
Jerusalem have no legal validity and constitute a flagrant violation of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and also constitute a 
serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East; 
 
4. Reiterates that all such measures which have altered the geographic, demographic and 
historical character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem are null and void and must be 
rescinded in compliance with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council; 
 
5. Urgently calls on Israel, the occupying Power, to abide by this and previous Security Council 
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resolutions and to desist forthwith from persisting in the policy and measures affecting the 
character and status of the Holy city of Jerusalem; 
 
6. Reaffirms its determination in the event of non-compliance by Israel with this resolution, to 
examine practical ways and means in accordance with relevant provisions of the Charter of the 
United Nations to secure the full implementation of this resolution. 
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Resolution 242 (1967) 
of 22 November 1967 
 
The Security Council, 
 
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East, 
 
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a 
just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security, 
 
Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United 
Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter, 
 
1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting 
peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles: 
 
(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; 
 
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their 
right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force; 
 
2. Affirms further the necessity 
 
(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; 
 
(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; 
 
(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the 
area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones; 
 
3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle 
East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement 
and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions 
and principles in this resolution; 
 
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts 
of the Special Representative as soon as possible. 
 
Adopted unanimously at the 1382nd meeting. 
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Resolution 267 (1969) 
of 3 July 1969 
 
 
The Security Council, 
 
Recalling its resolution 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968 and the earlier General Assembly resolutions 
2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967, respectively, concerning measures and 
actions by Israel affecting the status of the City of Jerusalem, 
 
Having heard the statements of the parties concerned on the question, 
 
Noting that since the adoption of the above-mentioned resolutions Israel has taken further 
measures tending to change the status of the City of Jerusalem, 
 
Reaffirming the established principle that acquisition of territory by military conquest is 
inadmissible, 
 
1. Reaffirms its resolution 252 (1968); 
 
2. Deplores the failure of Israel to show any regard for the resolutions of the General Assembly 
and the Security Council mentioned above; 
 
3. Censures in the strongest terms all measures taken to change the status of the City of 
Jerusalem; 
 
4. Confirms that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel which 
purport to alter the status of Jerusalem, including expropriation of land and properties thereon, 
are invalid and cannot change that status; 
 
5. Urgently calls once more upon Israel to rescind forthwith all measures taken by it which may 
tend to change the status of the City of Jerusalem, and in future to refrain from all actions likely 
to have such an effect; 
 
6. Requests Israel to inform the Security Council without any further delay of its intentions with 
regard to the implementation of the provisions of the present resolution; 
 
7. Determines that, in the event of a negative response or no response from Israel, the Security 
Council shall reconvene without delay to consider what further action should be taken in this 
matter; 
 
8. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of the 
present resolution. 
Adopted unanimously at the 1485th meeting. 
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